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Executive Summary
I. Overview
This report is the first comprehensive study of migrant workers’ access to justice in their 
country of origin. Using the case study of Indonesian migrant workers who travel to 
work in the Middle East, it analyses the mechanisms through which those workers may 
access justice in Indonesia, and the systemic barriers that prevent most workers from 
receiving full redress for harms that they suffer before, during, and after their work 
abroad. It also outlines the laws, policies and procedures that govern the operation of 
each redress mechanism, and analyzes the legal frameworks that govern migrant work-
ers’ relationships with Indonesian private and public actors more generally. Finally, the 
report sets out detailed findings on migrant workers’ access to justice overall, as well as 
findings specific to each redress mechanism. It concludes with recommendations for 
improving access to justice in 11 key areas, addressed to government, parliament, civil 
society, donors, and others. 
The findings and recommendations made in this report are based on interviews 
and focus groups conducted in Indonesia in 2012, involving 75 returned migrant work-
ers and their families, as well as representatives from civil society organizations, gov-
ernment ministries and departments, and migrant worker recruitment and insurance 
companies, as well as legal academics. 
The report is the first in a two part series on migrant workers’ access to justice in 
their countries of origin, with a forthcoming report on Nepal in 2014. 
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II. Indonesian Workers to the Middle East 
Each year, more than half a million Indonesians travel abroad to work for foreign 
employers on two-year labor contracts. Around half go to the Middle East. They are 
typically women, from small cities or villages, with primary school education and lim-
ited prior work experience, and most are hired for domestic work in private households. 
Migrants from all countries performing low-wage work in the Middle East suffer par-
ticularly high levels of abuse and exploitation, in part due to the kafala system which 
bonds a worker to her employer in many Gulf States. Routine harms include unpaid 
wages, unsafe work conditions, inadequate rest, inhumane housing conditions, fun-
damental changes in the nature or conditions of work, the employers’ confiscation of 
the worker’s identity documents, or in some cases, confinement to the home and/or 
physical or sexual abuse. 
When migrant workers’ rights are violated, their access to redress in local courts 
or other institutions in the Middle East is extremely limited. To the extent that an Indo-
nesian worker can access justice at all, it generally depends on (1) access to assistance 
from Indonesian consulates in the destination country, and/or (2) access to redress 
upon return home. Access to justice in countries of origin is also independently impor-
tant. Many of the harms workers experience abroad can be linked to lack of transparency 
and accountability in the privatized recruitment process in the country of origin, as 
well as to failure to provide adequate training and rights-based information to migrants 
pre-departure. Home-based government and private actors therefore often bear or share 
responsibility for worker harms, alongside destination country actors. Indeed, many 
common harms, such as wages or work conditions different to what was promised by 
recruitment agencies in Indonesia, are often violations of the contract signed between 
workers and those agencies. 
III. Migrant Workers’ Access to Justice in Indonesia: 
 Key Findings 
Over the past decade the Indonesian government has sought actively to regulate recruit-
ment and placement of workers overseas, and has developed processes and programs to 
enable migrant workers to access redress in Indonesia. During this time the Indonesian 
government has expanded its protection responsibilities for migrant workers, including 
those made available through its consulates. Further domestic law reform efforts are 
under way, and 2012 saw Indonesia’s historic ratification of the UN Migrant Worker 
Convention.1
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Despite these promising efforts, significant challenges persist. Most migrant 
workers and civil society participants in this study expressed frustration, disappoint-
ment, and a general view that the vast majority of migrant workers cannot access justice 
in Indonesia. Some of the study’s specific findings are summarized below.
A. Findings on the Four Indonesia-based Redress Mechanisms:
1. Administrative Dispute Resolution : non-enforceable government-facilitated negoti-
ation with a recruitment agency or insurer, culminating in “mediation.” Although 
this is the most accessible mechanism, redress is undermined by lack of stan-
dardized procedures and unclear agency functions, lack of transparency, an un-
remedied power imbalance between workers and recruiters/insurers, untrained 
government mediators, and no appeals, complaints or enforcement procedures.
2. Migrant Worker Insurance Scheme: a mandatory scheme, run by private insurance 
consortiums, intended to compensate workers for harms prior to departure and 
while abroad. In practice, the insurance system provides very limited redress to 
the majority of workers because of low worker awareness of their insured status, 
claims procedures that are unfamiliar and inaccessible to most migrant workers, 
and coverage exclusions and documentation requirements inappropriate to the 
realities of migrant work. 
3. Indonesian Judicial System: civil (e.g., contract disputes) and criminal (e.g., fraud, 
trafficking) cases against private individuals and agencies involved in recruitment. 
Very few cases have been brought (including strategic litigation), due to systemic 
barriers such as the costs, time, expertise and evidence required, as well as per-
ceived judicial bias/corruption. 
4. Embassy and Consulate Assistance: assistance to access redress or obtain evidence 
while the worker is abroad, and upon return home. The mechanism most familiar 
to workers, but also most criticized for inadequate resourcing, lack of expertise 
in relevant Indonesian and destination country laws and processes, and lack of 
standardized transparent procedures.
B. Overall Findings on Migrant Workers’ Access to Justice in Indonesia
• Indonesia’s labor migration laws do not enable workers to access justice. Most 
statutory rights and obligations lack accountable actors and enforcement mecha-
nisms, and laws do not focus on worker redress or recruiter accountability for 
preventing and redressing worker harms. 
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• Migrant workers should, by law, have substantial contractual rights within their 
agreements with private recruitment agencies, employers and insurers. However, 
those rights are not always included in contracts, and are in any case under-
recognized by all actors (including by migrant workers and their representatives), 
and are under-enforced.
• The most frequently used redress mechanisms often yield unsatisfactory or unfair 
outcomes for workers, in part because the mechanisms lack standardized proce-
dures, transparency and meaningful oversight.
• Implementation and accountability gaps exist due to overlapping responsibilities 
between the Ministry of Manpower, the labor migration agency under the Presi-
dent (BNP2TKI), and private sector actors, as well as between different levels of 
government (national and local). 
• Migrant workers face numerous barriers to accessing justice common to all mech-
anisms:
 – Inadequate information regarding their rights and the procedures for access-
ing redress in the destination country and upon return to Indonesia.
 – Challenging evidentiary and documentation requirements for claims, made 
worse by inappropriate hurdles to obtaining replacement documents.
 – Centralization of redress mechanisms, recruitment agencies, insurers and 
government agencies in Jakarta, resulting in practical, financial, and psycho-
logical obstacles to access.
 – Necessity of legal assistance for most redress mechanisms, and its limited 
availability.
 – Inadequate and non-transparent regulation of recruitment agencies, and lack 
of government oversight of village-level brokers.
 – Perceptions that government, insurers, and recruiters do not value worker 
concerns.
 – Corruption, or perceptions of corruption, associated with mechanisms and 
documentation. 
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IV. Recommendations
Improving access to justice for migrant workers requires reforming the specific redress 
mechanisms available to migrant workers, and considering new mechanisms. It also 
requires changes to the labor migration system overall, including increased transpar-
ency and more effective oversight and regulation to hold all public and private actors 
within the system to greater account. This is primarily a task for Indonesia’s parlia-
ment and government, but other actors, including non-government organizations, the 
legal and academic community, and the donor community, can play important roles in 
advocating, guiding, and supporting needed reforms and providing direct assistance to 
migrant workers seeking to access these systems. 
Accordingly, the report makes the following recommendations to Indonesia’s 
government:
• In the current labor migration law reform process, emphasize transparency across 
the labor migration system and private sector accountability (of recruitment agen-
cies, brokers, insurers, and others), and ensure that effective pathways exist for 
Indonesian migrant workers to access justice. This includes clarifying legal rights 
and responsibilities of all actors, and establishing clearly defined enforcement and 
redress procedures for breaches of existing statutory and contractual obligations.
• Decentralize key mechanisms including the insurance claims process and gov-
ernment-facilitated administrative dispute resolution in a manner that enables 
workers to effectively access redress throughout Indonesia. 
• Administrative Dispute Resolution. Standardize procedures and make them trans-
parent. Task mediators with facilitating fair outcomes in light of the parties’ 
contractual and statutory responsibilities, and train mediators accordingly. Also 
establish a complaints mechanism and appeals process, and require Ministry of 
Manpower investigations and sanctions for serious or repeat recruitment agency 
violations identified in administrative dispute resolution claims.
• Migrant Worker Insurance Program. Reform both the structure and operation of 
the program based on quality empirical data and expert analysis. Make the claims 
process simpler and more transparent, and require the insurer to meet a pay-out 
ratio that reflects appropriate coverage of the most common risks to migrant 
workers at all stages of the migration process. The new consortiums should have 
stricter compliance requirements for their ongoing appointment. 
• Embassies and Consulates. Increase resources and training to: provide competent 
legal assistance to workers in the destination country; conduct more rigorous 
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evaluations of destination-country recruitment agencies and employers, and make 
information available to workers pre-departure; and advise workers on redress 
processes in Indonesia, and advise and assist them to obtain necessary evidence 
while still abroad. Embassy complaint-handling processes should also be more 
standardized, transparent, responsive, and geographically accessible. 
• Regulate recruitment agencies more effectively, including through more rigorous 
government oversight and transparent licensing procedures that require ongo-
ing compliance with worker protection and redress responsibilities. In addition, 
establish procedures for migrant workers and civil society to lodge complaints 
that trigger investigations and sanctions.
• Regulate village-level brokers, either through recruitment agencies or indepen-
dently. 
• In collaboration with the private sector, establish a process for migrant workers to 
easily obtain copies of their placement agreement, employment contract, insur-
ance card, and other documents needed to pursue claims for redress, and elimi-
nate opportunities for corruption or obstruction by recruiters, brokers or insurers.
Government, law schools, the legal profession, civil society organizations and 
donors should work together to expand the availability of competent and affordable legal 
assistance to migrant workers. This includes enabling access to government-funded 
legal aid and developing law school clinical programs and labor migration courses, as 
well as improving training and capacity of lawyers and paralegals to advise and repre-
sent migrant workers within Indonesian redress mechanisms, and possibly to advise 
on basic destination country law.
Civil society, legal academics, and government should also partner to develop 
high-quality, accessible resources and training for migrant workers, the private sector 
and government. This should include resources on legal rights and responsibilities of 
migrant workers, recruiters, insurers, and each government ministry/agency, as well 
as resources on procedures and documents required to seek redress through insurance 
or other Indonesia-based mechanisms. 
Finally, donors should support academics and civil society to engage in further 
empirical and legal research to fill critical data gaps, as well as to develop strategic litiga-
tion to test and enforce migrant workers’ contractual rights, and to enforce Indonesia’s 
international human rights obligations. 
All reform initiatives should be developed in close consultation with civil society 
representatives and migrant workers, and implemented with the goals of furthering 
transparency and accountability and ameliorating barriers to accessing justice. 
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V.  Conclusion
Many of the challenges to migrant workers’ access to redress detailed in this report 
are not unique to Indonesia, or to migrants travelling to the Middle East. Countries of 
origin, and the various stakeholders within them, have much to learn from each other’s 
efforts (and failures) to address these challenges. It is hoped that this report provides 
an empirical foundation for those discussions, as well as providing an evidence-based 
foundation for advocacy and law reform within Indonesia. It may also function as a 
manual of sorts, to enable Indonesian civil society to better understand, use, and test 
existing justice mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
1.A Origin Countries and Access to Justice 
 for Migrant Workers
Global labor migration has increased exponentially during the past 20 years. Approxi-
mately 90 million migrant workers now provide essential services in domestic work, 
care-giving, construction, agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing, and the service indus-
try.2 Some of these workers travel through official government-sanctioned channels, 
some travel without the requisite immigration and labor permits (i.e., irregularly), and 
others move between statuses as their work or visa situation changes. Throughout the 
world, private commercial agencies, private brokers, and employers in origin and des-
tination countries perform the vast majority of recruitment and placement of low-wage 
migrant workers.
Low-wage labor migration raises complex human rights and labor rights con-
cerns, including treatment of noncitizens; equality and nondiscrimination based on 
race, ethnicity, and gender; rights to decent work and to a decent standard of living; and 
corporate human rights responsibilities. Low-wage migrant workers routinely encoun-
ter harms such as unpaid wages, unsafe work conditions, inadequate rest, inhumane 
housing conditions, or employers’ confiscation of their identity documents.3 Accounts 
of exploitation, abuse, human trafficking, debt bondage, and other severe human rights 
problems are not uncommon.
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To date, international advocacy efforts to seek redress for low-wage labor migrants 
have primarily focused on destination countries and actors within those countries: it is 
in the countries of work that temporary workers often experience direct and egregious 
human rights violations at the hands of unscrupulous employers. As a result, however, 
policy makers, human rights advocates, and donors at the international level have paid 
less attention to the critical role that countries of origin may play in enabling migrant 
workers’ access to justice. 
The special vulnerability of migrant workers stems not only from their circum-
stances in destination countries. The conditions that give rise to the exploitation, labor 
rights violations, and other problems that migrant workers encounter often begin at 
the point of recruitment and persist through their return home as they are frustrated 
in their attempts to secure access to justice, accountability, and a remedy for the harms 
they suffered.4 Indeed, many of these harms can be linked to the lack of transparency 
and accountability in the privatized recruitment process, and the inadequacy of pre-
departure training and rights-based education that migrants receive. Many harms that 
occur abroad also breach the contracts that workers sign with recruitment agencies at 
home, and are also covered by private insurance policies that workers must purchase 
before departing abroad. Workers’ access to affordable and efficient redress mecha-
nisms within countries of origin is therefore especially important, appropriate, and 
often required by international law.
In many destination countries, particularly in the Middle East, opportunities to 
seek redress and to systemically improve access to justice are limited. The supply of 
migrant labor is greater than the demand, and many destination countries see little 
incentive to better regulate and enforce regulations protecting migrant workers, par-
ticularly those with limited social and political capital. 
Countries of origin and the private actors operating within them profit signifi-
cantly from workers’ remittances, recruitment, and insurance costs. Indeed, in 2012, 
global remittances from migrant workers to their origin countries amounted to $534 
billion—triple the amount of global development aid.5 This has positive and negative 
consequences. On the one hand, it incentivises income maximization at the expense of 
worker protection. On the other, it creates longer-term incentives to ensure that labor 
migration is effectively regulated and that workers can access justice, for example to 
receive wages to which they are entitled or compensation for injuries. 
For all of these reasons, there is now a pressing need to examine migrant workers’ 
access to justice within their countries of origin and to identify paths to improvement, 
alongside efforts to strengthen access to redress in destination countries. 
Indonesia provides an ideal case study for understanding the challenges that 
migrant workers face in obtaining access to justice in their origin country, and the 
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promising opportunities for improvement. Indonesia is one of the largest migrant-
sending countries in Southeast Asia. It is currently reforming its domestic labor migra-
tion regulatory framework, and recently ratified the UN Migrant Worker Convention,6 
becoming one of only three countries in Southeast Asia to do so.7 Its civil society 
organizations are becoming increasingly engaged in the protection of migrant worker 
rights, and have formed coalitions to jointly advocate for better protection of Indonesian 
migrant workers under domestic and international law. Indonesia’s efforts to increase 
transparency and accountability within the private sector, and to address corruption, 
may also offer valuable lessons for improving regulation of the privatized recruitment 
and insurance industries that serve migrant workers. And the demonstrated interest 
of international organizations and donors in supporting these efforts by government 
and civil society creates possibilities for trials and innovation to systemically improve 
migrant workers’ access to justice at home. Finally, many of the challenges to migrant 
workers’ access to redress in Indonesia, and the conditions that give rise to them, are 
not unique. Countries of origin, and civil society within them, have much to learn from 
each other’s efforts (and failures) to address these challenges, and it is hoped that this 
report provides a foundation for those discussions.
1.B Overview of Report and Research Method
This report is one of two case studies within a larger study–the first of its kind–that com-
prehensively examines migrant workers’ access to redress within countries of origin. A 
second report will focus on Nepal, the country in Asia that receives the largest volume 
of remittances in proportion to GDP. 
 Report Overview
The report provides an in-depth examination of the mechanisms available to migrant 
workers seeking redress in Indonesia. It identifies migrant workers’ key legal rights 
under domestic laws, private contracts, and international law. It also clarifies the legal 
obligations of government, recruitment agencies, private insurers, and others, to redress 
the harms that workers suffer. And it provides an overview of the legal and institutional 
framework that governs labor migration in Indonesia, as relevant to the enforcement of 
worker rights and accessing justice.
The case studies of both Indonesia and Nepal focus on migrant workers who 
travel to the Middle East. The “Asia-Middle East corridor” is one of today’s most-travelled 
and fastest-growing migration corridors. Labor migration to the region, particularly to 
the Gulf countries, is almost all temporary contractual migration, in which workers 
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are bonded to their employers through the kafala system. As a result, workers in the 
region suffer particularly high levels of abuse and exploitation, and a number of Middle 
Eastern countries have received considerable criticism for failing to protect the rights of 
their significant migrant worker populations. Migrant workers’ access to redress in local 
courts or other institutions is generally extremely limited. Because of these challenges, 
the ability to access justice in one’s home country is particularly important for migrants 
to the Gulf and wider Middle East. 
Drawing on documentary sources and interviews, focus groups, and roundtables 
with migrant workers and a range of other stakeholders, both reports aim to fill critical 
information gaps pertaining to access to justice within countries of origin, while also 
highlighting areas for further study. They examine in detail the means by which labor 
migrants from specific origin countries access informal, administrative, commercial, 
and court-based justice mechanisms, against an overlay of the current domestic and 
international legal frameworks that regulate migrant laborers and establish legal rights 
and obligations.
This first report demonstrates that Indonesia, like other countries of origin in 
Asia, has made some efforts to improve protections for its nationals who travel abroad 
for low-wage work, including establishing specific redress mechanisms for migrant 
workers who experience problems in Indonesia or abroad. However, it also reveals a 
lack of clarity and knowledge across all sectors, both among implementers and users 
of these mechanisms, regarding the operation of the legal framework, the rights of 
migrant workers, and available avenues for accessing justice. 
This report works to fill that knowledge gap, in order to inform medium and 
long-term systemic change in Indonesia and beyond. Taken together, the two reports 
also aim to catalyze dialogue among stakeholders across countries of origin and glob-
ally about ways to strengthen migrant workers’ access to justice. Ultimately, the detailed 
case studies contained in these two reports will contribute to the development of new 
transnational strategies for protecting and fulfilling the human rights of the more than 
one million migrant workers who leave their homes in South and Southeast Asia every 
year for work in the Middle East, at all stages of the migratory process.8
Research Method
The findings of this study are based on field research in Indonesia, as well as analysis 
of laws, regulations, academic literature, and other secondary sources in both English 
and Bahasa Indonesia.9 The field research took place between January and July 2012.10 
It began with a roundtable in Jakarta in January 2012 on key pathways and obstacles to 
migrant workers’ access to redress.11 Twenty-three individuals participated, including 
scholars of law and women’s rights, civil society organizations, and private lawyers. 
The chairperson of the National Commission on Violence Against Women chaired 
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the roundtable. During this visit, researchers also met government representatives in 
Jakarta who were not formally involved in the study, but who provided background 
information about the migration process for Indonesian migrant workers.
The roundtable was followed by in-depth interviews and focus groups with 75 
returned migrant men and women and their families. Thirty-nine experts and stake-
holders were also interviewed about the structure, operation, and effectiveness of spe-
cific mechanisms for obtaining justice. These experts included government officials at 
both national and regional offices, migrant workers,12 and representatives of civil society 
organizations ranging from national advocacy organizations to small local groups that 
provided “case handling” assistance to workers (see Annexure 2 for participant break-
down, and Annexure 3 for a full list of interviewees). 
Focus groups provided the views of migrants and their families on their efforts 
to seek justice, and perceptions of the system. Discussion was wide-ranging, and data 
collected was qualitative (personal experiences, opinions) rather than quantitative (such 
as numbers of persons who tried a certain mechanism). The focus groups were held at 
five locations across four provinces—West, Central and East Java, and West Nusa Teng-
gara—that are responsible for sending three-quarters of all migrants who travel abroad 
each year.13 The towns selected were known by local organizations to send workers spe-
cifically to the Middle East. Seven focus groups were held in total: two groups in Suka-
bumi and East Lombok sub-districts and one in each other district (see Annexure 2). 
Focus group participants were either:
• Former migrant workers who had experienced problems during the process of 
migrating (or applying to migrate) to the Middle East for work—including before, 
during or after work abroad—and who had returned since 2009; or
• Family members of migrant workers who met the above conditions or who were 
still abroad at the time of the focus group.
Local civil society organizations in the district capitals played a central role, 
including identifying suitable participants and inviting them to the focus groups. Many 
workers felt somewhat reluctant to join a focus group and share details about their expe-
riences with others, and the organizations supported workers to feel safe in this envi-
ronment. In many cases, the organizations had helped these women and men migrant 
workers, and those migrant workers recommended other people to join (snowball sam-
pling). On these organizations’ recommendation, the focus groups also included family 
members; in many cases it was family members who had used various mechanisms in 
Indonesia on behalf of a migrant worker abroad, or had assisted the worker after return.
This report is qualitative in nature and therefore rich in detail and experience, 
but does not purport to be representative of all migrant workers or other participants. It 
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also takes a broad approach to access to justice, looking at all mechanisms and users of 
the system. While this is useful in identifying key issues and barriers, further detailed 
research on particular mechanisms would be useful. Similarly, the study could not, for 
reasons of time and space, investigate the experiences of particular groups of migrants 
such as women or irregular migrants, and the impact of gender and status on the 
migrants’ experiences and ability to access justice. These would be valuable follow-up 
studies. 
1.C International law and a Rights-Based Approach 
 to Labor Migration 
In considering access to justice for migrant workers, this report first takes a human 
rights approach: it looks not just at the laws and mechanisms in place to provide redress 
to migrant workers, but also examines how those laws and mechanisms ultimately serve 
the individual migrant worker’s realization and enjoyment of rights. It views migrant 
workers as rights-holders, and seeks to identify the specific entities that are responsible 
for fulfilling those rights—be they government agencies and ministries, private recruit-
ment agencies, insurers or others. Finally, the report draws on human rights established 
in the international treaties to which Indonesia is a party, alongside other statutory and 
contractual sources of migrant worker rights. 
International Human Rights Instruments and Labor Migration
As the international community has grown increasingly aware of the special vulner-
abilities of migrant workers, it has developed new instruments for protecting and pro-
moting migrant worker rights, such as the U.N. Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (the CMW).14 The CMW 
provides guidance on the applicability to migrant workers of existing human rights 
treaty provisions, aimed at protecting and promoting the free and equal enjoyment 
of rights and dignity. The committee overseeing the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (the CEDAW Committee) has also 
specifically addressed the human rights concerns of women migrants through Gen-
eral Recommendation 26 on Women Migrant Workers, noting that women experience 
human rights violations during all stages of migration. Other international treaties place 
specific responsibilities on origin countries to protect migrants from illegal practices of 
discrimination, exploitation, and abuse.
Regional organizations have also created their own normative frameworks. 
Within South East Asia, for example, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Declaration on the 
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Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers at the 12th ASEAN Summit 
(Jan. 2007).15 Efforts are underway among the South East Asia National Human Rights 
Institutions Forum to support and develop an ASEAN Instrument on Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, in furtherance of this Declaration.16 And 
the “Dhaka Declaration” focused on migration with dignity was adopted in 2011 by the 
Colombo Process, a regional ministerial consultation process on labor migration for 
countries of origins in Asia.17
 Origin Country Obligations Regarding Access to Justice and Related 
Rights
Indonesia has ratified a number of international conventions pertaining to the rights of 
migrants and workers (Annexure 1). International human rights law imposes on states 
the obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil the human rights of all persons within their 
jurisdiction. With regard to countries of origin vis-à-vis their obligations to their citizens 
traveling abroad for work, this requires taking affirmative measures at the outset to pro-
tect the rights of their migrant workers. This includes, for example, effectively regulat-
ing the recruitment process, and ensuring redress when the rights of migrant workers 
are violated. Access to justice thus becomes a critical component of ensuring not just 
transparency and accountability in the labor migration system, but also the ultimate 
fulfilment of the rights of the individual worker and her family members. 
The CMW identifies a specific obligation on origin countries to provide access to 
justice to migrant workers whose rights have been violated (Article 83). Indeed, access 
to justice, or access to redress, is a basic human right across all of the core interna-
tional human rights treaties. Victims of human rights violations have an explicit right 
to equal access to the courts and to an effective remedy, determined by a competent and 
independent tribunal, for rights violations. Furthermore, those rights must be enjoyed 
equally among all people without discrimination. This right is also reflected or implied 
in many national constitutions. For example, Indonesia’s Constitution states in Article 
28D(1): “each person has a right to recognition, security, protection and certainty under 
the law.”18
In addition to the specific obligation to ensure access to redress, origin countries 
have relevant obligations regarding the provision of information and documentation 
to migrant workers. As this study of Indonesia reveals, lack of information and lack of 
documents are frequent barriers to migrant workers accessing justice, and are also a 
contributing factor to other rights violations. The CMW provides that origin country 
governments have an obligation to inform prospective migrant workers of:
• All working conditions and requirements they must satisfy in the state of employ-
ment before their departure (Article 37). 
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• Their rights arising out of the CMW (Article 33(a)); and,
• The conditions of their admission and their rights and obligations under the law 
and practice of the state of employment (Article 33(b)).
It further requires origin country governments to adopt measures against the dis-
semination of misleading information relating to emigration and immigration (Article 
68). Among other things, this means that a state-party to the CMW such as Indonesia 
has an affirmative obligation to guard against migrants being placed in positions in 
which the terms and conditions of their work differ significantly from what they had 
been promised at the time of recruitment. Migrant workers must also be protected from 
the confiscation of their documents (Article 21). Finally, the CMW aims to create inter-
national and inter-state cooperation, consultation, and information sharing regarding 
the flow of migration, and calls upon state parties to collaborate.19
The CEDAW Committee has critiqued practices common in origin countries 
including detention of women by recruitment agencies during training, failure to pro-
vide information on migration, exploitative fees, and bans or restrictions on women’s 
out-migration which contribute to the abuses endured by migrant women.20 It specifi-
cally recommends that countries of origin:
• Provide comprehensive education on the migration process, including education 
specific to the contents of the labor contracts, legal rights, and entitlements within 
the countries of work, and procedures for accessing formal and informal justice 
mechanisms; 
• Require recruitment agencies to participate in training programs on women 
migrant workers’ rights and recruitment agency obligations toward women 
migrant workers; 
• Provide a list of reliable recruitment agencies, and implement accreditation pro-
grams to ensure good practices among recruitment agencies; 
• Establish clear regulations and monitoring systems to protect female migrants, 
including to ensure that recruitment agencies protect women migrant workers’ 
rights, including legal sanctions for breaches of the law by recruitment agencies; 
• Safeguard the remittances of women migrant workers; and, 
• Facilitate and ensure the right to return, services to women upon return, and 
other protections.21
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: INDONESIA  31
1.D Defining and Assessing Access to Justice
As well as being a fundamental human right guaranteed to all people, access to justice 
serves several important legal, normative, and practical functions. It is essential for 
enforcement of contractual rights, particularly relevant to migrant workers who enter 
into private contracts with recruitment agencies, insurers, and sometimes employers 
over the course of the migration process. It strengthens the rule of law by increas-
ing transparency and ensuring accountability of private and government actors, often 
addressing systemic gaps in rights protections. It can encourage future good behavior 
by state and private actors, and increase individuals’ faith and participation in public life 
and institutions. Financial redress can enable workers to escape the cycle of debt and 
poverty that makes them vulnerable to further exploitation and abuse. And of course, it 
achieves the ultimate aim of providing justice to individuals who have been wronged.
“Access to justice” is a large field of inquiry, with numerous competing definitions 
and frameworks. The American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, for example, 
emphasizes the importance of institutions:
  Access to justice means that citizens are able to use justice institutions to obtain solutions 
to their common justice problems. For access to justice to exist, justice institutions must 
function effectively to provide fair solutions to citizens’ justice problems.22
The World Bank takes a broader development-based view that recognizes social 
and economic injustice. It considers equality, access to decision-makers, and both for-
mal and informal “systems” (rather than institutions) for accessing justice. It defines 
access to justice as: 
  Access by people, in particular from poor and disadvantaged groups to fair, effective and 
accountable mechanisms for the protection of rights, control of abuse of power and resolu-
tion of conflicts. This includes the ability of people to seek and obtain a remedy through 
formal and informal justice systems, and the ability to seek and exercise influence on law-
making and law-implementing processes and institutions.23
This report takes an intermediate position. It reviews both formal and informal 
avenues for accessing justice but pays particular attention to the laws and institutions 
that enable and implement these pathways, as well as to their place in the overall legal 
and institutional frameworks governing migrant labor in Indonesia. In addition, it con-
siders perceptions regarding the implementation of the mechanisms or processes. 
To assess the effectiveness of these mechanisms, the study draws on lists of indi-
cators created by various international institutions to identify a set of core indicators.24 
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It then assesses the legal framework and the perspectives of users of each mechanism 
against these indicators. These indicators include:
1. The clarity of the legal framework; 
2. Citizen and institutional actors’ awareness of the mechanism(s) and its proce-
dures; 
3. The accessibility of those mechanisms, in terms of geography, cost, language, 
duration, complexity, need for representation, and other potential barriers; 
4. The fairness of procedures governing access to those mechanisms and due pro-
cess; and, 
5. The perceived justness of outcomes that the mechanism provides. 
As UNDP has outlined, efforts to increase access to justice should focus on 
removing impediments to access, with clear identification of “claims holders” or ben-
eficiaries, and “duty bearers,” as well as an assessment of capacity gaps. It also notes, 
though, that access to justice is, “much more than improving an individual’s access to 
courts, or guaranteeing legal representation. It must be defined in terms of ensuring 
that legal and judicial outcomes are just and equitable.”25 As far as possible, this report 
also highlights the duty bearers of particular rights, the extent to which those actors are 
held accountable by particular mechanisms, and ultimately whether just and equitable 
outcomes are achieved.
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2. Indonesian Workers to the 
 Middle East: A Case Study
2.A Indonesian Labor Migration
Indonesia established a government-sponsored overseas migrant labor program in 1970 
under the Suharto New Order Regime as a way to reduce domestic unemployment and 
attract foreign exchange. Today, the country sends more laborers abroad than any other 
Southeast Asian nation apart from the Philippines, with over half a million workers 
officially departing each year. As of May 2012, 2.4 million Indonesians were officially 
recorded as migrant workers abroad, with an unknown number working unofficially.26
The vast majority of these workers are women who work in the domestic sector as 
cooks, cleaners, childcare providers, or eldercare workers in private households. Experi-
ences at work and access to justice for Indonesian migrant workers are also, therefore, 
strongly gendered issues. They are shaped by the treatment of women both in Indonesia 
and abroad, including for example women’s differential access to education and labor 
markets, and the (lack of) social respect and legal protection given to “women’s work” 
in the home. 
Like workers from other countries of origin, many Indonesian migrant workers 
experience problems while working abroad, and cases of severe abuse are frequently 
reported by the Indonesian media. Arrivals records maintained by the Indonesian gov-
ernment reveal that each year tens of thousands of returnees report having “experienced 
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a problem”—14.5 percent of all returnees in 2011 and 18 percent in 2010 (the numbers 
of unreported problems are likely far higher). This equates to tens of thousands of 
problems reported per year, a significant challenge to any institutional redress mecha-
nisms in Indonesia or abroad, and does not include those who experience problems in 
Indonesia pre-departure and post-return. 
2.B Indonesian Labor Migration to the Middle East
The Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, has been a significant destination for Indo-
nesian migrant workers since Indonesia began its labor migration program. The first 
workers left for Saudi Arabia following the oil boom in the Gulf in the 1970s to meet 
sky-rocketing demand for low-wage labor. Today workers continue to travel to the region 
for a variety of reasons. Returned migrant workers in this study spoke of the pre-depar-
ture procedures being faster and more affordable for Middle East countries than other 
destinations in East and Southeast Asia. They also noted the region’s cultural and spiri-
tual significance for Indonesian Muslims. Expert interviewees in the study believed that 
Muslim women continue to choose Saudi Arabia above geographically closer countries 
in the hope that they will have the opportunity to see the holy city of Mecca and com-
plete the Haj. Indonesian scholars note a common perception that the Middle East is 
a “Land of Hope,” but add that workers have very little understanding of the social and 
cultural context before departure, and so are surprised by the “heavy work and long 
hours that are the reality they must face” on arrival.27
Around a third to a half of Indonesian migrant workers departing abroad each 
year travel to the Middle East (see Figure 1). The official numbers have declined since 
the introduction of moratoriums on labor migration to several Middle East countries 
in 2009 and 2010 (discussed below) but remain significant. In May 2012, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs reported that 861,000 Indonesian migrant workers were registered 
as living in the Middle East region.28 Many others are believed to be working in the 
Middle East unofficially. 
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 FIGURE 1: Approvals by the Ministry of Manpower for Indonesians to Work Abroad 2006–2011, 
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Saudi Arabia remains by far the most popular destination for Indonesian migrant 
workers in the Middle East (see Figure 2). However, other destinations in the region 
have opened up in recent years and many migrant workers travel to more than one 
country.29
 FIGURE 2: Middle East Destinations for Indonesian Migrant Workers, 2006–2011
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There is limited data on the specific demographics of Indonesian workers in 
the Middle East, but government data suggests migrant workers to the region are 
overwhelmingly female (95 percent on average across countries in the region) and are 
mostly employed as domestic workers in private households.30
A small study of workers who returned from the Gulf found that most were young 
(51 percent were under 21 the first time they migrated for work), had very low levels of 
education and literacy (56 percent had elementary school or lower), and had no previ-
ous work experience outside the home.31 Anecdotal evidence from migrant workers 
and civil society organizations that participated in this study was consistent with these 
findings, indicating that the women who travel abroad generally, and to the Middle East 
specifically, are invariably from rural areas and have little or no formal work experience 
before departure. Muslim women may speak basic Arabic before departure, but usu-
ally the learning curve upon arrival is steep.32 Civil society groups generally expressed 
the view in this study that less educated workers chose to go to the Middle East, where 
education was not required by overseas recruiters, whereas workers with higher levels 
of education (junior high school and above) went to Hong Kong, Singapore, or Taiwan. 
These intersecting vulnerabilities—gender, youth, little formal work experience, 
and low levels of education—make the barriers to accessing justice even greater for 
workers who travel to the Middle East. Indeed, this study shows that Indonesian migrant 
workers in the Middle East face more difficulties generally than migrant workers travel-
ing to other regions. Experts perceived this group as encountering more frequent prob-
lems, and problems of a more serious nature, than workers to the Asia Pacific region 
(see section 4.B below for discussion of these harms). In addition, the structure and 
procedures for the recruitment of Indonesian migrant workers make obtaining redress 
for harms more challenging. Because recruitment and processing of workers to the 
Middle East is highly centralized in Jakarta, workers are often connected directly with 
recruiters in the capital via brokers, thus circumventing local checks and protections 
and requiring workers to travel farther from their homes for pre-departure prepara-
tions. Circumvention of local checks can result in inadequate training, information, 
and documentation for workers. Workers to the Middle East are thus more vulnerable 
abroad and more likely to have negative experiences. Upon workers’ return, the location 
of recruiters in the capital creates even greater challenges to seeking redress. 
2.C Migrant Workers’ Access to Justice in Indonesia
Although the challenges faced by Indonesian migrant workers are well known to many 
Indonesians, the strategies that workers use, or could use, to resolve these challenges 
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are less understood. A common perception, demonstrated in at least one localized study, 
is that most migrant workers do not try to access justice at all. Rather, they rely on 
informal advice from fellow migrants, particularly those who are known to have been 
successful in confronting a recruiter or other party directly.33 
This reflects the situation for Indonesians generally. Indonesia’s justice system 
presents many challenges to access, particularly for poorer segments of society. Large 
studies of access to justice across Indonesia have shown that awareness of legal rights 
among the general population (not just migrant workers) is generally low; and that 
most people prefer informal mechanisms or traditional dispute resolution to the over-
burdened judicial and courts system.34 Women in particular have been found to, “face 
serious constraints accessing the formal justice system,” including trouble meeting 
financial costs and potentially social exclusion.35 Less is known, however, about how the 
international and highly regulated nature of migrant work interacts with these broader 
challenges in Indonesia.
Given this, the Indonesia-based research combined various data sources to assess 
migrant workers’ access to justice, beginning with identifying the key mechanisms 
available, their basis in law and policy, and their operation in practice. This study shows 
that Indonesia has several semi-formal mechanisms through which migrant workers 
might seek redress, in addition to the judicial system. These mechanisms include 
administrative dispute resolution and an insurance scheme in Indonesia, as well as 
assistance through Indonesia’s embassies and consulates abroad. Indonesia does not 
have a specialized tribunal for resolving disputes between migrant workers and recruit-
ers, brokers, or employers.
Almost uniformly, the many participants in this study were pessimistic about 
migrant workers’ prospects of redress for harms suffered in Indonesia or abroad. 
Participants from outside of government were highly critical of the existing legal and 
institutional frameworks governing overseas labor migration, and frustrated with their 
application. Some civil society representatives viewed the system as corrupt and extor-
tionate. Participants within government had more faith in the system but appeared con-
strained in their ability to assist migrants by bureaucracy and institutional in-fighting. 
Nevertheless, several recent developments in Indonesia may give rise to new pos-
sibilities for innovation and improvement in the resolution of migrant worker problems 
in Indonesia. For example, the government recently introduced the National Strategy 
on Access to Justice, which recognizes the importance of access to justice for poverty 
reduction and has been incorporated into the country’s 2010–2014 development plan.36 
The Indonesian legislative body is also in the process of reviewing the national laws on 
labor migration, in the wake of the country’s historic ratification of the Migrant Worker 
Convention.
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3. Legal & Institutional 
 Frameworks Governing 
 Indonesian Labor Migration
3.A Legal Framework 
Indonesia has regulated labor migration for almost 40 years. Early regulations gov-
erning labor recruitment and placement were adopted by Ministerial decree in the 
1970s, during the Suharto Era.37 These decrees were aimed primarily at maximizing 
the number of workers sent abroad, and included very few protections for workers. In 
1999, soon after the fall of President Suharto, the minister of manpower passed the 
first reformation-era decree on overseas migrant workers.38 The decree established the 
broad framework for migrant labor that exists today, i.e., an essentially private enterprise 
overseen by the state. The legal framework has expanded considerably since the 1999 
decree (itself no longer in force).
In 2004, the Indonesian Parliament (DPR) enacted the first national labor migra-
tion law. Law 39/2004 on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers 
Abroad is now the central governing instrument of the labor migration system. It focuses 
on governance and administration; institutional powers and responsibilities; licensing 
requirements for recruitment agencies; administrative requirements to travel abroad; 
and pre-departure processes. It also establishes a small set of migrant worker rights. 
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The minister of manpower has passed numerous implementing regulations 
related to Law 39/2004. These include:
• Regulation 7/2010 on Insurance for Migrant Workers;39
• Regulation 14/2010 on the Implementation of Placement and Protection of 
Migrant Workers, expanding on recruitment procedures for recruitment compa-
nies and pre-departure documentation and preparation of workers;40 and,
• Regulation 12/2011 on Labor Attachés Overseas, which places ministry staff in 
embassies abroad to assist migrant workers.41
In early 2013, the president also adopted a whole-of-government regulation, 
Government Regulation 3/2013, regarding Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers 
Abroad. This regulation sets out a protection framework for migrant workers, clarifying 
the role of each government department prior to departure, during overseas placement, 
and upon return.
As well as national-level laws and regulations, Indonesia has 33 provinces and 402 
districts (regencies) that may pass regional regulations (Peraturan Daerah, known as 
Perda) to regulate matters within their jurisdiction. A number of local jurisdictions have 
passed Perda relating to labor migration, particularly regulating pre-departure activities 
in their district or province. Three district-level Perda from West Nusa Tenggara Prov-
ince are reviewed in this study.42 Perda are subordinate to any national legislation on 
the same topic.43 And they are only practically useful for migrant workers if the relevant 
recruitment agency is headquartered in that jurisdiction (the head office is responsible 
for the activities of its branches).44 For migrants to the Middle East, Perda do not gener-
ally provide additional protections because, as noted above, the recruitment agencies 
that send workers to the Middle East are all centralized in Jakarta and are presumed to 
be outside the jurisdictional reach of the district level Perda. 
Jurisdiction over recruitment agencies might be achieved through local brokers, 
but brokers are not currently recognized in the law or given independent legal status, 
and are not mentioned in the local regulations that this study examined. Regulation of 
local brokers and the nature of their legal relationship with recruitment agencies war-
rants further study (see discussion of brokers below). 
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Who can be a Migrant Worker?
Anyone in Indonesia can apply to be a migrant worker, free of charge, pro-
vided they meet the following conditions:45
• Are at least 18 years of age, proven by birth certificate and national iden-
tity card;
• Have a letter from a medical practitioner stating that the prospective 
worker is in good health, and not pregnant (for female migrant workers);
• Have a letter of permission from the prospective worker’s husband or 
wife if married, and parent or guardian if not, witnessed by the local vil-
lage head;
• Have a job-seeker card obtained after registering at a local manpower 
office as a job seeker; and,
• Possess the qualifications or have the education level required by the 
employer.46
Manpower offices at the local level are responsible for ensuring applicants 
meet these criteria,47 and recruitment agencies may impose their own addi-
tional criteria such as literacy,48 based on specific employers’ needs. 
After satisfying these criteria and being accepted for a position by a recruit-
ment agency, the worker must then fulfill further requirements, including:
 • Pass a competency examination demonstrating work-related skills;49
• Pass a physical and mental health examination;50
• Obtain an Indonesian passport, and a visa and work permit for destina-
tion country;
• Attend a pre-departure briefing;51
• Sign an employment agreement;
• Obtain Migrant Worker Insurance (see Migrant Worker Insurance 
Program below);
• Pay the migrant worker fee to an authorized bank; and,
• Obtain an Overseas Migrant Worker Card, a “smart-card” containing all 
of the migrant worker’s information on a micro-chip.52
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3.B Institutional Framework: Responsibilities of 
 Relevant Government and Private Entities 
As in many other countries of origin, the vast majority of low-wage Indonesian migrant 
workers are placed overseas by private recruitment agencies and other related organi-
zations, regulated by the Indonesian government.53 The following section outlines the 
roles of the main government agencies and private actors involved.
 Government Agencies
The Indonesian government is responsible for overseeing the operation of private 
recruitment agencies, providing workers with information, and performing the screen-
ings and approvals for workers travelling abroad. Key government functions are carried 
out by the national-level Manpower and Transmigration Ministry (MoM), the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and a specialized national body, BNP2TKI. Because of the large geo-
graphic size and population of Indonesia, provincial and local governments also have 
management and oversight responsibilities.
This section sets out the functions of the principle government agencies and min-
istries. These functions often overlap, particularly between the MoM and BNP2TKI and 
their local counterparts. For example, provincial MoM officials do much of the docu-
ment verification and approval of recruitment in their area, but a BP3TKI official may 
then reapprove the documents or ask for additional material. When interviewed for this 
study, local MoM and BP3TKI officials described a lack of clarity about their respective 
roles. Civil society organization representatives and workers themselves were equally 
unclear about the precise delineation of responsibilities between MoM and BP3TKI 
offices—a problem that results in both inefficiencies and accountability gaps.
 National Institutions (Jakarta)
 • Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration (Ministry of Manpower or MoM)
  The Ministry of Manpower has principle responsibility for managing overseas 
labor migration in Indonesia, pursuant to Law 39/2004. MoM’s roles are to 
set standards and develop rules and regulations for implementation of the 
law, and to enforce the law. Its specific responsibilities under Law 39/2004 
include licensing and oversight of private recruitment agencies and insurance 
companies (Articles 12–26, 68), approving specific “job orders” from abroad 
(Articles 28–40), setting standards for all pre-departure processes and documents 
(Articles 41–47, 62–63), and supervising the placement of migrant worker appli-
cants (Articles 92–93). It is also in charge of developing international coopera-
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tion regarding migrant workers, for example negotiating bilateral agreements, 
and determining which countries can receive Indonesian migrant workers 
(Article 90).
 • National Body for Placement and Protection of Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI)
  To support the Ministry of Manpower, which has responsibility for oversee-
ing domestic employment concerns as well as migrant labor, the Indonesian 
president established the National Body on the Placement and Protection of 
Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI) in 2006.54 The National Body answers directly to 
the president (not the MoM) and is comprised of representatives of all depart-
ments, agencies, and institutions relevant to migrant work, who are tasked 
with coordinating their labor migration functions through BNP2TKI.55 
  BNP2TKI is responsible for “implementing policy regarding placement and 
protection of migrant workers abroad in a coordinated and integrated manner,” 
including reviewing documents, providing pre-departure briefings to workers, 
providing information to would-be and current migrant workers, managing 
the departure and return of migrant workers through Indonesian ports, and 
ensuring “the resolution of problems.”56 BNP2TKI also places migrant work-
ers recruited through government-to-government recruitment programs. In 
contrast to MoM, BNP2TKI does not have any enforcement authority over 
recruitment agencies or other actors. However, other differences are not as 
clear. In interviews, experts repeatedly emphasized the overlap between the 
functions of MoM and BNP2TKI in Jakarta, and the lack of clarity regarding 
their respective roles and responsibilities.
 • Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)
  The MoFA is responsible for Indonesian citizens abroad, primarily imple-
mented through embassies and consulates in destination countries. Under 
Law 39/2004, embassies’ specific responsibilities for migrant workers include:
  – Assessing the quality of employers and partner recruitment agencies in 
the destination country who are seeking Indonesian workers, and accredit-
ing partner agencies;
  – Based on this assessment, approving placement documents (including the 
placement agreement and the employment agreement) before giving the 
worker permission to travel to the destination country (Article 25(2)).
  – Recording a migrant worker’s arrival in the destination country, her 
address, and her date of departure, following the worker’s reporting of 
her presence in the country to embassy staff (Article 9(d)).
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  The “quality” assessment of recruitment agency partners is based on whether 
the recruitment agency is legally constituted and operating according to the law 
of the destination country (Articles 24–25(1)). The foreign mission must com-
pile and publish a list of problematic recruitment agencies every three months 
(Article 25(3)–(4)). According to Government Regulation 3/2013, in order to 
obtain accreditation, the agency must also demonstrate adequate facilities and 
human resources, a minimum two-year work plan, and present its latest bal-
ance sheet. It must also have a clear track record concerning the placement of 
migrant workers in the destination country—namely not appearing on the list 
of problematic agencies.57 Without further investigation or criteria for inclu-
sion in the list it may not adequately reflect the agencies’ treatment of migrant 
workers, but this might be addressed in the implementation of the 2013 
regulation.
  Regional Institutions and Agencies
  A number of different offices work at the regional level across Indonesia. In 
order of authority:
  – The provincial MoM office, under the authority of the governor;
  – BP3TKI (Agency for the Service, Placement and Protection of Migrant 
Workers);
  – District/City MoM offices, under the authority of the equivalent of a mayor.
 • Provincial Manpower Offices and BP3TKI
  Both the MoM and BP3TKI (the provincial office of BNP2TKI) operate at the 
provincial level and their respective functions are not clearly delineated in 
regulations (see Section 6.B on Government Agencies’ Dispute Resolution 
Functions below for further discussion). The MoM is generally responsible 
for coordinating within the province all activity and actors related to the place-
ment and protection of migrant workers from the province, including coor-
dinating the work of the BP3TKI.58 It also grants permission to recruitment 
agencies to recruit labor in the province.59
  The BP3TKI is tasked with implementation, namely “simplifying the docu-
ment preparation and processing for migrant workers” in the province.60 After 
the recruitment agency and local MoM office select workers for placement, 
copies of all signed placement agreements are sent to the BP3TKI (Article 
19(3)) and BP3TKI “undertakes all placement-related services for those work-
ers” (Article 20). These services are not defined in the regulation. The BP3TKI 
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also provides the worker pre-departure briefings (Pembekalan Akhir Pemberang-
katan, or “PAP”), facilitated by the MoM provincial office.
 • District/ City (Local) Manpower Offices
  The MoM has labor offices within local government administration. These 
offices are invariably geographically closest to migrant workers and thus the 
first port of call for individuals seeking information (as detailed under Admin-
istrative Dispute Resolution below). 
  Under the law, the local MoM labor migration staff are responsible for han-
dling all government interactions with an aspiring migrant worker until the 
person is officially selected by a recruitment agency. They first screen candi-
dates, (see Box on “Who Can be a Migrant Worker”) and provide job-seeker 
cards.61 They are then tasked with carrying out selection of workers with 
recruitment agencies in their jurisdiction.62 After the workers are selected, 
the local MoM provides approval for a passport to be prepared, and BP3TKI 
will then prepare the relevant documents at the province level.63 In practice, 
however, it is unclear whether all of these steps happen for all migrant work-
ers; they generally do not happen for workers to the Middle East for whom 
local brokers handle the initial stages of migration and connect the worker 
directly with a recruitment agency in Jakarta.
  BNP2TKI also has a local presence in a handful of locations through Service 
Posts (P4TKI offices), created to smooth the departure and return of migrant 
workers from major ports.64 Until recently, P4TKI offices were solely located 
in transit points, rather than in workers’ small home communities, although 
a handful have opened recently in sending regions.65 None of the focus group 
communities had a service post in the area, and future study is warranted 
to understand P4TKI’s potential for facilitating dispute resolution between 
migrant workers and recruitment agencies.
Recruitment Agencies and Other Private Actors
Private Recruitment Agencies
The vast majority of migrant workers are recruited and placed overseas by private agen-
cies. As of January 2013, the Ministry of Manpower reported 559 private recruitment 
agencies currently licensed to operate in Indonesia.66 These agencies handle the selec-
tion, training, departure, placement, and return of migrant workers from overseas. 
Regulation of private recruitment agencies is primarily conducted through licens-
ing. An agency may receive a license from the Ministry of Manpower after submitting 
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its documents of incorporation and paying a license fee. The conditions for obtaining a 
license are not onerous.67 The applicant is not obliged, for example, to demonstrate that 
he or she is a fit and proper person or to provide character references, and there is no 
provision for the ministry to seek additional information from the applicant or to place 
conditions on a license. Further, the licensing process is highly opaque—applicants are 
not required to publish their application, and the regulations do not provide for the fil-
ing of an objection to an applicant receiving a license. The MoM does have the power 
to cancel a license in certain cases, after providing written notice to an agency, and can 
temporarily suspend its operation (Article 100).68 
The Ministry of Manpower is responsible for oversight of recruiters at national, 
provincial, and local levels, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for over-
seas branches of an agency (Article 92). However, Law 39/2004 and regulations do 
not specify what “oversight” entails, or establish a mechanism for inspection of agency 
premises or records. Furthermore, neither the act nor regulations prohibit individuals 
involved in deregistered agencies from involvement in new agencies seeking registra-
tion. The limited regulation and oversight of recruitment agencies in Indonesia makes 
it extremely difficult for migrant workers to hold recruiters accountable for rights viola-
tions, ultimately undermining their access to justice. 
Recruitment Agency “Partners” Abroad
Indonesia-based recruiters frequently partner with destination country agencies that 
place workers with specific employers.69 The employment agreement that migrant 
workers sign in Indonesia must be made with either the employer or the partner agency 
abroad.70 As discussed earlier in this section (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, above), 
the MoFA, through its foreign missions, is tasked with assessing partners and reporting 
problematic agencies to Jakarta.71 
In early 2013, the Minister of Human Rights adopted a government regulation, 
signed by the president, to further clarify the responsibilities of business partners. The 
regulation recognizes the importance of agency partners as protectors of migrant work-
ers from cruel employers, and as responsible for resolving conflicts between employers 
and migrant workers.72
Brokers/Agents
Individual brokers (commonly called “sponsors” in Indonesia) operate at the local 
level, identifying potential workers and connecting them with recruitment agencies. 
Although brokers are a common part of many migrants’ experiences, their activities are 
not directly regulated. They are not subject to any independent licensing scheme and 
are not mentioned in Law 39/2004. Under some circumstances they might be consid-
ered “agents” of recruitment agencies and thus indirectly subject to regulation, though 
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this relationship does not appear to have been tested in court. Indeed, if brokers are not 
acting for recruitment agencies some of their activities could be prohibited by Article 4 
of Law 39/2004, which criminalizes recruitment by individuals of Indonesian citizens 
for work abroad. As discussed later in this report, the lack of government oversight of 
brokers has led to frequent fraud and other systemic problems for which workers have 
limited, if any, avenues for redress. As discussed earlier, this is a particularly significant 
problem for workers to the Middle East because the recruitment agencies are all Jakarta-
based, and workers rely on brokers to connect them with an agency. 
Insurance Companies, Training Centers, and Related Organizations
A number of other private actors are involved in the labor migration process. Insur-
ance companies (discussed in section 6.C., The Migrant Worker Insurance Program) 
provide financial redress to migrant workers who suffer covered losses. Other private 
entities include training centers paid to provide job and language training to migrants, 
health centers that conduct pre-departure examinations, certification organizations that 
certify a worker as qualified to work abroad, and professional associations of recruit-
ment agencies, such as APJATI (Indonesian Migrant Worker Companies Association) 
and Himsataki (Indonesian Migrant Workers Employers Association). Finally, banks are 
involved in the transmission of remittances, and transportation companies are involved 
in transporting workers from the airport in Jakarta back to their home communities.
Besides insurance companies, these actors were not specifically involved in dis-
putes described by civil society interviewees or workers in this study. However there is 
no reason to believe that they are better regulated—or more protective of workers—than 
private recruitment agencies and brokers operating within the labor migration system. 
The operation and oversight of these entities would benefit from further study.
3.C Procedural Framework and Institutional 
 Responsibilities Pre-Departure
Migrant workers’ experience throughout the pre-departure phase has a significant 
impact on whether they experience harm before or during the placement abroad, 
and whether and how they seek redress following this harm. Under Article 31 of Law 
39/2004, once the recruitment agency has received permission from MoM to recruit 
for a job order and then conducted recruitment and selection, the agency must arrange 
for all selected migrant workers:
• Education and training;
• Physical and mental health examinations;
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• Personal and travel documents;
• A competency exam;
• A pre-departure briefing;
• Departure.
Following sustained criticism of the government’s oversight of this process, in 
January 2013, the president signed new regulations that attempt to clarify the state’s role 
in protecting workers during pre-departure preparations.73 These include both standard-
setting (“administrative”) responsibilities, and service delivery (“technical”) responsibili-
ties as follows:
• Standard-setting (“administrative”) responsibilities:
 – Determining placement document requirements, and preparing workers’ 
documents;
 – Setting placement fees, based on the country of destination and work sector;
 – Setting conditions and terms of work abroad, including hours of work, wages 
and method of payment, leave and rest time, and social security.
• Service delivery (“technical”) responsibilities:
 – Public awareness campaigns and information dissemination about working 
abroad, both through direct provision of information and through the media;
 – Improving the “quality” of migrant workers through trainings, pre-departure 
briefings, and a competency exam;
 – Defending the fulfillment of the rights of migrant workers who have died, have 
been seriously injured, become unwell or whose placement has not occurred 
through no fault of the worker;
 – Monitoring and oversight of placement agencies.
How these will be defined and implemented in practice remains to be seen.
Education and Training
Recruitment agencies and the government have three phases of pre-departure infor-
mation, education, and training obligations toward prospective migrant workers (see 
Table 1). Article 31 of Law 39/2004 requires recruitment agencies to provide: education 
and training as part of the initial recruitment process with MoM’s oversight; additional 
training as part of pre-departure preparations; and a final briefing session immediately 
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pre-departure. The government is also required to provide workers with information 
before they decide to apply to work abroad.
 TABLE 1: Information and Training Requirements
Timing Method of 
Delivery
Information Provided Responsible 
Party
Location
Prior to 
application
In-person one-
day “counseling 
and guidance” 
session.74
– Recruitment process
– Documents required
– Rights and 
responsibilities of 
prospective/current 
migrant workers
– Situation, conditions, 
and risks in destination 
country;
– Methods for protecting 
migrant workers. 75
Regulation also requires 
that the information 
include fees and details 
of the position, including 
wages, leave, etc.76
Recruitment 
agency 
together 
with the 
local office 
of the 
MoM.77 The 
local office 
must also 
approve 
the content 
of the 
briefing.78 
Local office 
of MoM in 
region where 
recruitment 
will take 
place. 
Pre-departure 
preparations
Education, 
training and/
or work 
experience, 
culminating in 
“competency 
exam.”79
– Work skills relevant to 
job
– Situation, conditions, 
culture and traditions 
of country of work.
– Communication in 
language of country of 
work.
– Rights and 
responsibilities.80
Recruitment 
agency
In Jakarta, at 
an institution 
licensed 
to provide 
training, 
either 
independent 
or owned by 
recruitment 
agency.81
Pre-departure “PAP” briefing 
session in 
the several 
days before 
departure (not 
necessary 
for workers 
who returned 
from abroad 
within past two 
years).82
– Laws and regulations 
(immigration, labor and 
relevant criminal laws) 
of destination country.
– Employment contract, 
including type of work, 
conditions and wages, 
rights and methods for 
resolving disputes.83
Government 
(BP3TKI).84 
Recruitment 
agency 
responsible 
for enrolling 
worker.85
At BP3TKI 
at the 
provincial 
level. In 
Jakarta 
for those 
traveling to 
Middle East.
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At each pre-departure stage the worker is to be informed of certain rights and 
obligations. The PAP also includes discussion of how to resolve disputes. However, 
neither Law 39/2004 nor the subsidiary regulations detail the specific rights of which 
workers should be made aware, or even the source of those rights. Nor do they specify 
which dispute resolution methods workers should be instructed on or the kind of infor-
mation they should receive. 
Evidence from the focus groups and expert interviews indicates that few (if any) 
workers receive all of the required information. The pre-application sessions were not 
mentioned by any returned workers—all described a broker putting them in contact 
with a recruitment agency directly. The study did not determine when or how these 
sessions might take place for other workers recruited through locally-based agencies.
Most migrants described receiving some competency training, however the level 
and depth of the training varied considerably. In some cases the workers learned how to 
clean and iron. Others said they learned a little about the language and culture of their 
country of destination. Some described several weeks of training and others just a few 
days. A recruitment agency reported that some training centers gave the competency 
certificate for a fee without workers ever having to step through the door, apart from 
having their photographs taken. 
The most consistently available of the pre-departure information sessions is the 
government-run PAP: almost all workers reported attending a PAP, in which they 
signed the employment agreement and received information about what to expect and 
how to behave abroad. It was in the PAP that many workers learned to contact the 
Indonesian embassy if they have problems.
Former migrant workers participating in focus groups frequently described the 
manner of delivery of information and training as disempowering. They recounted 
being held in crowded placement centers with little opportunity to leave or visit their 
families, sometimes for several months, while they waited for their documents to be 
prepared.86 The authors observed recruitment agencies referring to the women as “chil-
dren,” and both government and recruiters displayed a paternalistic attitude toward the 
women who were leaving abroad, even though some had traveled several times previ-
ously. For example, civil society organization experts attributed migrant workers’ low 
awareness to the failure of recruitment agencies to inform workers about the contents 
and importance of the insurance policy, considering it unnecessary or too complicated 
for them.
Practices appear to have improved somewhat over the past 10 years, as the recruit-
ment industry has received increased scrutiny. But the provision of pre-departure infor-
mation and training remains inadequate, and likely contributes to the problems that 
workers encounter abroad. It also limits workers’ ability to seek redress for those prob-
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lems. As detailed in the sections that follow, many workers do not seek redress because 
they are unaware of their legal rights, the mechanisms that exist to enforce them, or 
they do not know how to access the relevant mechanisms.

5 3
4. Harms Experienced by Migrant 
 Workers
4.A Harms in Destination Country
Indonesian migrant workers encounter problems in all destination countries. On aver-
age, BNP2TKI reports that around 14 percent of returnees report a problem, and this 
does not include the many more who decline to describe their experiences to officials at 
ports.87 For those who travel through Jakarta’s Terminal 4 Selapajang, the main gateway 
into Indonesia, workers describe problems such as early termination, work-related ill-
ness, non-payment of wages, physical mistreatment, and sexual assault. In 2011 alone, 
2,137 returned workers reported physical abuse and 2,186 workers reported sexual 
assault during their time abroad.
BNP2TKI reports that the Middle East, and specifically Saudi Arabia, is respon-
sible for the majority of problems reported by returnees. In the four years between 2008 
and 2011, workers arriving at Terminal 4 reported a total of 194,967 problems. Around 
half of these were made by workers coming from Saudi Arabia, and almost 75 percent 
were made by workers returning from the Middle East as a whole (see Table 2).88 
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 TABLE 2: Problems reported by migrant workers returning through Jakarta Terminal 4, 2008–2011
Country of work Number of workers who 
reported problems upon return
Percentage of all workers who 
reported problems upon return
Saudi Arabia 96,448 49%
UAE 21,146 11%
Qatar 10,312 5%
Kuwait 7,930 4%
Oman 6,611 3%
Bahrain 2,214 1%
Syria 1,181 1%
Middle East Total 145,842 75%
Source: BNP2TKI Returns Statistics
Records of complaints made directly to BNP2TKI’s Crisis Center also reflect this 
pattern. Between July 2011 and June 2012, three quarters of the 7,615 formal complaints 
made by migrants or their families related to work experiences in the Middle East (74 
percent), even though only around one third to one half of workers are placed in that 
region.89 Almost 60 percent of the complaints related to Saudi Arabia, far higher than 
the next highest country, Malaysia, which accounted for just 9 percent of complaints.90
Interviewees and focus group participants generally held the view that most prob-
lems experienced by Middle East migrant workers occur overseas in the home of the 
employer, rather than pre-departure or post return. Official figures supported this obser-
vation. Of all complaints to BNP2TKI’s crisis center that identified a particular problem 
(a total of 7607), almost half were based on one of two issues: non-payment of wages, or 
“loss of contact” between the family and the worker abroad, i.e., when the family loses 
all contact with the worker abroad and contacts BNP2TKI for assistance in finding her. 
(See Table 3). It is possible that some complaints raised multiple issues, but this is not 
recorded in the data.
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 TABLE 3: Complaints By Type Received by BNP2TKI Crisis Center, July 2011–June 2012
Type of Complaint Number of Complaints 
Received and Verified
% Of All Complaints
Non-Payment of wages 1,639 22%
Loss of contact 1,520 20%
Employment different to contract 811 11%
Worker wishes to be brought home 782 10%
Worker dies while abroad 472 6%
Violence at the hands of employer 358 5%
Total 5,582 73%
Source:  BNP2TKI, Reports per Case, July 2011–June 2012.
BNP2TKI does not disaggregate the types of complaints by country or region, 
so it is unclear whether this distribution applies equally across destination countries. 
Government and civil society interviewees suggested that families of migrants work-
ing in the Middle East bring most “loss of contact” cases. Interviewees believed the 
increased prevalence in the Middle East was because homes are less connected to the 
internet for Skype communication or social media like Facebook (frequently used by 
workers to communicate with their family), and because employers in the Middle East 
take workers’ phones from them as a matter of course (unlike those in destinations such 
as Hong Kong and Singapore). As well as making it difficult for workers to maintain 
relationships with family and friends and causing workers and family much emotional 
hardship, “loss of contact” also prevents workers from seeking help when problems 
arise. Experts also noted a perception that cases of physical abuse and workplace injury 
were qualitatively more severe in Middle East destinations, particularly in Saudi Arabia. 
Almost all of the harms that focus group participants reported had occurred 
abroad; most were contract-related. The most common contractual problems related 
to non-payment of wages, sometimes for several months, sometimes for several years. 
Some workers reported that the work differed from what had been promised—one had 
agreed to domestic work, for example, but was made to work outside tending goats. Oth-
ers said the hours or nature of the work was excessive and they were not able to rest or 
provided with enough food or time to eat. In some cases workers were hit or threatened 
when they asked for their wages. In a handful of cases, workers reported that members 
of their employer’s family had hit and kicked them for making mistakes.
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In the late 2000s, public outcry about reports of ill-treatment of Indonesians 
working in the Middle East caused the Ministry of Manpower to impose moratoriums 
on recruitment of domestic workers to a number of Middle East countries. At the time 
of writing, moratoriums were in place on Kuwait (since 2009), Jordan (since 2010), and 
Saudi Arabia (since 2011).91 In 2011, the ministry also imposed moratoria on recruit-
ment to Yemen and Syria due to internal armed conflict. While the official number of 
domestic workers departing to these destinations has dropped considerably, hundreds 
of thousands remain in the region under current or expired contracts, and some con-
tinue to travel through irregular channels. BNP2TKI has been assisting Indonesian 
migrants in those countries to return.92
4.B  Harms in Indonesia
Even though workers mainly described harms they suffered abroad, many of these 
problems were likely connected to problems in the pre-departure phase. Inadequate 
documentation, information and training, for example, make workers more vulnerable 
to abuse, and less able to seek help should problems arise. 
In addition, a handful of focus group participants had experienced harms in 
Indonesia that were unrelated to what occurred abroad. For example, one worker paid 
a recruitment agency but the promised job did not materialize (this is referred to as 
a “failed departure”). Others described lost luggage and savings on the journey home. 
Studies by others have noted that in fact harms occur at every stage of the journey.93
Interestingly, when pressed about efforts to seek redress, workers and civil society 
lawyers revealed other challenges not initially described as “problems” associated with 
the migration process. For example, interviewees described recruitment agencies that 
refused to return crucial personal documents submitted during the application process 
(such as a birth certificate or diploma) without payment of a fee. The fee was purport-
edly to compensate the agency for the worker having broken the contract by returning 
early. In other cases, agencies reportedly took a cut of insurance payments, or demanded 
the worker travel abroad again to repay debts incurred through a previous trip that 
ended early. Recruiters appeared to see these as commercial solutions to a broken con-
tract, regardless of the terms of the placement agreement (if one was provided). These 
actions do not appear to be permitted by law. 
5 7
5. Migrant Workers’ Rights 
 Under Indonesian Legislation, 
 Contract, and International 
 Law
Many of the government officials and others interviewed in this study underscored 
the importance of educating workers about their rights, and fulfilling workers’ rights. 
However discussion of rights was always non-specific; neither government nor civil 
society representatives referred to a specific right or set of rights. No interviewees, gov-
ernment documents, or even legislation identified the source of the rights about which 
migrants ought to be educated, and it is unclear whether they were referring to rights 
under the Indonesian Constitution, legislation, contractual agreements, international 
law, or rights in some broader moral sense. Indeed, a review of the law, literature, and 
advocacy materials in Indonesia did not reveal any document that comprehensively sets 
out the legal rights of Indonesian migrant workers.
An important task of this research was therefore to begin identifying some of the 
specific legal rights that migrant workers possess under public, private, and interna-
tional law, that they might later be able to enforce in various forums to seek redress for 
harms that they have suffered—and about which they ought to be informed as part of 
government and recruitment agencies’ worker-education obligations (see Section 3.C). 
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This is not intended to be a comprehensive list, and it should be noted that the vast 
majority of the rights identified below have not been tested in Indonesia’s courts or else-
where. Their scope therefore remains undetermined, as does their enforceability and 
any causes of action or remedies that might be associated with them. Further rights will 
also likely be implicitly drawn from these sources as they are developed in the future. 
Needless to say, there remains a significant gap between the existence and the 
enforcement of protective rights contained in the Indonesian Constitution and domes-
tic laws, as well as in private contracts between workers and recruitment agencies and 
insurers, and international treaties that Indonesia has ratified. This is an area ripe for 
further research, policy development, strategic litigation, and law reform.
5.A Domestic Laws
 The Constitution
Indonesia’s constitution is the supreme law of the land in Indonesia. In the period 
known commonly as reformasi (reformation), which followed the fall of the Suharto 
dictatorship, the constitution was amended four times to create stronger checks and 
balances on government power, and to strengthen rights protection. The second amend-
ment of August 2000 created a bill of rights in Article 28 that includes rights to earn 
a livelihood, to healthcare, to information, and to social security. These rights may 
implicitly create significant protections for migrant workers, though they have not, to 
date, been tested in this context. Article 27 (2) also guarantees that each person has a 
right to decent and humane work.
Rights and State Obligations under the Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia Potentially Relevant to Migrant Worker 
Protection and Access to Redress
• Every person shall have the right to decent and humane work (Article 
27(2)).
• Every person shall have the right of recognition, guarantees, protection 
and certainty before a just law, and of equal treatment before the law 
(Article 28D(1)).
• Every person shall have the right to work and to receive fair and proper 
remuneration and treatment in employment (Article 28D(2)).
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• Every person shall have the right to communicate and to obtain infor-
mation for the purpose of the development of his/herself and social 
environment, and shall have the right to seek, obtain, possess, store 
and convey information by employing all available types of channels 
(Article 28F).
• Every person shall have the right to protection of his/herself, family, 
honor, dignity, and property (Article 28G(1)).
• Every person shall have the right to live in physical and spiritual prosper-
ity … and shall have the right to obtain medical care (Article 28H).
• The protection, advancement, upholding and fulfillment of human rights 
are the responsibility of the state, especially the government (Article 
28I(4)).
 Statute
Law 39/2004 establishes a small set of migrant worker rights within a statute primar-
ily focused on administration of the labor migration program (see Section 3.A). This 
includes the right to:
a) Work abroad;
b) Correct information about the labor market and the placement procedures for 
migrant workers abroad;
c) Equal service and treatment in overseas placement;
d) Freedom of religion and belief and to have the opportunity to worship according 
to one’s beliefs;
e) Payment according to the standard wage in the destination country;
f) The same rights, opportunities and treatment as other foreign workers according 
to the rules and laws in the destination country;
g) A guarantee of protection of the law according to the rules and laws in respect 
to dehumanizing treatment, or violation of one’s rights set out in the law for the 
duration of the placement abroad;
h) A guarantee of protection and safe return to the place of origin; and, 
i) Access to a draft of the original work contract.94
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Though limited, these rights offer some potentially significant protections for 
workers. For example, the right to “[r]eceive a guarantee of protection of the law … in 
respect to … violation of one’s rights set out in the law for the duration of the placement 
abroad” might form the basis of a right to redress. However the law does not identify 
the party or parties responsible for fulfilling and enforcing any of these rights. Nor does 
it impose any penalty if the right is not fulfilled: If, for example, the worker is not paid 
according to the standard wage in the destination country. Without means for enforcing 
these rights against particular actors, or consequences for non-fulfillment, workers do 
not find these rights especially valuable in practice.
In contrast, the law establishes serious consequences for migrant workers if they 
do not uphold their obligations, namely that the worker will be considered “illegal” and 
potentially unable to obtain redress. The obligations of workers include:
a) Complying with the law both internally and in the country of destination;
b) Complying with and undertaking the work according to the work contract;
c) Paying the service fee for overseas placement; and, 
d) Notifying or reporting arrival, presence and return to the representative of the 
Indonesian Republic in the destination country.95
Other national laws also provide some rights to migrant workers indirectly. These 
include Law 21/2007 against the Trafficking of Migrant Workers, and the Criminal and 
Civil Codes (see Judicial Remedies under Mechanisms below.) Although not framed as 
rights as such, the criminal law also theoretically protects migrant workers from crimes 
committed by recruitment agencies or individual brokers, including fraud. 
Rights in Regional Legislation
Perda, described in the Legal Framework section above, can potentially provide greater 
protections and support to migrant workers in a local context. For example, the Perda 
adopted by the governor of Sumbawa District, an island in West Nusa Tenggara Prov-
ince, requires that recruitment agencies provide the community with simple and clear 
information about their recruitment processes and positions available, and holds 
agencies responsible for the security and safety of all migrant workers during the pre-
departure process.96 However, one study found that over 80 percent of Perda address-
ing migrant workers are “extractive” rather than protective; in that they levy additional 
charges on recruitment agencies and workers as part of regulating recruitment in their 
jurisdictions.97 
Three of the five focus groups in this study were held in regions that have a Perda 
in place. There was no observable difference between the experience of those workers 
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and workers from regions without a Perda. Expert interviewees observed that Perda are 
only useful if the relevant recruitment agency has a branch at the local level. As noted 
above, the agencies that send workers to the Middle East are located in Jakarta, and are 
perceived as beyond the reach of local Perda because they do not have a local office. 
Brokers who arrange overseas employment for migrant workers might potentially be 
subject to local regulation if they could be recognized under the law as agents of recruit-
ers, however they are not specifically mentioned in the Perda examined in this study.
5.B International Law and Bilateral Agreements
Indonesia has ratified all of the major international human rights conventions, includ-
ing the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families 1990, which it ratified in early 2012. This latest ratification was a mile-
stone in Indonesia’s commitment to protect migrant workers, and had been demanded 
by civil society for many years (see Annexure 1 for a list of the treaties that Indonesia 
has ratified). Indonesia has also ratified the core ILO agreements on migrant workers 
and labor protections. For a discussion of Indonesia’s relevant obligations under inter-
national human rights treaties see Section 1.C above.
Although Indonesia’s Constitution requires that international treaties be incorpo-
rated into domestic legislation before becoming law, Law 39/1999 concerning Human 
Rights effectively incorporates all of Indonesia’s international human rights obligations. 
It also makes them directly enforceable in Indonesian courts and via other “effective 
national legal means.” Article 7 of Law 39/1999 states:
  (1) Everyone has the right to use all effective national legal means and international forums 
against all violations of human rights guaranteed under Indonesian law, and under interna-
tional law concerning human rights which has been ratified by Indonesia. 
  (2) Provisions set forth in international law concerning human rights ratified by the Republic 
of Indonesia, are recognized under this Act as legally binding in Indonesia.98
According to civil society experts, few Indonesian judges are familiar with Article 
7 of Law 39/1999, and it has not yet been used in Indonesian courts to enforce migrant 
workers’ human rights (and has generally been used infrequently, with limited success). 
This provision may form the basis of future strategic litigation to enforce Indonesia’s 
human rights obligations to migrant workers, drawing also on the general principle 
under Indonesia’s Constitution that: “The protection, advancement, upholding and ful-
fillment of human rights are the responsibility of the state, especially the government” 
(Constitution, Article 28I(4)).
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In addition to Indonesia’s international legal obligations, the Indonesian govern-
ment has entered into non-binding, and non-enforceable, memorandums of under-
standing (MOUs) with a handful of destination countries.99 Only the MOUs with 
Malaysia and Qatar cover Indonesian migrant workers in the informal or “unskilled”’ 
sectors. The signing of these agreements has been highly publicized but they have not 
generally increased protections for migrant workers, and have been criticized from 
many quarters. Among other things, they have been negotiated in a non-transparent 
manner, and it remains difficult or impossible to obtain copies of most MOUs.100
5.C Contractual Rights
The strongest and most clearly stated legal rights of migrant workers derive from the 
commercial contracts they sign prior to departure: the placement agreement (perjanjian 
penempatan) between the migrant worker and the recruitment agency, and the employ-
ment agreement (perjanjian kerja) between the migrant worker and employer or partner 
recruitment agency in the destination country. 
Both agreements are prepared by the prospective worker’s recruitment agency, 
and are signed prior to departure. Though requirements of these agreements are set 
out in law, Indonesia does not have standard versions of the agreements. Rather, each 
agency develops its own version of each agreement in collaboration with its partner 
agency in the destination country. Various government agencies must see the draft 
documents before they are provided to workers: the Indonesian Embassy in the destina-
tion country must view both documents before approving a placement in the country, 
and the MoM views the documents when the recruiter seeks permission to fill a job 
order.101 However the regulations do not require that the government ministries do any 
more than merely view a draft or sample version of the document. Indeed, they do not 
require or even encourage ministry staff to assess the agreements for compliance with 
the law or any other standards. As a result there is effectively no oversight of the content 
of the agreements. And in practice, as detailed in the following section, agreements are 
frequently inconsistent with statutory requirements. 
 Placement Agreement
The placement agreement is central in the Indonesian migrant labor system. Law 
39/2004 mentions the agreement frequently, including setting out requirements for 
content and delivery to the worker. Not only is it intended to protect workers during pre-
departure preparations and potentially while abroad, the mandatory delivery of signed 
agreements to government agencies is intended to ensure that local governments are 
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aware of who is preparing to travel from their district, with which agencies and to which 
countries. This information may be valuable later in the event the worker needs copies 
of documents or assistance from government to resolve a dispute (see Section 6 on 
Enforcement Mechanisms below). 
According to the regulations, the draft placement agreement, once viewed by 
the embassy in the destination country and the MoM in Jakarta, must be presented 
to the local MoM office in the district where recruitment is to take place.102 A recent 
Government Regulation of January 2013 clarifies that the head of the local office must 
“research” (presumably read and evaluate) the placement agreement before approving 
the production of a passport for the worker.103
Both the worker and the recruitment agency must sign the agreement before the 
worker commences training, document preparation, and other pre-departure require-
ments. The law states that the worker and the recruitment agency must hold identical 
copies of the signed placement agreement, and it cannot be changed or retracted with-
out mutual consent.104 The recruitment agency must then submit a copy of every signed 
placement agreement to the local city or provincial authority (the local MoM office that 
assisted with recruitment, and BP3TKI). 
These safeguards do not include procedures for invalidating or correcting defi-
cient placement agreements, or for redress if an agency fails to comply with its obliga-
tions. And because migrants to the Middle East use brokers to connect directly with 
Jakarta-based recruiters who are generally viewed as outside the local regulatory ambit,105 
these locally-based safeguards generally do not help migrants to the Middle East at all.
Content of the Placement Agreement
The placement agreement must set out the details of the position that the worker will 
fill, as well as obligations during the pre-departure process, including any fees the 
worker must pay, and the prospective date of departure abroad. 
Most significantly, Law 39/2004 requires that the agreement include a provision 
that the agency will compensate the worker in the event that the employer in the destina-
tion country does not fulfill all of the terms of the related employment agreement (such 
as payment of wages) (Article 52(2)). The explanatory notes to Law 39/2004 state that, 
  The guarantee referred to is a statement of the ability of the private recruitment agency to 
fulfill the promises made to the prospective migrant worker being placed by the agency. 
For example, if the Placement Agreement promises that the worker will be paid a certain 
amount by the employer, and this amount is not paid, the private recruitment agency must 
compensate the worker for the loss.106
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Two Sample Placement Agreements
Placement agreements for migrants to the Middle East were surprisingly dif-
ficult to obtain during the completion of this study. Indeed, nobody interviewed 
in this study had heard of a placement agreement being signed by a migrant 
worker to the Middle East. Eventually the research team obtained one sample 
agreement for workers to Qatar from a recruitment agency. In contrast, sample 
placement agreements for workers to the Asia Pacific were relatively easy to 
locate, and the research team viewed a sample from a recruitment agency 
website for workers to Malaysia.107 
Both agreements were several pages long but the second agreement (for work-
ers to Malaysia) was considerably more comprehensive. It included detailed 
rights for the worker including to refuse a specific placement that does not 
accord with what was promised, to worship during the placement, and to receive 
insurance and 200 hours of training. By contrast the sample agreement for a 
worker to Qatar contained no specific rights at all. Both agreements obligate 
the recruitment agency to protect the welfare of the worker, but for a worker to 
Qatar, the agency must only ensure the worker’s “safety, security and protec-
tion” until the placement “is in accordance with the applicable conditions”—
presumably until the placement is found to be in accordance with the contract. 
With respect to disputes and compensation, the Qatar agreement makes no 
mention of disputes related to performance of the employment agreement. It 
addresses only the situation where a placement does not go ahead: the worker 
has a right to return of the fees paid to the agency if he or she withdraws 
from the placement or is found to be medically unfit, but the costs of proce-
dures carried out to that point would be deducted before the fees are returned. 
In addition, the worker can receive a refund if the placement does not occur 
within three months from the signature of the agreement, if both parties attend 
mediation at the MoM and the recruitment agency is found to be at fault. These 
protections are very limited, onerous to enforce, and substantially beneath 
legal requirements. On this point, the Malaysia agreement is similar in that it 
requires repayment of costs if the worker leaves the training or placement. Both 
agreements fail to incorporate the provisions of Article 52(2).
This is clearly a small sample, and many more contracts should be viewed to 
determine the protections given or not given by placement agreements. Nev-
ertheless, the differences between these two documents (both of which have 
been viewed and approved by the government) suggest at minimum a need for 
a more comprehensive legal vetting process.
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This provision is critical, because it imposes direct responsibility on recruitment 
agencies for the treatment of workers abroad, as well as accountability for the promises 
made to workers during the hiring process. It is unclear from the law and from the 
documents themselves how the recruitment agency’s compensation obligations under 
the placement agreement interact with insurance coverage provided to the worker, or 
the obligations of the employer to fulfill the terms of the employment agreement. As 
the agreements have not been tested in court, this is an area that would benefit from 
further analysis and potentially from strategic litigation.
Employment Agreement
The employment agreement must be given to the worker after training is completed 
and the worker is approved for departure, usually in the few days prior to leaving the 
country. At this stage a worker going to the Middle East is in Jakarta, far from home, 
having invested much time and effort in the pre-departure process, and with much 
to lose if she changes her mind once she sees the employment agreement (including 
reputational consequences of returning to the village instead of going abroad). 
Indonesia has not developed a standard employment agreement, but Law 39/2004 
sets out minimum required provisions including: the names and addresses of the par-
ties, the type of work and conditions including hours, wages, and holidays, and the 
duration of the contract period (two years, with a possibility to extend).108 The law does 
not require the contract to be in a language the worker understands. For migrants to the 
Middle East (the majority of whom have primary school education or less—see Section 
2.B) the contract may be in English or Arabic. The three sample contracts obtained from 
civil society organizations for this study were in Arabic and Bahasa Indonesia. 
The employment agreement raises a host of transnational legal issues, given that 
one party (the employer/partner agency) is in the destination country; the majority of 
the contract is performed in the destination country; and the contract is prepared by 
the Indonesian recruitment agency and partner agency, and signed by the worker in 
Indonesia. Although the content of the agreements are governed, at least in part, by 
requirements under Indonesian law, the role of the destination country’s law and legal 
system in the content and enforcement of the agreement is unclear. These issues war-
rant further study.
Fulfillment of Rights in Placement and Employment Agreements 
Taken together, the placement and employment agreements ought to contain legal 
rights that provide workers with significant protections from bad faith dealings by 
recruiters and employers. This is not the case in practice. First, despite the many layers 
of government checks and approvals, it appears that many migrant workers, particularly 
those traveling to the Middle East, do not receive a placement agreement at all (see 
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Text Box above). Civil society organizations said they rarely saw placement agreements, 
and a recruitment agency representative intimated that the document is rarely given to 
the worker. According to legal experts, recruitment agencies commonly place workers 
in a boarding house for training before a job order has even been received, making it 
impossible for her to receive a placement agreement with details of the position at the 
time of recruitment; instead the agreement is given at the airport, if ever. In contrast, 
most focus group participants received and were aware of the employment agreement.
Second, even if the placement agreement is given, the agency does not have an 
obligation to explain it to the worker. This is in contrast to the employment agreement, 
which must be explained by public officials during the pre-departure briefing. Civil 
society organizations suggested that even when the agreement is given to workers, the 
recruitment agency takes it back after the worker has signed it, and migrant workers 
are not encouraged to read it or take steps to understand its terms, or the rights that it 
contains.
Third, as described in the box, the majority of placement and employment agree-
ments may be out of compliance with the law in any case. Neither of the two docu-
ments reviewed for this study included a guarantee by the recruiter, required under 
Law 39, article 52(f), to compensate the worker in the case that the employer violates 
the agreement. Furthermore, the agreements do not contain mechanisms for enforcing 
contractual rights or resolving disputes, though workers may try to do this in practice 
through negotiation and mediation (see Section 6.A on Administrative Dispute Resolu-
tion below).
The law does not impose any sanction if the agreements provided by the recruiter 
are not in accordance with the law, and neither the statute nor the agreements them-
selves establish consequences for recruiters if they fail to comply with their obligations. 
As a result of all of these legal and implementation failures, the migrant workers who 
took part in the study were unaware of their rights under the placement and employ-
ment agreements, beyond the promised wage and country of work. 
Experts interviewed for the study were unable to identify case law exploring the 
enforceability of contractual rights, or explaining the relationship between the place-
ment agreement and employment agreement. This raises further questions for research, 
and potentially fertile ground for strategic litigation to enforce statutory requirements 
and contractual rights. 
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5.D Summary of Rights under Law and Contract
Migrant workers in Indonesia have legal rights deriving from the constitution, stat-
ute, regulations, and private commercial agreements with recruitment agencies and 
employers (and insurers—see below), as well as under international law. Statutory 
rights include specific rights to work abroad, to be treated equally to other prospective 
workers, to be paid the prevailing wage, receive a copy of the work contract, and to not 
be mistreated or exploited. Workers also have a right to training and information suit-
able to the type of work they will undertake.
In practice, migrant workers’ statutory rights provide little protection because 
most rights are difficult (if not impossible) for workers to enforce; they rarely identify 
the party responsible for fulfilling particular rights; and they do not clearly delineate 
between the obligations of government and recruitment agencies. Nor do they establish 
enforcement mechanisms. For example Law 39/2004 does not set out any method by 
which a worker may complain if he or she is not treated equally, or does not receive the 
prevailing wage, or does not receive a copy of the contract. It also provides no mecha-
nism for filing or resolving a complaint if a government official does not do the required 
checks, or if the placement agreement does not contain the required worker rights. 
Rights under the employment agreement include rights to specific wages, to a cer-
tain type of work, to leave days, and other details of the relationship with the employer. 
Rights under the placement agreement include a guaranteed placement if a fee was 
paid (or have the money returned), and compensation by the recruitment agency if the 
employer does not pay the agreed wages or does not comply with other terms of the 
placement and employment agreements. Similarly, the placement agreement (which 
Middle East workers rarely receive, in any event) contains no mechanism for obtaining 
the compensation that the agency must pay if the worker’s employment agreement is 
not fulfilled. The employment agreement is difficult, if not impossible, to enforce after 
a worker returns to Indonesia.
Workers are generally left with verbal agreements made with brokers, and various 
sources of legal rights in need of accountable actors and effective enforcement mecha-
nisms. The following section examines current redress mechanisms in Indonesia and 
the extent to which they do, or might, provide avenues for enforcement of these rights.
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6. Mechanisms for Enforcing 
 Rights and Seeking Redress
Throughout the migration process, migrant workers interact with numerous govern-
ment agencies and private parties in Indonesia and abroad, in relation to whom they 
have legal rights (see previous section). These private parties include recruitment agen-
cies, insurance companies, overseas employers, and potentially private local brokers 
who make verbal promises to workers. They may also include transport workers (who 
extort returning migrant workers), training center staff, and other parties based in 
Indonesia. 
Workers have several avenues through which they might attempt to seek redress 
in the event of a dispute with, or rights violation by, one of these parties. Apart from the 
courts, these avenues were typically viewed by the various stakeholders in this study as 
paths to problem-solving rather than mechanisms for legal rights enforcement. They 
include:
• In person negotiation/“peaceable resolution;”
• Filing of a claim with a government agency and attending mediation (Administra-
tive Dispute Resolution);
• Filing of a claim for insurance;
• Use of the court system.
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This section reviews each of these mechanisms, identifying: the relevant legal 
framework where applicable, the various actors involved, the procedures for filing and 
resolving a complaint, and perceptions of the efficacy (or otherwise) of the mechanism. 
It draws on the experiences of migrant workers, the perceptions of lawyers and civil 
society “case-handlers” who assist migrants, and the views of government officials who 
implement and oversee the mechanisms. 
By far the most popular method for a worker seeking redress against a private 
party in Indonesia, according to study participants, is informal in-person negotiation, 
whether with the broker, the recruitment agency or the employer. And very few migrant 
workers take their problems any further because of lack of information and a lack of 
faith in the efficacy of available mechanisms. This perception was borne out by focus 
group participants, among whom only a handful had taken any action beyond commu-
nicating with the broker or the agency. 
In addition to the mechanisms above, workers also use the services of the Indo-
nesian embassy to resolve problems directly with employers while they are still abroad. 
Foreign missions may also support cases in Indonesia by providing documents or 
other evidence of harms that occurred abroad. The role of the Indonesian embassy in 
resolving disputes between workers and their employers in the Middle East is the final 
“mechanism” discussed in this section.
Legal Aid in Indonesia
While abroad, migrants can potentially access legal aid services through 
the Indonesian embassy and consulates (see section on Embassy Protec-
tion below). In Indonesia, however, state-funded legal aid is generally only 
provided to criminal defendants.
Nongovernment options are available to migrant workers, but they are lim-
ited. Private legal aid services have a long and respected history in Indone-
sia; the first official organization, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) Jakarta, 
opened in 1970, under the military-led regime of President Suharto, and was 
a vital outlet for the pro-democracy movement.109 Today, alongside other 
issue-mandated civil society groups with lawyers on staff, such as women’s 
organizations, branches of the LBH Foundation operate in 15 provinces of 
Indonesia.110 However, legal aid organizations still operate largely in cities. 
Though they take up a great variety of cases, from corruption to gender 
equality and land claims, lawyers at Legal Aid Jakarta who were interviewed 
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for this study said that migrant worker cases were “extremely rare” and fell 
generally within labor cases.111 And while some private lawyers specialize in 
migrant worker cases, one lawyer interviewed suggested this was also rare 
because the cases are complex, and migrant workers can rarely pay legal 
fees.112 
Instead, when seeking redress migrant workers rely on local non-legal civil 
society organizations , usually staffed by returned migrant workers who are 
personally invested in improving the system. All the migrant workers who 
participated in focus groups in this study had received such assistance; 
none had received professional legal advice. These organizations play a 
vital function in advocating for individual migrant workers in claims against 
government or private parties and assisting with gathering documents and 
evidence. Nevertheless, several experts lamented the scarcity of trained legal 
advisors in regional areas who could advise workers on their rights under 
statute and contract.
This situation may change in light of the new 2011 Legal Aid Law (16 of 
2011).113 Significantly, the law recognizes a “right to access justice” in Indo-
nesia, and reaffirms the constitutional right of all Indonesians to equality 
before the law.114 It also provides state funding for legal aid services provided 
by private lawyers and organizations. It is not yet clear how the law will be 
implemented. For migrant workers, a central question is whether they will 
be included within the definition of “the poor,” the target population of the 
law. Migrant workers may come home with some earnings, but still face 
structural barriers to seeking redress for valid claims. Agustinus Supriyanto, 
an expert on international law and migrant workers, suggests that a broad 
interpretation of the law could provide a vital service to the thousands of 
migrant workers seeking redress each year.115
6.A Negotiation and Informal Dispute Resolution
Informal negotiation is the first, and often only, dispute resolution method used by 
migrant workers and their families, if they take any action at all. Law 39/2004 in fact 
requires workers and recruitment agencies to negotiate their disputes before taking 
further action:
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  85(1): In the event of a dispute between a migrant worker and a private recruitment agency 
regarding the implementation of the Placement Agreement, the two parties must endeavor 
to resolve the matter peacefully and through informal discussion.
Participants described negotiation as useful for a range of disputes with recruit-
ment agencies, including: repayment of lost fees if the placement fails; return of per-
sonal documents; repayment of lost wages if the worker was not paid according to the 
placement agreement; an insurance payment (see Migrant Worker Insurance Program 
below); and to improve working conditions or obtain back-wages from an employer. 
Such negotiation is also usually the only option for workers in disputes with local bro-
kers, who are not subject to direct regulation and receive little government oversight 
(unless the matter is reported to the police for criminal fraud).
Who is Responsible? Recruiters vs. Insurers
Indonesia’s migrant worker insurance scheme covers workers for many cat-
egories of harm in Indonesia and abroad—including harms that are the 
fault of the recruitment agency, directly or indirectly. Further, Law 39/2004 
requires that migrant workers’ placement agreements contain a guarantee 
that the recruitment agency will compensate the worker for violations of the 
employment contract (including, for example, non-payment of wages). The 
insurance policy covers some losses that are also breaches of the employ-
ment contract (including non-payment of wages). 
As a result of these overlaps, in practice civil society organizations often 
approach both for compensation. One former case-handler explained that 
in cases of non-payment of wages, for example, civil society organizations 
would generally go to the recruitment agency, which would rarely compen-
sate the worker directly, but might also “help” the worker to make an insur-
ance claim. Because this adds significant time to the claims process, many 
civil society organizations now go straight to the insurer with such claims. It 
would appear from Law 39/2004 that the recruiter retains ultimate respon-
sibility for compensating contractual breaches if the insurer improperly fails 
to do so, but this issue was not explored by participants in this study.
The BNP2TKI 2011 Standard Operating Procedure Manual instructs staff 
that the recruitment agency and the insurance company may both be par-
ties to a mediation, but that each deals with different harms. According to 
the manual the insurer deals with work-related harms, whereas the recruit-
ment agency is responsible for problems associated with the pre-departure
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process, i.e.: the worker was unable to do the work, could not communi-
cate with the employer, was not in good health, or returned home with a 
child.116 It is not clear whether this reflects standard practice or BNP2TKI’s 
assessment of the legal obligations of each party. In any case, a clearer 
statement in legislation or regulation about the respective responsibilities of 
recruitment agencies and insurers would aid civil society organizations and 
migrant workers and their families to make successful claims. 
Law 39/2004 does not establish a procedure for negotiation/informal discussion. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that migrant workers and their families learn strat-
egies from each other.117 
Participants explained that in most cases, the migrant worker or family member 
attempts to locate the other party, explains the situation, and asks for some relief. In 
some cases a local authority or civil society organization assists the worker to gather 
necessary documents or to retrieve documents from recruitment agencies—such as a 
copy of the employment agreement if the worker did not receive or keep a copy.
Negotiations may range from highly informal conversations to more formal meet-
ings in which civil society organization representatives present documents and evidence 
of loss to the other party, and request specific redress. Civil society organization repre-
sentatives noted that these discussions are sometimes heated, with each side making 
demands of the other.
Parties may discuss the dispute by letter or phone, but civil society representatives 
emphasized that in-person meetings were usually required to achieve a result. A repre-
sentative of SBMI Brebes noted: “We have to be very careful in our case handling and 
negotiation—we do it all in person. As soon as we need to involve the sponsor/broker 
or even the placement agency, we go straight to the placement agency office.” Partici-
pants described the considerable time and work involved in every negotiation, including 
sending letters, making calls, and driving or taking transport to numerous meetings. 
In-person meetings present several challenges. Meeting with brokers can be dif-
ficult because some disappear after arranging recruitment, although others may be 
known to the community and can eventually be contacted.118 Brokers who are contacted 
often deny any responsibility and blame the agency. An in-person meeting at an agency 
can be highly intimidating for a worker or her family, as it involves travel to Jakarta (for 
Middle East recruiters), and agencies are often located in secure private complexes pro-
tected by high walls. Travel to Jakarta may also be expensive (though direct negotiation 
may still be cheaper than other pathways to redress).
One mother in Central Java described attempting to negotiate with the recruit-
ment agency after her daughter, who was working in Saudi Arabia, had not been paid 
for two years and was being prevented from returning home. She told the focus group:
74  MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCING RIGHTS AND SEEKING REDRESS
  I have been going back and forth, back and forth, to the recruitment agency for the last year. 
But nothing happens. There is no one there except the outsourcing agent and he just says, 
“yes, yes” but gives me no answer. Really it is the broker’s responsibility, but he has disap-
peared.119
Although Law 39/2004 refers to negotiation between the recruitment agent and 
the worker, workers also negotiate with other parties, such as insurers (see Migrant 
Worker Insurance Program below) and employers. In the latter case, civil society groups 
described workers enlisting the help of friends, family, civil society organizations and 
even the recruitment agency to speak to an employer. An organization in Lombok 
explained their process as follows:
 
  In a case of a salary not being paid, we sometimes contact someone who has worked in that 
country before and ask her to telephone the employer. This is actually a new technique for 
us. It turns out that the employers can also be approached. A woman who helped us in one 
recent case had worked there a long time and knew the language and the culture of people 
there to help smooth our path [in the negotiation]. The return flight was arranged and the 
salary paid.120
In this way, negotiation may also prevent problems from escalating, or help to 
resolve misunderstandings before a worker needs to seek formal redress. And despite 
the inherent power imbalances that can make a fair negotiation difficult to achieve, 
negotiation appeared to be a familiar method for resolving disputes. Indeed, partici-
pants described negotiation as an ongoing component of all dispute resolution mecha-
nisms, even after a worker has filed an official complaint. 
6.B Administrative Dispute Resolution
Beyond direct negotiation, the principal mechanism for resolving disputes between 
migrant workers and Indonesia-based actors is administrative dispute resolution ser-
vices provided by government agencies. Services range from assisting workers to obtain 
documents from recruitment agencies and other government departments, to writing 
letters to various parties such as the recruitment agency or embassy abroad, or speaking 
to the other party on the worker’s behalf.121 The final stage in administrative dispute 
resolution is a “mediation” in which the government agency brings together the parties 
to a dispute to negotiate. 
It is unclear which government agency is ultimately responsible for resolving 
migrant worker disputes, the procedures they should follow, the potential claims that 
can be made, the remedies available, and possible appeal mechanisms. Although not an 
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official term used by government in Indonesia, this report uses the term “administra-
tive dispute resolution” to broadly encompass all of the dispute resolution activities that 
government agencies perform, described in as much detail as could be obtained from 
stakeholder interviews and government documents.
Government Agencies’ Dispute Resolution Functions 
Indonesian law does not clearly distinguish which government ministries and agencies 
can receive migrant worker’s complaints and assist in their resolution. Indeed, partici-
pants in this study generally viewed MoM and BNP2TKI’s dispute resolution functions 
as interchangeable. As one lawyer noted, “The more formal mechanism we use to 
resolve disputes is filing a complaint with the government, in this case either BNP2TKI 
or the Ministry of Manpower, the main thing is that it is government.”122
Law 39/2004 authorizes the MoM to assist to resolve disputes. Article 85(2) states:
  If a resolution through informal discussion is not reached, one or both of the parties can 
request the assistance of an agency with responsibility for labour [the MoM] in the District/
City, Province or National Government.
However, BNP2TKI in Jakarta and provincial BP3TKI offices also receive migrant 
worker complaints, as does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jakarta. They may be 
authorized to do so under Article 90 of Law 39/2004, a provision that broadly requires 
the national government to, “facilitate the resolution of disputes or conflicts between 
the migrant or prospective migrant workers and the employer and/or the placement 
agency.” 
In practice, responsibility for receiving complaints appears to have been increas-
ingly delegated, to BNP2TKI.123 The involvement of the MoM was in fact described as 
a source of frustration by the MoM head of protection in Jakarta, who emphasized that 
all cases should go to BNP2TKI. This has not occurred in practice because manpower 
offices in cities and districts are better known to the community than BNP2TKI, which 
does not have many local offices.
The specific dispute resolution functions by agency were described by study par-
ticipants as follows:
Ministry of Manpower. Because of the lack of implementing regulations, most 
of the eight local and provincial MoM offices interviewed in this study124 were unsure 
of their responsibility for resolving disputes. Nevertheless, most MoM administrators 
expressed great concern about the situation of migrant workers, and were reluctant to 
refuse people.125 They noted that they receive complaints and assist workers or their 
families in compiling their documents, but felt their powers to actually resolve disputes 
were limited, and that they “do facilitation only.” As one explained:
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  We provide all services but are limited in resolving problems—we just forward them on. But 
we do try our best to help. We write down the story from the beginning—who invited you 
to work abroad, which recruitment company did you use? We can give people options and 
help them make contact with other offices.126
The MoM in Jakarta and some local offices also facilitate resolution of disputes 
that occur within their jurisdiction. For example, officials in Lombok and Sukabumi 
stated that they call in local recruitment agencies if a migrant worker files a complaint. 
In practice, because all Middle East recruitment agencies are in Jakarta, the mediation 
must be conducted in Jakarta or it is unlikely the recruitment agency will attend.
BNP2TKI Crisis Center. BNP2TKI’s dispute resolution service is provided by its 
crisis center in Jakarta, created in November 2008. In June 2011 the center established 
“Hello TKI,” a toll-free hotline for migrant workers and their families within Indonesia. 
Workers abroad can also call an international number (although not toll-free), or send 
an e-mail or SMS.127
In its first year of operation the crisis center hotline received 243,799 calls or 
emails from migrant workers, family members, or persons interested in working 
abroad—suggesting considerable awareness of the service. Only 3 percent (7,601) of 
calls were registered as complaints (other calls were requests for information or other 
matters). After officials verified the documents in these cases, half (4,097) were accepted 
as formal complaints. By the end of the first year (June 2012) 2,729 cases had been 
resolved.128 By November 2012 these figures had almost doubled: 9,764 complaints 
had been received from migrant workers and their families, and 4,577 of those cases 
had been resolved—primarily cases involving non-payment of wages (22 percent) and 
‘loss of contact’ (21 percent).129 Data is not available on the nature of the resolution of 
these cases, as compared with the amounts or actions that workers and their families 
demanded. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When the worker is still abroad, the family members 
(or civil society organizations contacted by family) can file a complaint with the MoFA. 
In most cases this is done through the local MoM office, which forwards the complaint 
to staff in the MoFA’s Citizen Protection Division (see Section 4: Protection of Citizens 
Abroad). Citizen Protection then, “coordinates the provision of protective measures 
for citizens abroad with foreign Indonesian Representatives and the relevant agencies 
in the country.”130 Individuals may also submit complaints directly to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Jakarta, without going through a local government office. Complaints 
may be submitted in person, or through an online complaint service.131
Some organizations described contacting all agencies at many levels at once in 
order to get a response, for example:
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  [W]e usually send a letter to the village head, the local government head, the district head, the 
recruitment agency, to BNP2TKI and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—everyone who could 
be involved. The village office will help us in drafting these letters, and so will the local Ministry 
of Manpower office. Everyone plays a role. Without their support nothing will happen.132
Some perceived the MoM to be more effective or authoritative than BNP2TKI 
because only the ministry has the ability to sanction recruitment agencies. As Legal 
Aid Jakarta explained:
  The choice of whether to go to BNP2TKI or the Ministry of Manpower is completely up to 
us. In practice, we usually request a meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs if the case 
is for a migrant worker, and then at the Ministry of Manpower, not to BNP2TKI. Because 
we think of BNP2TKI as below the Ministry of Manpower and it is the Ministry that has the 
authority—that is the most important thing in resolving disputes.133
Holding Government Accountable—the Ombudsman of Indonesia
The Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia was established in the early 
days of “reformasi,” following the fall of the Suharto regime. It is composed 
of nine members, who are selected by the legislature. In 2008, the office was 
significantly reformed and its powers expanded by Law 37/2008 regarding 
the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia.134
The Ombudsman is charged with overseeing all government institutions, 
or private entities contracted by the government, that provide services to 
the community. These functions are particularly relevant to Indonesia’s 
migrant labor system, which relies heavily on bureaucratic administration, 
oversight, and enforcement. Members of the community may make a com-
plaint (including through an online complaints service) or request an inves-
tigation, or the staff of the Ombudsman may commence an investigation 
independently. The investigation results in a report. The Ombudsman does 
not have enforcement capability.135
During the Roundtable held in Jakarta in January 2012, participants spoke 
highly of the Ombudsman as a promising new tool for addressing the con-
cerns of migrant workers. At least one organization, Migrant Care, reported 
using the Ombudsman’s Office as part of their advocacy and case-handling 
work. Further research is needed to understand how the Ombudsman com-
plaints procedures work in practice, and the ways in which investigations or 
reports may enable workers to compel action or obtain redress. 
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Dispute Resolution Procedure 
The implementation of Articles 85 and 90 of Law 39/2004 is not yet governed by com-
prehensive regulation. Indeed Law 39/2004 does not direct the Minister of Manpower 
to pass regulations establishing operational details for dispute resolution, in contrast to 
other areas such as recruitment and placement. 
BNP2TKI has several guiding documents for resolving migrant worker disputes, 
including a 2011 Standard Operating Procedure Manual and a 2012 internal regulation 
on Service Standards for Migrant Worker Protection.136 According to the service stan-
dards, the agency will receive complaints against recruitment agencies and insurers that 
are filed at any related agency, including an MoM office. BNP2TKI officials are then 
instructed to gather all relevant documents, including the worker’s personal documents, 
contracts, and other pre-departure documents such as the medical exam and insurance 
card. Although MoM does not have documented procedures, interviewees from MoM 
and BNP2TKI described a similar procedure followed by both institutions.
The BNP2TKI Dispute Resolution Process137
The Standard Operating Procedure manual sets out complaints-handling 
procedures as follows:
A) Procedure for Handling/Resolving Problems
 a) Prospective Migrant Worker/Migrant Worker/Family Member 
[“complainant” or their legal representative] submits a complaint 
in person or indirectly to relevant agency (i.e., to BNP2TKI (Deputy 
of Protection), BP3TKI, or MoM at the provincial, district or city 
Levels) and completes a complaint form.
 b) Recording of the complaint, and researching the complainant’s per-
sonal documents and other related documents in support of the 
complaint (passport, KPA, placement and employment agreements, 
medical report).
 c) Verification of the type and character of the case, to determine the 
appropriate person to handle the case.
 d) Scheduling a mediation (calling the recruitment company/insurer 
and complainant) to resolve any case arising from overseas place-
ment, not including criminal cases. 
 e) If the case involves criminal matters, urge and guide the complain-
ant to file a complaint with the relevant authorities.
 f ) Prepare a summary of a concluded case including notes of the 
agreement. 
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As the MoM official in Jakarta noted, migrant workers rarely have all of their 
documents, particularly if they left the place of employment in distress: “The documents 
are usually not compiled properly—they will just know they were in Saudi Arabia, but 
often won’t even know their passport number.” 
An MoM representative explained that in such a case, it would contact the recruit-
ment agency to verify the facts claimed by the worker, request additional documents 
(such as the employment or placement agreement) and the details of the agency in the 
destination country. The official further explained that recruitment agencies are usually 
given two weeks to comply with these requests, and if they did not comply a further 
letter would be sent.138 It was not possible to determine the extent to which recruiters 
and insurers comply with government requests for documents, and the steps the gov-
ernment can take if faced with non-cooperation.
Once all of the documents are gathered, the staff of BNP2TKI and/or the MoM 
in Jakarta will register the complaint formally and start the resolution process. Unless 
the complaint involves criminal conduct, the service standards require that the case go 
to “mediation.” Officials interviewed said that in practice, prior to scheduling a media-
tion they would often try to negotiate directly with the recruitment agency or insurance 
representative, and encourage the party to respond to the migrant worker’s complaint. 
“Mediation”
The final stage of administrative dispute resolution is a meeting between all parties 
at BNP2TKI’s offices, or the MoM offices in Jakarta, where insurance companies and 
Middle East recruitment agencies are located. Study participants commonly used the 
term “mediation” to describe this meeting, although the meetings are not presided over 
by a professional mediator, and are not governed by the rules on mediations that apply 
to court-based alternative dispute resolution.139 In essence, these “mediations” are meet-
ings between the parties organized and presided over by a bureaucrat, who assists the 
parties to come to a negotiated settlement. As an interviewee from Legal Aid Jakarta 
explained, “the mediator is just someone who we believe has the authority and who 
understands the problem and it is hoped will help us resolve the case.”
Not all cases are suited to mediation. As a practical matter, mediation is only 
possible with parties who are based in Indonesia and who are recognized under the 
law—overseas employers and brokers/agents, for example, are not subject to mediation. 
Legal experts interviewed in this study agreed that mediation works best for insurance 
claims for unpaid wages, or in cases of “failed departure”—where the worker has not 
departed Indonesia but has paid pre-departure fees (e.g., for insurance and medical 
examinations). In both cases, the other party is located in Indonesia, and the claims are 
for easily quantifiable financial loss.
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The MoM does not have a standard procedure for mediating disputes, and rather 
“does it as we have always done it.” Based on the description provided by officials, the 
procedure appears identical to that set out in BNP2TKI’s Service Standards (see box 
below). It involves contacting the parties in dispute, trying to achieve some negotiated 
resolution over the phone or by letter, and if this fails, calling all parties into a meeting.
The BNP2TKI Mediation Process
Following section “A” concerning pre-mediation case handling (see previous 
box) BNP2TKI Regulation 13/2012 then sets out the procedures for mediation 
as follows:140
B) Pre-Mediation Stage
 a) The mediator must suggest to both parties that they negotiate their 
dispute directly.
 b) The mediator must give the parties a negotiation period and must 
explain the mediation process to both parties.
 c) Any decision made by an attorney [on behalf of a client] must be 
approved in writing by both parties.
C) Mediation Stage
 a) The mediator must determine a time to hold the mediation.
 b) During the mediation, either party may be accompanied by an attorney.
 c) The mediator must encourage the parties to explore their individual 
interests and to find a solution that is best for both parties.
 d) The resulting agreement from the mediation must be completed 
within 14 working days.
 e) The agreement must be stated in the minutes of the meeting, signed 
by both parties.
 f ) When the parties cannot reach agreement, the failure to agree is noted, 
and the mediator must suggest the parties seek legal recourse.
 g) In the event the recruitment company does not respond to calls to 
attend three times or is not proactive in resolving the case, BNP2TKI 
may delay placement processing services.
 h) In the event that the recruitment agency does not fulfill its obliga-
tions, it will be suggested that the Ministry of Manpower impose a 
sanction in line with the law.
 i) If the parties fail to reach an agreement, any information or admis-
sion made by the other party during the mediation cannot be used as 
evidence in a court of law. 
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Neither BNP2TKI Service Standards Regulation nor Law 39/2004 provides any 
guidance about appropriate redress for particular harms, except in insurance claims (as 
described in the next section). 
Remedies, Sanctions, and Appeals
BNP2TKI does not have an internal appeal or grievance procedure if a migrant worker 
is dissatisfied with the conduct or outcome of mediation or if the recruitment agency 
has refused to attend. BNP2TKI explained that the worker’s principal option is to appeal 
through the courts. None of the legal experts interviewed had experience appealing a 
mediation and recourse to the courts for the filing of a civil claim was not viewed as a 
realistic option (see Section 6.D on the courts). In some criminal cases the violation 
may be reported to the police if mediation fails, and an MoM official believed that the 
courts have resolved a handful of such criminal cases.
The MoM has power to sanction, or even de-register, a recruitment agency if it 
believes the agency has violated the law.141 BNP2TKI does not have power to compel or 
sanction a recruitment agency but it may report the agency to the MoM. The BNP2TKI 
deputy of protection explained:
  For example we call the recruitment agency because there is a problem with a migrant 
worker, her salary has not been paid or other problem. We call the agency and ask them to 
come here, but often they won’t want to resolve the case or they don’t have any information. 
We then deem the agency as negligent, and as violating the law. So we send a recommenda-
tion to the Manpower Ministry that the agency be sanctioned.142
The deputy knew of one or two agencies that had been sanctioned by MoM, but 
to his knowledge none had been sanctioned as a result of BNP2TKI’s recommendation. 
In general, lawyers and civil society groups did not consider MoM sanctions to be an 
effective tool for holding agencies accountable for violations committed against migrant 
workers in individual cases.
Perceived Effectiveness of Administrative Dispute Resolution
Awareness of Administrative Dispute Resolution among Migrant Workers
Civil society organizations and legal experts were highly familiar with administrative 
dispute resolution services and spoke of them as the routine first step if direct negotia-
tions fail. In contrast, although migrant worker focus group participants mentioned 
visiting a local government office for advice or assistance in resolving a case, they did 
not view this as a mechanism or pathway to justice as such. Rather their use of local 
government was framed as seeking the intervention of a more powerful local figure in 
a dispute, usually with a local broker or agent. 
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Workers were not familiar with the more formal mediation procedure, possibly 
because BNP2TKI’s Crisis Centre is new. None of the workers described being informed 
pre-departure about the dispute resolution role of the MoM or BNP2TKI. Instead, as 
detailed in later sections, they were advised to simply go to their embassy if they had 
a problem. The large number of calls to the crisis center in its first year of operation 
suggests that awareness of the center is growing, though the very small percentage (3 
percent ) of those calls that involved a claim suggests that awareness of the agency’s 
dispute resolution function may still be relatively low.
Accessibility to Migrant Workers and their Families
Legal experts and civil society groups were generally positive about administrative pro-
cedures. They perceived them as relatively accessible options, and far cheaper than 
litigation. These procedures also enable the civil society group to confront the other 
party directly and present the worker’s case. As Umu Hilmy of Brawijaya University 
explained: “For non-litigation methods, we have more hope because we can argue 
against the denials from the recruitment agency lawyers directly.” Because workers 
were unfamiliar with mediation, they did not have a view on its accessibility.
Administrative dispute resolution can also be relatively fast and affordable—apart 
from potentially substantial travel costs—because neither MoM nor BNP2TKI charge a 
fee for the filing of a complaint. The informal or quasi-formal negotiation process was 
also described as a familiar dispute resolution method for local conflicts. 
At the same time, geographic distance is a significant barrier for many migrant 
workers. Although Article 85(2) of Law 39/2004 requires that a complaint against a 
recruitment agency be filed at a local manpower office, in practice this was usually inef-
fective because of the limitations of local manpower offices generally (see discussion in 
Government Agencies’ Dispute Resolution Functions above) and because Middle East 
recruiters are located in Jakarta.143 As a result, a migrant worker or family member must 
travel to the MoM or BNP2TKI in Jakarta, which is expensive, intimidating, and takes 
the complainant away from his or her family responsibilities. Until the role of local 
manpower offices is strengthened, or BNP2TKI has greater reach to the district level, 
accessibility will remain an obstacle, particularly for migrant workers to the Middle East.
Fairness of Procedures
All officials and civil society groups interviewed for the study were clear about the pro-
cedures for administrative dispute resolution, including mediation. Their perceptions 
accorded with the BNP2TKI SOP and its service standards, suggesting a measure of 
clarity and transparency. However, the service standards themselves note that imple-
mentation is not “optimal,” and that technical implementers in the field have found the 
numerous changes in the law and procedures “confusing.”144 
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A number of organizations believed that the process of negotiation and media-
tion could be empowering for workers. It gives organizations an opportunity to spend 
time with the worker and provide counseling or other moral support, and also provides 
an opportunity for organizations to educate and train workers about the process. Jihun 
from SBMI explained, “When we accompany a case, the family or the migrant worker 
herself experiences the case along with us. We invite them to Jakarta so that they can 
learn and we hope they could do on their own next time if they face a similar situation, 
and they also get to know the different government buildings.”
This learning-by-doing approach may also benefit communities. Eddy Purwanto, 
who was previously a private lawyer representing migrant workers, explained that he 
demonstrated to workers that they have rights by bringing them through the process, 
and that, “there is a transformation, there is a learning for the whole community so 
that if their case finishes and they go home to their village, they can help others who 
have similar problems.” 
Nevertheless, most migrant workers still confront significant challenges when 
using these quasi-formal administrative mechanisms. These include difficulties in 
gathering all of the required documents, and the need for some skilled representation, 
especially for mediation. The recruitment agency is not required to provide copies of 
documents that the worker has lost (such as the contract), and there is no mechanism 
to compel the agency’s attendance or to enforce promises made or agreements reached. 
The procedural standards do not establish appropriate remedies or set monetary bench-
marks. And because the format is more akin to a facilitated negotiation rather than a 
true mediation, the presence of the “mediator” does little to ameliorate the significant 
power imbalance between the two parties. The procedures also lack general worker 
protections such as a guarantee of confidentiality.
Compounded by the lack of an appeals process, the administrative dispute reso-
lution procedure is thus relatively weak: recruiters have little incentive, and cannot be 
compelled, to reach an outcome that is truly fair to the worker, and neither the process 
nor the government “mediators” structurally correct the barriers that workers face in 
seeking justice.
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Yuni’s Experience
Yuni is a mother of two who works with her husband selling snacks on the 
street in Sukabumi West Java. To supplement the family income, she went to 
Qatar in 2008–2009 to work as a domestic worker, using a local broker and 
a Jakarta-based recruitment agency. In Qatar, she was responsible for caring 
for a young baby, cleaning the house, and cooking for the family, which left 
her only around three hours per day to sleep. For the first eight months, her 
employers did not pay her wages and forbade her from calling her family or 
receiving calls from home. She was finally paid after eight months, but only 
for three months of work. This pattern continued for the next nine months, 
and after one year and five months, she was still missing seven months of 
wages. Finally, Yuni went on strike for a day in protest and in response, her 
employers returned her to Indonesia without paying any of what they owed. 
She explained the process when she returned:
When I came back I didn’t know where to file a complaint. I just 
thought that this is my fortune, and I was resigned to my situation. 
I did go to my sponsor [broker] and he said he would fix it, he even 
took my documents with him, but after more than a year I never 
heard anything. Finally, I spoke to my older sister who had had a 
similar problem and she introduced me to Mrs. Jejen [Coordinator 
of SBMI in Sukabumi]. I asked her if she could get my wages for me, 
but she said it was not possible now, but that I could put in a claim 
for insurance. Mrs. Jejen handled everything for me. She took me to 
Jakarta one time—to BNP2TKI and then to the recruitment agency. 
Thanks to God, they agreed to handle it, to help me. 
After that I don’t know what the process was as I didn’t go along. 
But three months later Mrs. Jejen called me and said the recruitment 
agency wanted to meet with us in Jakarta. They had arranged the 
insurance for me—I received 3 million rupiah (around US$315). This 
was not the full amount I was owed though—for seven months work 
I should have received 15 million ($1560). However, we only had the 
documents to prove early termination—I couldn’t prove the unpaid 
wages so I couldn’t submit the full claim. That was in early 2011. 
The reason they gave for the low payment was that I didn’t have my 
passport, only my contract. But the broker had taken my passport 
and when we asked him he said he gave it to the recruitment agency. 
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The agency refused to give it to me, even after they had paid me the 
money. They just said that if I wanted to travel abroad again, I would 
have to use them. They are still holding it today.
The whole process was really hard for me. The hardest thing was 
going back and forth to Jakarta, and I just went two times, Mrs. Jejen 
went many times. This cost money each time—around 300,000 
($30) per person. Many people explained to me the process along 
the way: Mrs. Jejen, another person in Jakarta, a researcher and also 
someone at the woman’s human rights commission. But I have 
forgotten most of it now. In the end, the amount was not enough, 
but satisfied or not satisfied, I just had to accept it.
Justness of Outcomes 
As the Crisis Centre figures indicate (see discussion in Government Agencies’ Dispute 
Resolution Functions above), BNP2TKI has a relatively high clearance rate, resolving 
more than half of complaints within a year. It does not, however, provide information 
about the outcome of the cases, the kind of redress achieved, or the extent to which the 
redress obtained is comparable to the losses sustained and/or the amounts claimed. 
In general, participants indicated that all amounts and claims were subject to 
some negotiation, and that as a result workers would never get the full amount, but 
they would always get something. As a staff member at one civil society group stated:
  We have never had true satisfaction in a case. Because we see that in almost all cases the 
worker loses something. For example from any claim, the worker will only receive 75 percent 
or 80 percent at most of what she deserves—whether salary or concrete demands. And more 
serious claims such as sexual harassment are never even discussed—there is no compensa-
tion for them.145
As the Crisis Center refines its procedures, it would be valuable to gather detailed 
outcome data as well as data on migrant workers’ satisfaction with the procedure and 
result in their cases. 
6.C The Migrant Worker Insurance Program
The Indonesian Migrant Worker Insurance Program is a specialized scheme established 
under Law 39/2004 as:
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  A form of protection for migrant workers in the form of financial compensation for losses 
suffered by the migrant worker before, during and after working abroad.146
The Insurance Program is regulated and monitored by the Minister of Manpower, 
and serves as the ministry’s key strategy for providing redress to, and protecting the 
financial wellbeing of, Indonesian migrant workers.147 The scheme is broad in scope 
and could, if it functioned effectively, provide meaningful financial redress for many of 
the problems commonly experienced by workers. 
Pursuant to Law 39/2004, all migrant workers are required to participate in the 
Insurance Program, thereby spreading the risks of traveling abroad across migrant 
workers, similar to national health insurance or workers’ compensation. Protection of 
migrant workers through insurance began in 1998 through a foundation run by recruit-
ment agencies, and the current scheme was established in 2006.148 
Although lawyers, civil society groups , and workers believe that migrant workers 
should be insured, they expressed frustration and cynicism about this particular pro-
gram. Many described the program as essentially extortionate, in that migrant workers 
are required to pay money to the insurance companies in order to receive approval to 
travel, but receive little benefit in return because they rarely receive pay-outs for losses. 
The World Bank in Indonesia has also been critical of the scheme, identifying problems 
in both its structure and implementation.149 In interviews, The Ministry of Manpower 
rejected such assessments and described them as “misperceptions,” as did the insur-
ance consortium at the time, Proteksi.150
At the time of publication of this study, the fate of the Migrant Worker Insurance 
Program was uncertain. On 16 July 2013, the Supreme Court reportedly invalidated the 
key implementing regulation for the scheme on the basis that it was inconsistent with 
the broader law on insurance and with anti-monopoly legislation, however the decision 
has not yet been made public.151 Further, the previous day (15 July 2013) the Indonesian 
Financial Services Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, OJK) froze the operations of the 
consortium of insurers appointed to provide insurance to migrant workers under the pro-
gram. It noted that, “several things needed improvement in the current migrant worker 
insurance scheme,” and announced that some consortium members would be audited.152 
On 30 July, 2013 the Ministry of Manpower appointed three new consortiums comprising 
32 insurance companies, none of which had participated in the previous scheme.153 How-
ever the reported Supreme Court invalidation of the 2010 regulation raises questions as 
to the validity of the appointments and the continuing operation of the program.
Despite these uncertainties, the analysis of the Insurance Program below, based 
on research conducted in 2012, remains relevant to any efforts to reform the program. 
The review of the structure and the operation of the program revealed systemic prob-
lems that went beyond the specific consortium members. These included inappropriate 
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gaps in the insurance policy, a failure of recruiters to meaningfully inform migrant 
workers about their insurance coverage and procedures for making claims, and a need 
for greater procedural clarity, transparency and accountability within the claims process, 
among other problems. 
In the discussion that follows, the term “Proteksi” or the “Proteksi Consortium” 
refers to that specific previous insurance consortium. Whenever the discussion refers 
to the general role and functions of a consortium appointed to provide insurance to 
migrant workers, the term “consortium” is used. The discussion below also refers to 
regulation 7/2010 which established the contours of the Insurance Program during the 
period of this study.
 Legal Framework and Institutions for Insurance
Licensing and Regulation of Insurance Providers
Law 39/2004 makes the purchasing of comprehensive insurance mandatory before 
departure. It places the onus on recruitment agencies to arrange insurance for workers 
they place (Article 68(1)), although regulations allow recruiters to recoup insurance costs 
from the worker.154 The law assigns responsibility for establishing and overseeing the 
scheme to the Ministry of Manpower (Article 68(2)). In contrast to the largely unregulated 
administrative redress mechanisms for migrant workers, the MoM has adopted numer-
ous regulations governing the insurance program (see Table 4, below). It has established 
a licensing scheme for insurers that provide migrant worker insurance (see Institutional 
Actors later in this section), and has set out insurance coverage and claims requirements. 
TABLE 4: Laws and Regulations Governing Migrant Worker Insurance
Law/Regulation Content
Law 39/2004 Governs the recruitment, placement and protection of Indonesian migrant 
workers; establishes insurance requirement and MoM and recruitment 
agency responsibilities. 
MoM Regulation 
23/2006
The original regulation governing insurance for migrant workers; since 
amended by later regulations.
MoM Regulation 
7/2010
The current regulation on the insurance system for migrant workers when 
research for this study was conducted. Reportedly invalidated by the 
Supreme Court on 16 July 2013.
MoM Regulation 
14/2010
The current regulation on the recruitment and training process for migrant 
workers, including the obligation to purchase insurance. 
MoM Regulation 
1/2012
Amended evidentiary requirements in Regulation 7/2010 for insurance 
claims. Potentially invalidated by the Supreme Court decision of 16 July 2013.
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National insurance legislation also sets out a framework for the insurance indus-
try as a whole, presumably including migrant worker insurance, with oversight from the 
Minister of Finance.155 The relationship between the migrant worker insurance scheme 
and the general insurance regulatory framework is gaining increasing attention, and 
was reportedly the basis of the July 2013 decision of the Supreme Court.156
The Insurance Consortium
Migrant worker insurance is provided by a consortium of insurers appointed by the 
minister of manpower. In 2010, the minister appointed the Proteksi Consortium as 
the sole provider of migrant worker insurance for a four-year term.157 Each consor-
tium draws on a pool of ten insurance companies: three life insurance companies and 
seven general insurance companies.158 Proteksi was based in Jakarta but purportedly 
had branches in major cities across Indonesia.159 It was responsible under Regulation 
7/2010 for all insurance services for migrant workers, including selling the policies, 
extending coverage, providing insurance documents, and paying claims.160 Between 
October 2010 and February 2012, BNP2TKI reported that 1,028,243 individuals had 
purchased insurance policies from Proteksi.161
For a number of reasons, including the low pay-out rate (see discussion below), 
the work of the Proteksi Consortium has been controversial in Indonesia. In 2012, Par-
liamentary Committee IX established a working group to review Proteksi, and found 
that it, “had failed to carry out its tasks as the provider of insurance in guaranteeing 
protection to migrant workers working abroad against risks arising prior to, during, 
and post placement.”162 The committee recommended that the Proteksi consortium 
be disbanded and replaced by a “more competent” consortium within three months.163 
The MoM rejected this recommendation, noting that Proteksi had already been twice 
sanctioned. The Financial Services Authority (OJK) froze the operations of Proteksi in 
July 2013, and it was replaced by three new consortiums.
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Insurance Brokers—An Important Role in Need of Reform
Like recruitment brokers, insurance brokers are “middle-men” between 
migrant workers and the insurance company. Unlike recruitment brokers, 
insurance brokers are independently regulated—both by general insurance 
law and by Ministry of Manpower regulation. The Ministry of Manpower 
appoints brokers (s. 20) and the broker selected by the consortium must 
sign a collaboration agreement to be able to handle cases (s. 21). The broker-
age firm engaged by the Proteksi consortium was PT Paladin International 
Insurance Brokers.
If this system worked effectively, brokers could be powerful allies for work-
ers. Brokers are tasked with helping insurance purchasers—in this case the 
workers—with two key tasks: “to find appropriate coverage and to make 
claims.”164 The regulations clearly intend for brokers to act in the best inter-
ests of the worker.
However, the structure of the Migrant Worker Insurance Program com-
plicates the role of brokers. First, the program is essentially a regulated 
monopoly offering only one product, so the services of a broker to identify 
an appropriate product for the worker are redundant. Further, the only fee 
that brokers receive is for selling the insurance policy (from the insurer) and 
brokers, therefore, have little incentive to assist a worker in the filing of a 
claim or any other activities beyond the sale of the policy.
Second, although the broker is only entitled to receive 15 percent of the 
insurance premium for the sale of each policy, the media has reported that 
Paladin in fact received up to 50 percent of the worker’s premium.165 The 
insurance industry suggested this amount was to cover Paladin’s costs in 
setting up representatives across Indonesia and abroad. The insurance regu-
lating body within Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (BAPEPAM) was highly 
critical of the high commission received by PT Paladin, noting: “[The bro-
kers’] loyalty is unclear at present. Based on insurance law the brokers must 
function as representatives of their customers, but in practice here they 
work for the consortium.” He also noted that the high commission reduces 
the pool of insurance funds held by the consortium, in effect limiting the 
amounts that may be paid out in claims.166 In July 2013 the Financial Services 
Authority (OJK) ordered a stop to PT Paladin’s marketing of migrant worker 
insurance, on the basis that the broker’s commission constituted a misap-
propriation of funds.167
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The Standard Insurance Policy
Under a standard Proteksi insurance policy, identical coverage was provided to all 
migrant workers, regardless of where they were travelling to work or individual risk 
factors.168 The policy was based on the requirements of Regulation 7/2010, which sets 
the premiums that a consortium can charge, the risks it must cover, the amount of cov-
erage for different risks, and the duration of coverage.169 Insurance coverage is divided 
into three periods, each with separate premiums: pre-departure (IDR 50,000), during 
placement (IDR 300,000), and post-placement and return (IDR 50,000) (Table 5). The 
total premium for these three periods for all migrant workers is IDR 400,000 (approxi-
mately US $40).
 TABLE 5: Periods of Migrant Worker Insurance Coverage
Period Duration of 
coverage
Premiums 
(IDR)
Risks covered
Pre-departure 5 months 50,000 Death
Illness or Injury
Accident
Failure to depart for no fault of the worker
Physical or sexual assault/harassment
During 
placement
24 months 300,000 Death
Illness and Injury
Accident either during or outside of work 
hours
Unemployment, either individual or en 
mass, before the contract has expired
Legal problems
Wages not paid
Returned home early
Physical and sexual assault/harassment
Mental illness
Failure to be placed for no fault of the 
worker
Moved to another worksite or place against 
the wishes of the worker
Post-
placement 
and return
1 month 50,000 Death
Illness
Accident
Loss due to actions of a third party during 
the journey home, including loss of luggage, 
physical /sexual assault
Source: Minister of Manpower Regulation 7/2010.
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This scheme has the benefits of simplicity (a single standard policy) and breadth 
of coverage (combining life, health, employment, and general insurance). However it 
has several significant shortcomings that have been the subject of criticism from many 
quarters.
The primary criticism is that more complex claims are simply not paid out, in 
part because of the overly-broad and ill-defined coverage under the policy. The World 
Bank and International Finance Corporation in Indonesia analyzed limited figures from 
2010. Their study, conducted at the request of the Indonesian government, found that 
the vast majority of insurance payments are for simple, quantifiable and easily docu-
mented losses—early termination/worker sent home (43 percent ) and the cost of a 
return flight home (49 percent ). Because of a lack of reliable public data, it is unclear 
whether the scheme is currently an effective redress mechanism for other contractual 
breaches such as non-payment of wages, changes in the nature of work against the 
worker’s wishes, or other breaches of labor conditions such as excessive hours or unsafe 
work conditions. It is also unclear whether it is effective for accidents and injuries that 
migrant workers sustain while working abroad.
What is clear is that claims for serious harms such as physical or sexual violence 
were not paid.170 The Ministry of Finance Insurance Bureau has criticized the scope of 
coverage and suggested that such harms should be covered by the government, and are 
not appropriate for an insurance scheme. A spokesperson noted in September 2012 
that new regulations are needed to, “explicitly state what is insured and what is not” 
and to delineate the different responsibilities of the private and public sectors.171 The 
World Bank has similarly argued that serious risks that are not traditionally “insurable” 
(such as physical and sexual assault or torture) should be covered by a public protection 
scheme, such as a welfare fund.172
The World Bank also critiqued the policy for placing responsibility for all possible 
risk on the migrant worker, as opposed to the recruitment agency or other party. It has 
argued, for example, that only some of the risks covered above should be borne by the 
worker, such as death or illness. Other risks should be borne by the recruitment agency as 
a cost of doing business—for example, early termination of the employment agreement.
Finally, the standard insurance policy contains a number of significant exclusions 
to coverage such as pre-existing health conditions, war, and losses due to the migrant 
worker being charged with a crime. The policy also excludes coverage if the worker 
undertakes work in the destination country that differs from the placement agreement, 
without taking into account that this frequent practice is rarely the worker’s fault. Fur-
ther, workers are not covered for loss of employment if they leave their employer, regard-
less of the grounds for departure. This is particularly problematic as departure from 
employment is often one of the only options that workers have to escape abusive situa-
tions, particularly in the context of domestic work (see Section 6.E below, on Protection 
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of Workers Abroad). Although these may be standard exclusions for employment insur-
ance contracts, they do not recognize the particular circumstances of migrant workers 
and may unfairly exclude coverage when workers need it most, leaving them without 
redress for significant harms. 
The regulations do, however, provide the insurer with discretion, “as part of [the 
insurer’s] social function,” to compensate a migrant worker for harms that are not cov-
ered by the insurance policy.173 There are no guidelines on when and how this discretion 
should be exercised; it appears to be exercised in an entirely ad hoc and non-transparent 
manner in the awarding of “charity” payments that are a fraction of the amount claimed 
by workers whose claims are otherwise denied (discussed below).
Purchasing Insurance and Claims Procedures
Compounding the structural shortcomings of the Migrant Worker Insurance Program, 
the mechanics of the system have made it particularly challenging for workers to file 
claims and obtain compensation. Study participants underscored the inaccessibility 
of the system including the particularly complicated procedures for filing claims, and 
expressed deep dissatisfaction with the small number of claims approved and amounts 
paid. 
Obtaining Insurance
Under Law 39/2004, the obligation to enroll a prospective migrant worker in an insur-
ance program rests exclusively on the head office of the recruitment agency placing 
the worker (Article 68). Insurance is a prerequisite for obtaining the KTKLN Card 
(migrant worker identity card) (Article 63) and must be obtained before the worker 
departs abroad.174 Placement of a worker abroad without insurance coverage is a crime 
with severe penalties175 (Article 103). 
Under MoM Regulation 7/2010, recruitment agencies are obligated to pay the 
premium on behalf of the worker.176 The pre-placement insurance must be paid before 
the worker signs the placement agreement with the agency, and the insurance to cover 
the period of employment and post-employment must be paid as part of the pre-depar-
ture preparations. The recruiter may then recover the costs of the premium from the 
worker.
Following payment of the premium, the consortium must issue to the recruit-
ment agency a receipt for payment and a copy of the insurance policy in the worker’s 
name, as well as the participant insurance card (“KPA”), for the agency to then provide 
to the worker.177 The insurance company must also give a copy of the insurance policy 
to the director-general of the MoM, the head of the Provincial MoM Office, the head of 
the District or Municipal MoM Executive, and the chair of the recruitment agency.178
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Key Insurance Documents
The migrant worker’s ability to make an insurance claim is dependent on her 
possession of two key insurance documents: the policy and the insurance 
participation card (KPA):
Insurance Policy: An insurance agreement between the insurer and the insured, 
printed by the insurer and based on the list of participants provided by the private 
placement agency.
Regulation 7/2010 states that the consortium must give the policy to the 
worker after the premium is paid. All workers receive the same insurance 
policy, a copy of which is available on the Proteksi website.179 The coverage 
and the premium do not change regardless of where the migrant worker is 
travelling. The only unique information on the policy is the policy number. 
It does not contain the migrant worker’s name. 
Insurance Participation Card (KPA): A card printed by the insurer in the name 
of the migrant worker/prospective migrant worker as proof of being insured. The 
card is linked to and cannot be separate from an insurance policy.
The KPA is required for making an insurance claim. Regulation 7/2010 states 
that every worker has the right to a KPA (Article 18), and mandates that the 
consortium print and provide the KPA (Article 14(1)) through the recruit-
ment agency (Article 16(5)) together with the policy after the premium is 
paid (Article 16(2)). 
The regulations do not specify procedures for supplying a worker with a 
replacement KPA, nor an obligation to provide one, which is particularly 
significant for the many workers unable to make claims because they either 
lost or never received their KPA.
The Ministry of Manpower can impose administrative sanctions on the consor-
tium if it fails to print and provide the KPA and insurance policy to the worker or 
distribute copies to other relevant government offices. The sanctions include written 
reminders, temporary stoppage of some functions, and finally removal of the license 
to participate in the program. The ministry is required to publish neither the details 
of sanctions imposed, nor any remedial action taken by the consortium in response. 
Moreover, it is not clear how sanctions are triggered, and the law does not provide a 
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mechanism through which a migrant worker can complain to the ministry about not 
having received her KPA or policy. 
It is also not clear whether the consortium’s obligations to give the worker her 
KPA and policy are satisfied by giving the documents to the recruitment agency. In fact, 
there is no accompanying obligation on the part of the recruitment agency to deliver 
the documents to the worker or ensure that he or she understands them, and there are 
no sanctions for failure to do so. As a result, many workers do not receive the policy 
and KPA, and do not understand their contents or implications, substantially limiting 
their ability to pursue claims. 
Submitting a Claim
The procedure for submitting a claim is set out in MoM Regulation 7/2010, as well as in 
the standard insurance policy. A migrant worker, or her rightful heir, must file an insur-
ance claim with the consortium180 within 12 months after the harm occurred or loss 
was sustained, regardless of whether it was in Indonesia or abroad.181 This requirement 
is particularly onerous in light of the standard two year duration of migrant worker 
contracts, and the significant practical barriers faced by a worker filing a claim from 
abroad (or by family members in Indonesia collecting the required original documents 
while the worker is abroad). 
To submit a claim, the migrant worker or family member must present the origi-
nal KPA, together with supporting documents, to the consortium.182 These documents 
may include receipts for medical expenses such as hospital bills, the employment agree-
ment, or a letter from the embassy supporting the basis of the claim. Evidence of harm 
abroad invariably requires documentation from abroad, which is significantly easier to 
obtain while in the country, rather than after returning home. 
Disputing a Claim Decision
If a worker’s claim is rejected or the worker is unsatisfied with the payment, he or she 
may submit a complaint to the Ministry of Manpower (at local or national levels) or 
BNP2TKI, and request a facilitated dispute resolution identical to the process for dis-
putes with recruitment agencies183 (see Section 6.A above). Regulation 7/2010 does not 
set out any detail about this process. 
The standard insurance policy has its own conflict resolution clause, which is 
not consistent with the regulation, and was not mentioned by any participant in this 
study. It provides workers with the options to either seek arbitration of a dispute, with 
each side appointing their choice of arbiter, or file a claim in the district court. None of 
the interviewees in this study knew of a case being arbitrated, or brought in court, and 
all were cynical about its prospects of success (see Section 6.D on Redress through the 
Courts below). 
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Perceived Effectiveness of the Insurance Program
Awareness of the Program
Although the Migrant Worker Insurance Program is a mandatory program for migrant 
workers, awareness of the program among focus group participants was very low. 
Almost none of the focus group participants mentioned insurance coverage when asked 
about documents or steps they took to access redress. Five participants, when asked 
directly, simply said that they were not insured and did not receive any insurance card. 
Another from Indramayu recalled, “I didn’t receive any insurance, but I wasn’t even 
told my passport number, let alone receive an insurance card.” 
Participants who mentioned insurance expressed limited understanding of its 
operation. One returned worker in Malang noted: “When I left the second time I heard 
someone at the [recruitment] office say: ‘You have insurance.’ But the insurance docu-
ments weren’t given to me. [The agency] just said, ‘Later, if anything happens, telephone 
the office and the office will arrange everything’.” Only two participants stated that they 
knew they were insured and had a KPA. While this sample is not representative, and 
the interviewed workers left at different times, these reports suggest a general lack of 
awareness and understanding of the insurance program among migrant workers.
A lack of awareness about insurance and claims procedures was generally accepted 
by all interviewees, although they gave different explanations. A former insurance bro-
ker interviewed blamed the lack of awareness on workers, commenting that migrant 
workers would just throw the policies they received on the floor, not understanding 
them. In the end, he explained, his company stopped providing the policies to save on 
paper.184 Other experts attributed the lack of awareness to bad faith dealings. The direc-
tor of the BNP2TKI’ Crisis Center said:
  In this area, a lot of games are played. I get very upset, because for example they give out poli-
cies, but the worker is not required to sign the policy. So how would the worker understand 
what the content says, especially the fine print? This is how I see it and so I get very upset, 
not against the individuals but the institutions … they are sneaky.185
Experts from civil society groups invariably attributed migrant workers’ low 
awareness to the failure of recruitment agencies to inform workers about the contents 
and importance of the insurance policy, which may explain migrant workers not wish-
ing to keep a copy. Lack of information, however, means that workers often do not 
know to gather evidentiary documents before returning, or to submit a claim within 
the 12-month period. 
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Accessibility
Migrant workers face substantial barriers to accessing the insurance claims process, 
despite the accessibility of insurance coverage itself, which is arranged by recruitment 
agencies. Empirical data confirms that the number of claims submitted is very small 
compared to the workers who likely have valid claims.186 The parliamentary working 
group cited that, in 2010-2011, 113,910 returning workers reported experiencing prob-
lems when interviewed at the airport, but only 15,874 (or 14 percent) of those workers 
submitted insurance claims. Given the breadth of the policy, it is likely many returning 
workers with valid claims are not filing them.
As noted above, the greatest hurdle that migrant workers confront is their lack 
of awareness and understanding of their insurance coverage and related claims proce-
dures. A second major hurdle is geography. Proteksi was based in Jakarta, and although 
it reportedly had representatives across the country, interviewees were sceptical that 
these representatives could effectively receive and process claims. Further, Proteksi’s 
presence in major destination countries was limited, and thus workers were not able 
to submit their claims abroad. 
Combined with the one-year deadline for filing claims, this excluded significant 
numbers of workers from accessing insurance benefits to which they would otherwise 
be entitled. Proteksi had a desk at the airport for returning migrant workers to file 
claims immediately upon return, although filing at the airport was not required. This 
ameliorated the problem somewhat for workers able to return home within a year of 
the harm occurring, but was of no avail to those for whom the harm or loss occurred 
during the earlier part of their time abroad. And the statistics cited by the parliamentary 
working group (see above) revealed that even with this facility, only 14 percent of work-
ers with problems filed claims.
In June 2012, the Indonesian Lawyers Association (AAI) and BNP2TKI launched 
a three-month (June to September 2012) joint project to provide legal assistance to 
migrant workers seeking to file insurance claims at the airport. The head of AAI reported 
that lawyers accompanied 5,889 workers during interviews with the insurance claims 
handlers at Terminal 4, and that 2,750 persons (47 percent) received a payout.187 This is 
not significantly greater than the proportion of successful claims reported by Proteksi 
more generally. It is likely, however, that more claims were filed than would have been 
filed had the lawyers not been present, and that the payouts were higher. More research 
should be undertaken to determine the impact of legal aid on migrant workers’ ability 
to access compensation through the insurance program. 
In addition to barriers to filing a claim, migrant workers and their families also 
confront the obstacle of travel to Jakarta to negotiate the rejection of a claim. As one 
SBMI case handler from Brebes explained:
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  In Brebes, there is no bargaining directly with the insurer. At most, the government will 
bargain on our behalf, it is the way [the system] is structured. And [the local official] also has 
to coordinate with the provincial level—that is the bureaucracy. So the best path is to take it 
to the center [Jakarta] directly. Then the case is mediated.188
Fairness and Transparency of Procedures
Study participants were highly critical of the insurance claims procedure. Almost all civil 
society group case-handlers who assist workers to submit insurance claims described 
the process as unnecessarily complicated, noting that workers could rarely fulfill the 
claim requirements. For example, many migrants could not submit a claim because 
they did not hold their original KPA, either because they never received it, or they had 
to leave it behind when they fled their employer’s home. The regulation does not require 
replacement of a lost KPA.
Organizations also complained of a lack of transparency in the insurance claims 
process. Roma Hidayat from ADBMI, stated that, “the way to make a claim and the 
mechanism for deciding a claim is not public information—there is a serious lack of 
transparency and accountability in the system.” She noted that, “If we ever ask … what is 
happening to a claim they will still say it is ‘in process’ but what process we don’t know, 
we never receive an answer.”189 Workers are often unable to establish the status of their 
claim, or the timeframe in which it will be decided, making it difficult for them to make 
financial and other key decisions about their future. There is a similar lack of transpar-
ency and due process in the rejection of claims, with no reasons provided to the worker.
Outcomes
According to case handlers and lawyers, because of evidentiary and other challenges, 
almost all claims submitted are either rejected outright or not paid out in full. Data from 
BNP2TKI revealed that in both 2010 and 2011 just under half of claims (45 percent and 
48 percent respectively) were rejected.190 Civil society groups suggested that this was 
sometimes attributable to incomplete documents, but at other times the claims were 
simply refused. The consortium explained that claims are usually rejected because the 
worker was sent home due to poor physical or mental health, due to not having the 
required skills, or because the worker wished to return, none of which are covered by 
the policy.191 Because the regulations do not require reasons to be provided to the claim-
ant when rejecting a claim, and because there is no publicly available data on the types 
of claims made, it is difficult to assess the accuracy of this explanation. 
Data on the amounts paid out, including whether accepted claims were paid in 
full or in part, is similarly unavailable. However, the perception among civil society 
organizations was that claimants rarely received the full amount claimed due to docu-
mentation difficulties. As one advocate explained:
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  One weakness in the insurance system is when … if you don’t have one thing, like the 
Employment Agreement, the company won’t pay out 100 percent on the basis that the docu-
ments aren’t complete. So there are some that only receive 25 percent of what they are due, 
after much negotiation, and this really harms migrant workers.192
One returned worker, for example, had submitted a claim for unpaid wages of 
IDR 15 million ($1560), but received only IDR 3 million (US $312) from the consortium. 
The consortium determined she did not have evidence of non-payment of wages, so 
gave her compensation for a claim of early termination, which provides a smaller pay-
ment. Payments in such cases were often described as “ex gratia payments” or “charity 
cases,” in which the insurer declared that the full claim was invalid, but paid a reduced 
amount as a form of charity. Although technically legal since early 2012 (see Legal 
Framework, above) worker representatives believed the practice was used to stop work-
ers challenging the refusal of their entire claim.
Mimi’s Case
My sponsor took me to the recruitment agency and I stayed at the boarding 
house for 1.5 months. They taught me how to sew. I had no problems there, but 
when I got to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the placement wasn’t the same as what was 
written onto my visa, the employer was different. I was put on the top floor of the 
house, and I wasn’t allowed to eat or drink while I was working, not allowed to 
go out. They didn’t pay me for five months, they said because I couldn’t speak 
Arabic. They were angry with me all the time because I couldn’t understand 
them. I asked the agent if I could change, but the agent said no. I asked my 
employers if I could go home, but they refused. Eventually I just refused to work, 
and they took me to the embassy. There was a big argument at the embassy, 
and finally the employer agreed to pay my trip home, thanks to God. But they 
held onto my wages.
The recruitment agency helped me file the insurance claim, but I didn’t get all 
of my wages back. The claim was for two million rupiah, but they paid out 1.5 
million. Even then, the sponsor only gave me 500,000 … It was all divided up—
the sponsor received 500,000, the agency 500,000, and 500,000 to me. It was 
hard for me to accept this. But it was complicated because I didn’t hold onto 
the policy … There were policies but the recruitment agency didn’t want to give 
them to us—if we held them and arranged everything ourselves, then of course 
the payment couldn’t be divided up. 
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In some cases, delays in assessing insurance claims result in justice denied. 
Indeed, participants reported instances in which the government reportedly stepped 
in to provide assistance when insurance claims were delayed or rejected. ADBMI in 
Lombok provided an example of such a case:
  We had a case that when we claimed insurance, we asked [BP3TKI] to put forward the claim, 
and the staff of [BNP2TKI], a person from Jakarta answered us that they were finding it 
difficult to communicate with the recruitment agency. So at that time, because the victim 
had broken her leg and needed money for treatment, BNP2TKI gave money from their own 
budget for the treatment, although it should have been covered by insurance.193
6.D  Seeking Redress in the Courts
Indonesia has a national network of courts overseen by the Supreme Court in Jakarta. 
In labor-related cases such as claims of unpaid wages, migrants have the right to bring 
suit against another party under civil law. Indeed, the BNP2TKI Regulation 13/2012 
requires BNP2TKI officials to direct parties to the courts if they cannot resolve their 
insurance claim or their case against a recruitment company at mediation. In cases of 
serious abuse and exploitation of migrant workers, police may file charges against the 
recruiter, resulting in a criminal trial.
The universal opinion of the lawyers and civil society groups interviewed in this 
study was that the court system is not a viable option for the vast majority of migrant 
workers seeking redress. Criminal cases are hamstrung by lack of evidence of what 
occurred abroad, among other challenges, and civil litigation is expensive, slow, and 
time-consuming. Migrants appearing before the courts require sophisticated legal rep-
resentation and extensive documentary evidence—generally insurmountable barriers 
to access. As a result, very few cases involving migrant workers have gone to court, and 
none of the migrant workers interviewed for this study had used the Indonesian court 
system to resolve their cases. 
This section provides a brief overview of the court system and describes stake-
holders’ perceptions of both the civil and criminal jurisdictions of the court, with the 
aim of identifying specific barriers to entry, and potential areas for further exploration 
and action.
Overview of Indonesian Courts and Tribunals
Indonesia has a civil law system based on the Roman-Dutch model, modified by custom-
ary and Islamic law.194 Judges are trained specifically for their positions and appointed 
for life. The highest court in Indonesia is the Mahkmah Agung (the Supreme Court). 
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It has the authority “to hear a trial at the highest level, [and] to review ordinances and 
regulations made under any law against such law.” For example, the Supreme Court 
may review regulations made by the Minister of Manpower for compliance with the 
minister’s authority under Law 39/2004.195
Beneath the Supreme Court, the constitution provides196 for public courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction, a constitutional court based in Jakarta,197 and other specialized courts 
and tribunals.198 The public courts (also known as ordinary courts) would hear the vast 
majority of potential migrant worker cases, whether civil or criminal in nature, because 
they apply the law contained in civil, criminal and commercial codes. They include 
courts of first instance (district courts) as well as appeals courts (high courts). 
The Industrial Relations Court
In 2004, Indonesia revised its system for resolving industrial or workplace 
disputes by passing Law 2/2004 on Industrial Relations Disputes Settle-
ment. The law sets out a framework for the settlement of disputes that 
is intended to be “prompt, fair, and inexpensive.” “Disputes” include, “a 
disagreement on rights, conflicting interests, a dispute over termination of 
employment, or a dispute among trade unions within one company” (Article 
1).199 The law was intended to resolve workplace disputes between compa-
nies and workers within Indonesia.
Law 2/2004 establishes a process that initially mirrors the process in the 
migrant labor system—bipartite deliberations and negotiations, followed by 
conciliation (in the case of an unfair dismissal challenge) or mediation by 
a civil servant at the Ministry of Manpower. However, if the case fails to 
resolve through mediation, the parties can bring the case to the Industrial 
Relations Court.
The Industrial Relations Court is created within the public courts of general 
jurisdiction, and has jurisdiction over “the workplace of the worker” (Article 
81). Cases must be brought at the district court level. On each case sits a 
panel of three judges—a regular district court judge and two ad-hoc judges 
whose appointments are proposed by the employer organization and the 
worker/union respectively (Article 88). Decisions of the Industrial Relations 
Court can only be appealed directly to the Supreme Court (there is no right 
to appeal to the intermediate high court level). 
The Industrial Relations Court is generally viewed as foreclosed to migrant 
workers. The law limits parties to the dispute to a worker/worker’s organi-
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zation and an employer/employer’s organization (Article 1), and does not 
extend to parties involved in the recruitment of workers. Although the law 
does not mention recruitment agencies, there may be scope to examine and 
test joint liability or agency theories that could allow workers to bring indus-
trial relations claims against recruitment agencies within Indonesia, though 
it should be noted that this court has also been criticized for its inaccessibil-
ity and failure to provide workers with timely just outcomes. Regardless, the 
structure of the Industrial Relations Court, and the lessons learned from its 
operation, may provide a useful basis for considering a specialized tribunal 
for migrant workers. 
Like other branches of government, the judicial branch has undergone significant 
structural reform in the past 15 years, including a shift in responsibility for judicial 
appointments200 and organizational, administrative, and financial functions away from 
the executive branch.201
However, perhaps due to the relatively closed nature of court work and delibera-
tions, the judicial branch in Indonesia is viewed as having been slower to reform than 
other branches of government. Numerous critical reports have highlighted the percep-
tion or reality of nepotism, collusion, and corruption in the judicial branch. For exam-
ple, Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer found that Indonesians 
in 2010–2011 perceived the judiciary to be among the most corrupt institutions (after 
the legislature, political parties, and police) in the country.202 There is a widespread per-
ception, even among lawyers and others within the system, that the outcomes of cases 
can be bought by the wealthy, and thus litigation is a losing battle for people from poorer 
and disadvantaged communities.203 This was reflected in the views of participants in 
this study, although the challenges in civil and criminal cases may differ.
Redress through the Criminal Justice System
Criminal offenses in Indonesia are predominantly set out in the Indonesian Penal 
Code204 (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, or KUHP), although some other regu-
lations, including those related to immigration and anti-trafficking, contain criminal 
offenses relevant to migrant workers.205
Indonesian Penal Code
The KUHP contains a number of offenses relevant to migrant workers.206 These include 
fraud, abduction of children, child labor, and deprivation of liberty. Private recruiters 
could potentially be criminally liable if, for example, their negligence results in the 
“deprivation of [the migrant worker’s] freedom by illegal means, or caus[ing] the persis-
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tence of such deprivation of freedom,” punishable by up to three months imprisonment 
(KUHP, Article 334). 
Migrant workers face numerous obstacles to bringing charges under the code, 
most notably the statute of limitations for bringing claims. Under the KUHP, the com-
plaint must be filed within six months after the complainant “has knowledge of the 
committed act,” if domiciled in Indonesia, or within nine months if the complainant is 
abroad (KUHP, Article 73). Family members and civil society organizations cannot file 
while the worker is overseas because the KUHP only permits the individual to make 
the complaint, unless she is a minor below the age of 16, in which case a guardian can 
bring the complaint (KUHP, Article 72). For migrant workers who are often abroad for 
two years or more, these are significant constraints, unless the offense occurs in the 
pre-departure phase and the complaint is filed in this period.
Immigration Violations and Trafficking in Persons
In 2009, Indonesia ratified the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized 
Crime 2000 and its two related protocols on the trafficking and smuggling of human 
beings. Related domestic legislation has resulted in the creation of potential avenues of 
redress for migrant workers, as well as potential liabilities. 
The recently passed Law on Immigration 6/2011, for example, established more 
severe penalties for possessing or using a false Indonesian passport for one’s own use 
or the use of another.207 The same penalty applies for providing false information to the 
government in an application for a passport.208 Such offenses must be prosecuted by 
the Ministry of Immigration and so may be double-edged swords for migrant workers: 
although they could be used to prosecute a broker or recruitment company that arranges 
a falsified passport for a worker, the worker who unwittingly uses the falsified passport 
could also be prosecuted.
The Indonesian legislature also passed the national Law on Trafficking in Persons 
(Anti-Trafficking Law) in 2007, which came into force in 2009. The Anti-Trafficking Law 
addresses more serious cases of abuse and exploitation of migrant workers.209 It defines 
trafficking210 in line with the international definition of trafficking in persons under 
the UN Convention. This includes the recruitment of an individual by the use of fraud, 
deception, or abuse of power, by a person having control over that individual, for the 
purpose of exploitation. “Exploitation” includes “forced labor or services, and slavery or 
slavery-like practices … or the use of the labor or ability of a person by another to obtain 
a material or a non-material benefit.” These provisions may be relevant in many migrant 
labor cases, particularly those involving deceit, abuse, force, or other forms of coercion.
The procedures for investigation and prosecution of the Anti-Trafficking Law fol-
low the KUHP, though specific provisions intended to protect victims are included. For 
example, victims of trafficking have a right to confidentiality and witness protection 
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throughout the legal process (Article 44), as well as a right to restitution (Article 48). 
Restitution in this context refers to compensation for financial loss or loss of earnings, 
pain and suffering, medical and psychological treatment, and other losses sustained as 
a result of being trafficked. The restitution must be ordered at the same time as other 
orders of the court in a criminal matter, and must be paid within 14 days from the day 
the defendant is informed of the order and will be held by the court until all appeals, if 
any, are decided (Article 48). 
Importantly, the Anti-Trafficking Law establishes liability for corporations found 
guilty of trafficking in persons. If a corporation, such as a recruitment company, is 
found guilty of a trafficking offense, the managers of the corporation will be held liable 
for the offense (Article 13). In addition, the corporation can be levied substantial fines 
of three times the amount imposed on individuals, and may also have its license or 
legal status revoked, the proceeds of the crime confiscated, its management dismissed, 
and its board prohibited from establishing another corporation to conduct the same 
business (Article 15). 
Civil society groups and lawyers interviewed in Indonesia were highly familiar 
with the Anti-Trafficking Law, perhaps because of a strong anti-trafficking movement 
that led to the law’s enactment. Nevertheless, according to the experts at the January 
2012 roundtable and interviewees, the law is still not widely used. Some attributed this 
to the penalties in the Anti-Trafficking Law being too high, as a result of which police 
are unwilling to bring charges. Others suggested that because the Anti-Trafficking Law 
only came into force in 2009, justice actors are less confident about using it. 
  It is hard—the courts and other parts of the justice system don’t really understand the Anti-
trafficking law, they just know the Criminal Code (KUHP). And in fact this is an advantage to 
the recruitment agencies that lobby the justice system actors not to process the case accord-
ing to law.211
Perceptions of the Criminal Justice Framework
In general, the experts interviewed for this study or who participated in the Roundtable 
were more critical of the criminal procedure and its implementation than they were 
about underlying laws and criminal offenses. 
Criminal prosecution has the benefit of highlighting egregious cases of abuse, and 
bringing some justice to victims and their families. It may also hold recruitment agencies 
and individuals accountable for abuses suffered by workers. In some cases, a guilty verdict 
in a criminal case may also support a civil claim for redress, or may support a claim for 
restitution from the defendant as part of sentencing (for example in trafficking cases). 
However numerous procedural barriers obstruct migrant workers’ access to 
the criminal justice system. Indonesian criminal procedure is set out in the Criminal 
104  MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCING RIGHTS AND SEEKING REDRESS
Procedure Code or KUHAP.212 Under the KUHAP, police officers are responsible for 
receiving and investigating complaints brought to their attention. The police then pro-
vide a file of evidence to the public prosecutor, who may also be involved in the inves-
tigation phase. According to the Ministry of Manpower in Jakarta, cases may also be 
brought to court if the migrant workers are unable to resolve their claims through 
mediation within the ministry or BNP2TKI. In those cases, migrant workers will then 
report their cases to the police, and staff from the ministry may act as witnesses.213 
Experts interviewed during this study indicated that migrant workers frequently 
go to the police to file complaints, for example if the broker defrauded them of fees or 
documents, but they knew of very few cases resulting in prosecution before the court. 
Unlike informal mechanisms or a civil case, the victim and his or her representatives’ 
play no role in criminal cases beyond reporting the matter and then appearing at trial. 
The ultimate decision-making authority as to whether or not to proceed with a case rests 
with the police and prosecutors.
Prosecutorial review was described as difficult in many cases, because migrant 
workers usually have little documentary evidence of the crime. A representative of 
Migrant Care, a large case-handling organization in Jakarta, said that he almost always 
receives a letter of termination of investigation because the evidence is not strong 
enough. He described the high-profile case of Ermawati, a minor (under 15) who died 
while working in Saudi Arabia. After two years, her case had still not been processed 
and the prosecutor had sent it back to the police for more evidence. 
Several lawyers and civil society staff noted the difficulty in having cases taken 
seriously by the police. As the coordinator of ADBMI in Lombok explained, “We have 
reported cases to the police a number of times but the police always say they can’t find 
anything to charge the defendant with.” A lawyer experienced in migrant worker cases 
noted that police seem to be “less than vigilant” in cases involving migrant workers. 
He explained:
  What is needed from the lawyer or CSO in these cases is to push the [police and prosecutors] 
and remind them to go forward with the case. If not, the case will simply disappear as we 
have experienced. It is extraordinary.214
Finally, even if a case is prosecuted, it may still fail if the victims decide not to 
testify. Eddy Purwanto of TIFA and Jihun of SBMI described a case in which the recruit-
ment company essentially bribed victims to not testify at a trial for trafficking-related 
offenses.215 In that case, eight workers were sent to Hong Kong but when they arrived, 
the agency partner collected them and sent them on to Macau. Most of the workers were 
minors sent abroad illegally, and their employer in Macau did not pay them for their 
work. After hearing of the case, SBMI and the TIFA lawyer believed the action of the 
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agency could constitute trafficking. They secured the return of the girls and reported 
the case to the police:
  We reported the recruitment agency to the police so that the company would be punished for 
sending these young girls abroad. But the staff of the agency started approaching and intimi-
dating the girls. They said ‘Come on, don’t file a complaint, what is it you want? Money? 
We can give it to you, how much—10 million, 50 million rupiah?’ Two workers immediately 
decided to take the money. The others refused, but as the amount offered increased, they 
agreed. Eventually only one girl was left who wanted to see them punished. This young girl 
wanted to see them prosecuted up to the last minute, but finally she succumbed to the pres-
sure and was paid IDR 40 million [approx. US$4,000] from the agency in return for not 
testifying.216
This case also demonstrates an important benefit for migrant workers of direct 
negotiation or government-facilitated mediation over the criminal justice system: it 
provides them with a more direct route to financial redress. Another member of a civil 
society organization noted:
  The informal system is far more satisfying in terms of a sense of justice for victims than 
going to the police. The police might resolve the case according to law and the perpetrator 
may go to jail, but justice for the victim is getting back her money and her money won’t 
come back by sending the perpetrator to jail. The lost money will always be a burden for the 
victim.217
Participants interviewed for this study mentioned only two cases in which a 
recruitment agency or broker was successfully prosecuted for crimes against migrant 
workers. In one case in Indramayu, West Java, SBMI noted that a broker received three 
years imprisonment and the recruitment agency manager received four. It was not clear 
what these defendants had been charged with, whether they had paid a fine, or whether 
the individual worker had received restitution. In addition, a case-handling officer from 
Migrant Care described a case in Jakarta in 2007 in which there were two victims. While 
the broker in that case received a sentence of four years imprisonment, the recruitment 
agency was allowed to continue to operate. 
According to an MoM official, most cases do resolve if they proceed to court, but 
he acknowledged that because migrant workers rarely have all of the necessary eviden-
tiary documents, the “resolution” is rarely restitution in the form of full compensation 
for the loss. Rather, he implied, it would be a compromise solution or partial payment. 
He was unable to provide examples of such resolutions.218
It was was very difficult to obtain information on the specific charges and crimi-
nal provisions that have been invoked in relation to crimes perpetrated against migrant 
workers, and the nature or identity of the defendants (i.e., brokers or recruiters in 
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their individual capacity, recruitment agencies in their corporate capacity, insurers etc.). 
Some interviewees appeared to conflate criminal and civil processes, demonstrating a 
lack of clear understanding of the distinct mechanisms and processes through which 
migrant workers may seek redress. The types of criminal charges filed warrants further 
research and examination.
Redress for Civil Claims
In addition to pursuing criminal cases prosecuted by the state, Indonesians may bring 
civil claims in the courts of general jurisdiction. Civil claims are matters between private 
individuals or companies based on the provisions of Indonesia’s Civil Code, the B.W. 
(Burgerlijk Wetboek).219
There are several potential claims a migrant worker could bring under the Civil 
Code. The Civil Code provides for breach of contract claims (regulated by Book III 
of the Civil Code), or enforcement of a contract if a recruiter has failed to carry out a 
necessary step in the placement process. A worker could, for example, bring a claim 
against a recruitment agency if she was not sent to the location agreed under the place-
ment agreement, was not paid the amount agreed, or was made to do a different kind 
of work or work under very different conditions than those stipulated in the agreement. 
A worker could also potentially sue for nullification of the agreement based on fraud or 
duress if the situation abroad was not as promised, but a recruiter was still demanding 
payment of fees (B.W. Article 1321). The worker may also sue an insurer for breach of 
the insurance contract if the insurer improperly denies a claim. 
The potential benefits of a civil claim are significant. Both parties to a civil claim 
are required to attend all hearings (unlike an informal mediation at BNP2TKI). Potential 
compensation available to the migrant workers could cover direct financial losses as well 
as pain and suffering if the recruitment agency is found liable. Furthermore, in seeking 
to address the more systemic issues underlying contract fraud and related abuses, the 
pursuit of civil claims would contribute to an analysis of the law and of migrant worker 
contracts that could bring much needed clarity to this complex area of law, while clearly 
identifying liability for recruitment agents and their brokers. For further claims that 
could be tested through strategic test case litigation, see Recommendation 10 below. 
As noted in the recommendation, pro bono involvement of law firms, donor support 
for civil society organizations, and law school clinics and academics may be needed to 
develop and bring any viable claims.
Accessibility of the Civil Courts
Pursuing a claim through the civil courts faces many barriers. Most significantly, the 
pursuit of civil claims is generally cost-prohibitive for migrant workers and their family 
members. In order to bring a civil case, the worker must be represented by a lawyer 
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who is paid on an hourly basis (unless acting pro bono), and must pay an administra-
tive/registration fee and other fees for each document submitted in evidence. Further, 
because the claim is generally filed in the locality of the defendant, the migrant worker 
must usually travel back and forth to Jakarta to attend the hearings. 
If jurisdiction over the defendant can be established, the next impediment is the 
length of the civil litigation process. After a claim is filed, the court will require the par-
ties to mediate the case with a professional court mediator, through a confidential medi-
ation process. If the mediation fails, the case will progress to court, proceed through 
stages of filing of documents and claims, and then go to trial. The Supreme Court has 
indicated that most such claims will be resolved between 6 and 12 months after the first 
court hearing. Once the district court has decided the case, however, it may be appealed 
to the high court and eventually to the Supreme Court. The entire process could take a 
number of years and may require a substantial investment of time and effort that may 
be prohibitive for individual migrant workers needing to support their family.
Perceptions of Procedures and Outcomes
According to those interviewed, civil claims filed in the court by a migrant worker are 
extremely rare; most interviewees did not know of any such case. Only three of the 
experts interviewed had direct experience with a civil claim in the district courts. They 
noted that an experienced lawyer with detailed knowledge of migrant worker law and 
contracts was needed, and civil society groups rarely had lawyers on staff. Even if they 
had the legal expertise on staff, civil society groups usually did not pursue civil cases 
because they would not meet the worker’s need for immediate assistance, and work-
ers were unable to wait for a trial and then various appeals before ultimately receiving 
compensation. Finally, they stated that migrant workers rarely have the documents 
required to support a civil claim. As Pratiwi from Jakarta Legal Aid explained, “most 
workers [with serious problems] have lost their documents or they never had a contract 
at all, but if they enter the formal system, they need this as evidence.” Migrant workers 
may be able to obtain certain documents such as employment, placement, or insurance 
contracts from the other party through the required discovery process, but this requires 
further examination.220
6.E Protection Abroad and Embassy Assistance
All mechanisms described above are available within Indonesia. However, focus group 
participants who had travelled abroad frequently started their search for justice while 
they were in the destination country. A number of options are open to workers while 
they are abroad, including contacting the agent in the destination country, contacting 
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the recruitment company back in Indonesia, and contacting local authorities abroad, 
such as police or migrant worker assistance organizations. For the purpose of this study 
and its focus on workers’ country of origin, the Indonesian embassy and its assistance 
services play a critical role. 
Legal and Institutional Framework
Like other major migrant worker countries of origin, Indonesia has established services 
within its missions abroad that focus on the protection of citizens including migrant 
workers. In fact, the employment agreements reviewed for this study required that any 
dispute between a worker and an employer be resolved peaceably with the assistance 
of an embassy.
The Citizen Protection division within the embassy is charged with protecting 
and assisting all Indonesian citizens abroad.221 Article 78 of Law 39/2004 states that 
Indonesian foreign missions are responsible for the protection of migrant workers. 
Article 80 further elaborates on that obligation:
  78(1): Republic of Indonesia representatives provide protection to migrant workers abroad 
in accordance with [national] law and international law and custom.
In 2006, after numerous complaints about the treatment of migrant workers 
abroad, the President’s Instruction on Improving the Placement and Protection of 
Migrant Workers included an enhancement of embassies’ protection role (Table 6).222
 TABLE 6: Enhanced Protection Role for Embassies after 2006
Program Action Outcome Target Date 
1. Advocacy and 
Defense
Facilitating Legal Aid for 
Migrant Workers
Cooperation between 
Indonesian embassies 
and local law firms in 11 
destination countries
July 2007
Placement of Police 
Attachés in Embassies 
according to need.
2. Strengthening the 
Role of Embassies 
in Migrant Worker 
Protection
Establishing Citizen 
Services/Labour Attaches 
in migrant worker 
receiving countries
Citizen Services/Labor 
Attachés in six countries, 
including [in the Middle 
East] Jordan, Syria and 
Qatar
June 2007
Source: Adapted from Presidential Instruction 6/2006.
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: INDONESIA  109
In 2008, following the Presidential Instruction, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
adopted a regulation on Citizen Services, containing the Guideline on Services to and 
Protection for Indonesian Citizens Abroad.223 The Ministry of Manpower also adopted 
a regulation in 2011 to place its own staff in embassies as labor attachés to undertake 
labor-related activities.224 Labor attaché offices within embassies have specific protection 
functions for migrant workers, namely:
• Facilitating and mediating the resolution of disputes and conflicts between 
migrant workers and their employers; and,
• Facilitating advocacy for migrant workers according to law and regulations in the 
country of placement, and international law.225
In January 2013 the president signed a further regulation Government Regulation 
3/2013, underscoring that the Indonesian government is responsible for the protection 
of migrant workers abroad, and that Indonesian representatives abroad are charged 
with providing this protection in line with international standards and the laws of the 
destination country.226 Crucially, the regulation also requires that the Indonesia-based 
recruitment agency assist the embassy or consulate in providing protection and legal aid 
to a migrant worker if required during the placement period.227 It is not clear whether 
and how recruitment agencies will meet this obligation, particularly given that the regu-
lation does not include a provision for compelling assistance or sanctioning an agency 
if it fails to assist. 
Establishment of a Right to Legal Aid and Legal Assistance Abroad
Under Law 39/2004, the protective responsibilities of embassies and consulates include 
a responsibility to provide migrant workers with legal aid: 
 80(1) Protection during the placement period is implemented by, among other things:
 (a) Providing legal aid according to the law in the country of destination along with interna-
tional law and custom;
 (b) Defending the fulfillment of the rights of migrant workers under their contracts and/or 
under the law of the country of migrant worker placement.
According to the recent 2013 government regulation (Government Regulation 
3/2013), this includes:
• Guidance and oversight, including monitoring of recruitment agencies and 
employers;
• Consular assistance and protection;
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• Provision of legal aid;
• Defense and fulfillment of the rights of migrant workers;
• Protection and other assistance in accordance with international norms; and, 
• Diplomatic efforts on behalf of migrant workers.
The provision of legal advice and legal defense are essential to migrant work-
ers seeking justice abroad, and the legal services set forth in the 2013 regulation are 
reasonably comprehensive. The regulation clarifies that legal aid and rights protection 
obligations extend to mediation between the worker and another party, assistance in 
filing claims in court, and the provision of a lawyer (see Table 7).
 TABLE 7: Rights Protection Obligations of Indonesian Foreign Missions
Protection Obligation Activities of Indonesian Representative Mission
Provision of Legal Aid Mediation services
Advocacy services
Accompanying a migrant worker with a “legal problem,” (i.e., to 
meetings, court dates, government services in destination country).
Handling cases of migrant workers who have experienced physical 
and/or sexual violence.
Providing an advocate/lawyer
Defending and fulfilling 
the rights of migrant 
workers
Calling to the embassy a party who has not fulfilled the rights of a 
migrant worker.
Reporting cases to the relevant authorities
Demanding fulfillment of the rights of migrant workers, as 
contained in the employment agreement, national law, labor law of 
the destination country, and international law.
Filing claims in court against parties that have violated the rights 
of a migrant worker.
Assisting migrant workers who have been given work in a different 
location or with a different employer than what was promised 
in the contract, or whose work was not as described in the 
employment agreement.
Resolving demands and disputes between migrant workers 
and their employers and/or recruitment agency partners in the 
destination country.
Adapted from Government Regulation 3 of 2013 regarding Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers Abroad, 
January 2, 2013, articles 20–21.
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Government Regulation 3/2013 vests both authority and responsibility for protec-
tion of migrant workers in the head of the embassy, through the labor attaché. It does 
not, however, make legal services mandatory for every case, and does not provide guid-
ance for determining which migrants are eligible for assistance. The extent to which 
comprehensive legal aid is provided will depend on the budget provided to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and labor attachés, and the availability of other resources, such as 
local lawyers in the destination country who are familiar with the legal framework, 
language, and procedures of the legal system, and are available to provide the needed 
legal aid. 
Complaint Resolution Procedures
An MoFA “Standard Operating Procedure” (MoFA SOP) for handling cases is available 
on an MoFA blog, and sets out the procedures for different kinds of cases.228 Similar to 
procedures in Indonesia, resolution of a case begins with a complaint filed by a migrant 
worker. The MoFA website explains that appointments will be “fast, friendly, free and 
transparent.”229 The usual procedure, as explained by the MoFA, is for the migrant 
worker to report to security, who will then send the worker to be interviewed by a task 
force: “The task force will interview the person and then will determine whether it is a 
labor case, or if it is a criminal case, in which case it should be handled by the police 
attaché. In labor cases it goes to the labor attaché.” 
The MoFA Guideline on Providing Services to and Protection of Indonesian Citi-
zens Abroad (MoFA Guideline) explains that the foreign missions will assist migrant 
workers to fulfill their rights under the employment agreement, including wages, 
holidays, payment of expenses, insurance, type of work, location of work, change of 
employer, and early termination of the contract.230 This assistance includes:
1) Calling the employer/agent in to resolve the dispute;
2) Assisting in reporting the matter faced by the migrant worker to agencies in the 
sending country [Indonesia] to proceed further, in the event the migrant worker/
agent/employer is not prepared to resolve the case at the Indonesian foreign mis-
sion;
3) Accompany the migrant worker [to meetings, hearings or proceedings], provide 
legal advice and translation.
4) Forward a report on the handling of the case to the MoFA to be forwarded to the 
MoM, BNP2TKI and the family of the migrant worker.231
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Perceived Effectiveness of Embassy Dispute Resolution
Awareness of Embassy Services and Legal Rights
Migrant workers participating in focus groups were familiar with the services provided 
by the Indonesian missions abroad, often more so than with the services available to 
them within Indonesia. Many were informed before departing that they should contact 
the embassy if they had any problems with their employer, and were usually given the 
number of the embassy in the destination country. MoFA data suggests that signifi-
cant numbers of workers do report to their embassy with complaints. In 2010, 16,064 
cases were reported to Indonesian embassies, of which 10,587 were to embassies in the 
Middle East (4,242 in Saudi Arabia and 6,345 in other Middle East countries).232
Thirteen of the migrant workers participating in this study reported or attempted 
to report their cases to the Indonesian embassy. In other cases the worker knew of the 
embassy, but either could not, or chose not, to seek help. Those who did not report to 
an embassy explained that they were located in smaller towns or cities and physically 
distant from a foreign mission to which they could report. Some noted their lack of 
knowledge about the location of the embassy and the services available, and others 
reported a negative perception of embassy assistance. In one focus group, the work-
ers agreed that the embassy staff “were the same as everyone else” and “don’t defend 
us, and sometimes they even get angry at us.” One worker reported hearing rumors 
that people were slapped or hit by embassy staff and told to go home, although the 
researchers were not able to confirm this and it was strongly denied by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Whether true or not, negative rumors significantly affected the decision 
of migrant workers as to whether to report their situation or claims to the embassy or 
consulate. 
Accessibility of Services
Embassies are accessible to migrant workers in person, by phone, or via an internet 
connection. Of the 13 migrant workers in this study who sought embassy assistance 
while in the Middle East, one telephoned the embassy because she had access to the 
Internet and Skype through her employer’s son. For others, the employer or a friend 
of the employer took the worker to the embassy after she expressed a wish to return 
home. In one case, a relative of the employer helped the worker contact the embassy 
after seeing her crying because the employer had prevented her from leaving at the end 
of her contract. Others escaped and caught a taxi on their own, relying on the assistance 
of the taxi driver to locate the embassy.
Despite the multiple methods through which a worker might contact an embassy, 
significant challenges to accessibility persist. These include workers’ limited access to 
telephone and internet services, and the limited number of foreign missions capable of 
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receiving complaints. In Saudi Arabia, for example, geographically the largest country 
in the Middle East, Indonesia has a presence only in Riyadh (the embassy) and Jeddah 
(a consulate). For migrant workers who escape from towns or cities outside of these 
two urban areas, reaching a foreign mission is extremely difficult. As one migrant said, 
“I was given the number of the embassy in Jeddah but I was in a small village called 
Abdaha. How would I get to Jeddah? It was 12 hours or more by car.” Although Indone-
sia has reportedly requested permission to open more offices in the Kingdom to handle 
complaints, this request has been refused. 
Documentation may also limit access. One migrant worker described being 
turned away by an embassy after fleeing because she did not have her passport, even 
though her employer was holding her passport and she could not reclaim it. An expert 
in migrant worker cases reported from her research in Malaysia that the Indonesian 
embassies frequently denied migrant workers assistance or even entry because the 
workers did not have their passport and so were considered “illegal.”233 This prevented 
the embassy from performing key protective functions because many migrant workers 
go to the embassy precisely when they have fled their employer without their docu-
ments. Other migrants in the focus group agreed this was common, but the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs disputed that migrants in distress would ever be turned away.
Fairness and Transparency of Procedures
An embassy’s procedures for handling migrant worker cases are not clearly set out in 
regulations or the MoFA Guideline. Although the regulations provide a general list of 
activities that embassy staff can perform (see above), this list does not contain time-
lines, ethical provisions, rights of the migrant worker during the process (for example 
to information or involvement in the case), or any detail about the circumstances under 
which a case should be considered resolved and closed. These procedural fairness and 
transparency concerns were reflected in the experience of migrant workers. 
In most cases described by focus group participants who received embassy assis-
tance, the embassy called the employer upon receiving the complaint, heard the employ-
er’s perspective and negotiated on the worker’s behalf.234 A worker whose employer in 
Saudi Arabia had prevented her from going home to her family for 13 years described 
her experience as follows:
  When I finally ran away [in 2011], I left the house, and straight away I found an Indonesian 
domestic worker who helped me, and I told her everything. She took me to the embassy the 
next day, and [an embassy official] helped me. I told him that I had been there for 13 years and 
now I wanted to see my parents. [The official] called my employer to come to the embassy 
and asked her why I hadn’t been sent home, and she lied and said I hadn’t wanted to go, 
even though I had been asking to leave for a long time. I found out later that my family had 
called me many times but my employer had told them each time that no one of my name 
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was there. I asked [the official] to help me with my wages as well because I had not been 
paid for 4 of the 13 years I had been there, but he was unsuccessful. To this day I have not 
received the money.235
Migrant workers did not describe embassy staff members involving them in the 
communications or negotiations undertaken with the employer, and workers were often 
left in the dark about what transpired during those interactions. One worker who fled 
her employer without her passport or other documents reported: “the embassy people 
went to the house of my boss I think, but I don’t know anything about that or what 
happened there.” She then learned the embassy staff requested the employer attend the 
embassy to mediate the wage claim with the worker but the employer refused. Eventu-
ally, she said, “my employer opened her heart and her heart was open enough to give 
me back my passport,” and the embassy staff went to the house to collect the passport. 
She did not know what was said.
Workers expressed gratitude for the assistance they received abroad, but also 
spoke of feeling confused and disempowered, and that they had no real choice to accept 
or refuse a negotiated resolution. This sense was compounded by their physical situa-
tion in the closed shelter (see below), but was likely also a result of the lack of transpar-
ent procedures and worker protections within the dispute resolution process. 
Availability of Legal Aid in Practice
Although both law and regulations provide for legal aid and legal representation through 
the embassy or consulate, none of the migrants interviewed for the study had received 
legal assistance from the embassy. This may be because until recently, the embassies 
did not hire lawyers to assist with cases—cases were either handled by an embassy or 
consulate’s foreign services staff or labor attachés.
At the time of the research for this report, the introduction of legal experts into 
embassies was a subject of public discussion due to a recent visit to major destination 
countries by a specially created taskforce, the SATGAS TKI (see Text Box below). The 
SATGAS TKI had visited the Middle East and strongly recommended a lawyer be placed 
in embassies to assist migrant workers who faced serious legal problems. The chair-
person of the taskforce noted that access to legal assistance must be meaningful, and 
he urged that lawyers who are genuinely able to represent workers in foreign systems 
be placed within, or made readily available to, the embassies. One example would be a 
“retainer lawyer”—for example, a Saudi lawyer paid on a retainer to represent Indone-
sian clients. The chairperson noted that in Saudi Arabia even criminal cases could be 
resolved by negotiation and payment of compensation, but that competent representa-
tion was necessary to achieve that result. 
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Experts nevertheless remain concerned that even if local legal experts are retained 
by embassies, they would focus on those cases deemed most serious—particularly cases 
in which migrant workers are themselves charged with serious crimes and imprisoned 
in foreign jails (see Text Box below)—and they would not necessarily be available to 
assist workers with more common employment contract violations.
Protecting Migrant Workers Sentenced to Death
In addition to legal problems that some workers encounter as the victim of a 
crime or labor violation, some are also charged with offenses as defendants. 
In the Middle East, many of these cases involve migrant domestic workers 
and are frequently related to their work situation. In 2011, one such migrant 
worker, Ruyati Binti Sapubi from West Java was sentenced to death in Saudi 
Arabia for the murder of her female employer. Although the Indonesian gov-
ernment had been informed of her trial and had made diplomatic requests 
for leniency, Ruyati was executed on June 18, 2011.236 The Indonesian govern-
ment was not informed of the execution in advance.237
In August 2011, the president responded to the public outcry by placing a 
moratorium on labor migration to Saudi Arabia, and formed a Special Task-
force on the Handling of Cases of Migrant Workers and Citizens Abroad 
Threatened with the Death Sentence (SATGAS TKI). The taskforce includes 
members of government, the legal profession, and civil society, as well as 
experts on migrant worker issues. It has conducted field visits to Indonesian 
embassies abroad to determine the number of Indonesians potentially on 
death row and the reasons for their sentences.
The spokesperson for SATGAS TKI, Humphrey Djemat, the chair of the Indo-
nesian Lawyers Association, noted that among countries in the Middle East, 
the largest number of migrant workers threatened with the death sentence 
are in Saudi Arabia—28 as of June 2011. He described the findings of the 
field trip to Saudi Arabia as follows:
In Saudi Arabia it was very difficult to enter the prisons, even for the con-
sular offices it is hard, at least two weeks notice is needed. But finally we 
were able to visit and obtain information on Indonesians detained there. 
The cases were varied. Some had murdered Saudi nationals or also other 
Indonesians. Others, however, were charged with witchcraft—seen as 
“black magic”—based on reports by their employers, or with adultery,
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which also attracts the death sentence. It is very hard for Indonesians; 
most do not speak Arabic well and so are not able to defend themselves 
during the investigations. At least the Saudi government respects the 
right to consular assistance (unlike Malaysia) but it often takes five or 
six months to reach us. 
The chairperson called for greater specialized legal assistance for migrant 
workers abroad but noted the sensitivity of this issue. It is important, accord-
ing to Djemat, to keep the other government informed so that they are not 
offended and do not suspect interference in their domestic laws and poli-
cies.238
Justness of Outcomes
The MoFA reports high rates of “resolution” of cases, noting that in Saudi Arabia it 
resolves 94 percent of cases, while in the rest of the Middle East, the figure is 90 per-
cent (the remaining cases were still “in process”). Because the MoFA does not define 
“resolution” or give any information on the types of resolution available,239 however, it 
is unclear how well the resolution ultimately serves the justice interests of the migrant 
workers. 
The perception of the migrant workers and others interviewed for the study was 
that the outcomes rarely constituted complete redress. As with the other mechanisms 
reviewed, workers believed that the emphasis of embassy or consulate staff was on get-
ting the case closed and sending them home to Indonesia, rather than seeking a fair 
outcome. Several participants said that they did not feel the embassy took their con-
cerns seriously. Two former migrant workers recounted that embassy officials advised 
them to return to Indonesia and that their employer would send their wages, but the 
money never arrived. The employer may indeed have promised this, but in any event 
the embassy did not explain to the workers its limited power to enforce any promise 
and the risks to the worker of leaving early.
Another worker reported having asked to return home because she could not cope 
with the volume of work and was frequently hit by her employer. The employer took her 
to the embassy and she stayed there for two weeks while her case was negotiated on her 
behalf by an embassy official. The worker finally received her salary but the cost of the 
flight was deducted from the total, and she received no compensation for the abuse she 
endured. Another worker who asked to leave at the end of her two years had her flight 
paid but none of her outstanding wages were returned to her. In most cases workers 
described themselves as resigned to the situation and wished only to go home rather 
than staying longer without employment.
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Experts acknowledged that embassy officials face many challenges in advocating 
for a fair outcome for workers. First, a number of destination countries in the Middle 
East (such as Saudi Arabia) are intolerant of rights-based advocacy in general, or are in 
the midst of internal conflict (such as Syria and Yemen). Embassy or attaché staff mem-
bers are also limited by the laws and procedures of the destination country. The kafala 
system, present in many Middle Eastern countries, creates a structural obstacle because 
it prevents workers from changing employers, regardless of abuse or other problems 
at the place of employment. If a worker leaves her employer she loses her immigration 
status and is left with no place to go and no opportunity to sustain herself while her 
case is being resolved. Indonesian government representatives therefore often have 
little leverage to demand a fair outcome from employers. One member of the SATGAS 
TKI who visited Saudi Arabia explained:
  The employer is called, and a translator is arranged. But there is no obligation on the 
employer to attend. So it depends on the kindness of employer. If they are nice people they 
pay. If they are not, then the worker can only wait for a ticket home. If the worker is still 
within the period covered by insurance, the insurer will usually pay [ for the ticket].240
He also described the bureaucratic challenges in seeking non-financial redress 
in Saudi Arabia:
  As soon as [the embassy] wants to send a troubled worker home it faces many difficulties 
with the government of Saudi Arabia. Usually, obtaining the exit permit takes a long time; 
the bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia is bad and the system and procedures are unclear, which is 
why it takes so long. For example, a migrant worker who has been sentenced to one month 
in prison should be released after that time, but the bureaucracy is so bad that it can be a 
long time before they process her documents to be released.241
Despite these challenges, the users of the system suggested that embassies could 
do more to promote fairness in outcomes, and not only “resolution” of the case. 
Even if complete redress is not available in the destination country from the 
employer, embassy staff also play a vital role in preparing workers before they travel 
home including ensuring they have all the necessary documents from their time in-
country to make an insurance claim on their return, such as agreements, receipts of 
medical care, evidence of complaints to police, and letters from the embassy itself. 
Given that so many migrant workers were unaware of available mechanisms, or did 
not have these vital documents, when they returned, it appears that embassies are still 
focusing on immediate protection and resolution of cases, and are less focused on, or 
equipped to address, meaningful and long-term access to justice for migrant workers.
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Roma
Roma’s experience seeking the payment of unpaid wages in Saudi Arabia 
demonstrates not only the challenges of obtaining justice from disingenu-
ous employers, but also how the effort and time invested in seeking redress 
abroad can dissuade workers from submitting claims when they return.
Roma left her village for Saudi Arabia in 2002 as a 22-year-old young mother 
with only elementary school education. She explained, “All the women from 
my home town went to Saudi, I wanted to be like them and see what it was 
like.” When she arrived, she found she was the only domestic worker for 
her employers and their nine children. She cared for the children, as well as 
cleaning the house, rarely sleeping more than five hours a night, and getting 
little food. Each month her employer asked her to sign her wage statement 
for 600 Riyal, telling her that her money was being saved and would be 
given to her when she went home. At first she believed her employer, but 
then started to complain. The recruitment agency sought to advocate on her 
behalf, as did the local Saudi assistance services, but each time the employer 
lied and said the money would be paid. She describes her case:
After four years I decided to leave, I was so stressed I was fainting, because 
they still had not paid me and let me go home as promised. So one day 
when my employer’s son was coming home, I snuck out the back door 
and caught a taxi. I told him to take me to the embassy but he took me 
to the Maktab Amal (the Saudi shelter for workers in distress). The shelter 
remembered me from my earlier complaint but this time told me not to 
go back to my employer, and to stay there at the shelter.
The shelter at the Maktab Amal was huge and most of the people 
were Indonesians—almost 600. They treated us well and we ate a lot, I 
became fat! Every night we would chat and help each other reduce the 
stress of our situations. The staff offered to help us find a new employer, 
but I just wanted to be paid and go home. So they approached my 
employer very nicely to ask for my salary, but she lied and told them I 
had been paid and showed them the papers I signed. So the Maktab 
Amal helped me take the case to the court. I went to the court seven 
times and really fought with the employer in that room but they denied 
everything because of the pay-stubs.242 The process was difficult—it took 
so long and I became exhausted waiting but I wanted to win because I 
had earned that money through hard work.
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Finally, the staff at the Maktab Amal asked if I would accept a partial 
amount from the employer and I agreed because I wanted to leave. They 
helped me negotiate 6000 Riyal, just ten months salary, and then I had 
to pay for my own flight home, so I only received 4,800 Riyal in the end. 
This process took a year and I wasn’t happy, it was so little compared 
to what I was owed.
I moved to the embassy while my flight home was arranged, but I was 
more stressed because the space was so small and I couldn’t go any-
where. We couldn’t leave, not even to go out to the yard. I was there 
for more than a month waiting for my ticket. The embassy staff didn’t 
help me—I was told to just look after myself. They knew I had already 
received my salary so weren’t concerned with me. When I finally came 
home I was tired and didn’t put in a claim anywhere because I thought 
it would be pointless, I just left the airport and went straight home. 
Beyond Claims Assistance: Other Protective Services
One of the most important services that embassies and consulates offer to workers seek-
ing redress abroad is accommodation. According to the director of Citizen Services in 
Jakarta if the person has run away and the embassy staff determine after an interview 
that she or he has a case, the worker will be taken inside and housed in the shelter. The 
shelter enables workers to stay in the country to seek redress, and is also a safe transit 
station for workers on their way home. The Citizens Protection Division of the ministry 
reports that a large number of workers are housed by the embassy each year. In 2009, 
the number was 17,152 people worldwide, and in 2010 it was 15,766. The breakdown 
in Middle Eastern countries is as follows:
Indonesian Mission 
in Middle East
No. of Indonesian Citizens Housed in Shelter
2009 2010
Abu Dhabi 985 748
Amman 1,509 1,641
Damascus 499 544
Doha 703 798
Dubai 713 883
Kuwait City 3,116 1,731
Jeddah 1,650 1,472
Riyadh 3,102 2,770
TOTAL 12,277 10,587
Source: Directorate of Citizen Services, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia243
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Some migrant workers reported spending only a night or several days in the shel-
ter while their flight home was arranged. For others it was a stay of several months or 
even years, while they waited for their cases to resolve. This significantly disincentivizes 
migrant workers from bringing a case abroad, especially because they are not able to 
leave the embassy grounds once they decide to leave their employer because they no 
longer have legal status in the country. Workers who participated in focus groups and 
who had stayed at an embassy described feeling trapped, and reported that the facili-
ties were overcrowded. One male migrant worker who had fled his employment at a 
salon after not being paid many months’ wages expressed great frustration with the 
embassy shelter because he was cut off from society and not allowed to receive guests. 
He recalled 10 people sharing a room and, recounted, “We had to go to sleep at 9 p.m. 
Some people had been there for two years and nothing had happened in their case at 
all. Some people stayed under the stairs.” 
Outside of bilateral agreements, Indonesia’s use of diplomatic channels on behalf 
of individual or all migrant workers has often been met with opposition. In Saudi Ara-
bia, for example, the Indonesian Labor Attaché in Riyadh has reportedly requested a 
minimum wage and inclusion of domestic workers in the national labor law before it 
will lift the moratorium on workers to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has reportedly dis-
missed the request as meddling in domestic affairs.244
Fleeing an Employer
Focus group discussions revealed that workers in problematic employ-
ment situations frequently take matters into their own hands and flee their 
employer. This may be because they do not trust the embassy to resolve 
their problem, or because they would rather keep working and earning 
money in the destination country instead of filing a complaint and having to 
return home. Fleeing and working irregularly exposes workers to other risks 
as their visa status is generally tied to the original employer, and becoming 
“illegal” in the destination country severely limits the worker’s recourse to 
help if she encounters problems. Several focus group participants described 
such experiences:
I went to Saudi Arabia as a domestic worker but after one year I ran 
away from my employer. She hadn’t paid me anything for six months 
and when I asked for my money she slapped me across the face for ask-
ing. When I fled the house I had no documents. I ran to the highway and 
eventually came across an Indonesian who would take in undocumented
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workers. I worked for him for two years and my pay was much more 
than with my legal employer. But then I became sick and the police 
found me and took me to the hospital. My phone was taken from me 
at that time and I lost contact with my family for seven months before 
I was able to get home. 
—Female Migrant Worker, Indramayu, West Java
I went to Saudi Arabia as a private driver and had no problem with 
the work but I was unhappy with my employer. First, I was not allowed 
to leave the house and also I was not paid anything for the first three 
months—just one month’s wages after the fourth month. Also, my 
employer would speak to me rudely and called me an animal. I tried 
talking to him many times but he never listened. I also complained to 
the agent twice but it was pointless. I wanted to change my fate so after 
four months I ran away to Jeddah and worked for four years, always 
changing employers and without a contract or my passport.
—Male Migrant Worker, Sukabumi, West Java
This was my second time as a migrant domestic worker to Saudi Arabia. 
I arrived in Riyadh in 2006 but ran away after seven months because 
they didn’t pay me anything for my work. So I went to Jeddah and 
worked there, working from house to house, but the work was never 
guaranteed, there was a lot of insecurity. I stayed in a place that took in 
run-aways and paid monthly rent until 2009. Jeddah wasn’t safe—there 
were raids. So I came home. 
—Female Migrant Worker, Sukabumi, West Java
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7. Challenges to Enforcing 
 Migrant Workers’ Rights and 
 Obtaining Redress
Across interviews with migrant workers, their families, civil society organizations, and 
in some cases government officials, a set of challenges emerged that was common to 
all mechanisms. These challenges revealed deeper structural obstacles to migrant work-
ers’ access to redress than can be comprehensively addressed through reform of any 
single mechanism. These challenges are outlined below, and include: centralization of 
actors and mechanisms; documentation requirements for claims; a lack of seriousness 
in the approach of various actors to worker complaints; workers’ lack of awareness and 
understanding of their legal rights and redress options; inadequate legal aid; inadequate 
recruitment agency regulation and accountability; overlaps and gaps in responsibilities 
for worker protection; the time, resources and emotional cost to a migrant worker of 
seeking redress; and corruption, or perceptions of corruption, within government and 
the private sector.
124  CHALLENGES TO ENFORCING MIGRANT WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND OBTAINING REDRESS
7.A Centralization and Distance
A pervasive challenge for workers, their families and CSO representatives is the central-
ization of the migrant labor system for workers traveling to the Middle East. Because all 
Middle East recruitment agencies are Jakarta-based, most disputes can only be resolved 
in the capital, far from many workers’ homes. 
Case-handlers noted the need to travel back and forth to Jakarta to negotiate 
directly with any Indonesia-based party or make any kind of claim. As a civil society 
organization staff person recalled: “In one case where the worker was not paid up to 
IDR 158,000,000 in wages, someone in our office went to Jakarta to submit an insur-
ance claim. The process went for a long time, and he went back and forth at least three 
times.” This should not be necessary given that Proteksi has outposts around Indone-
sia, but even a recruitment agent agreed that to get any response from the insurer, one 
must go directly to its central office and confront Proteksi representatives in person.245
Administrative dispute resolution presented a similar challenge. Although local 
labor offices can receive complaints, they can rarely resolve them. This is due partly 
to constraints on local offices’ authority, but also due to the practical constraint that 
recruitment companies and the insurance consortium are located in Jakarta. As a local 
official noted:
  If the recruitment agency has a branch here we call them. But if the office is in Jakarta, or if the 
broker is here but took the worker to the capital for departure [as in most Middle East cases], 
well, that is a significant obstacle for us. We still write to them, but they never come.246 
Official mediation services are also primarily available in Jakarta at the BNP2TKI 
Crisis Center, although a BP3TKI or other local offices may occasionally conduct media-
tions if the recruitment agency has a branch in the province. 
Travel to Jakarta is costly and intimidating for many workers. It is also time-
consuming and stressful for workers who must leave their work and family responsi-
bilities in order to make the journey each time—factors that significantly disincentivize 
workers from pursuing claims. 
7.B Documentation Requirements that Workers 
 Struggle to Meet
The lack of required documentation was one of the most commonly cited reasons for 
not filing a claim, or for failing to achieve the desired claim outcome. This was true of 
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insurance claims, administrative dispute resolution, and use of the civil courts. It was 
also considered the principal reason that prosecutors decline to file criminal cases. As 
one legal expert said:
  Obtaining the documents is really the hardest part; meeting the requirements is extremely 
difficult. It is hard both when trying to get copies of documents from the recruitment agen-
cies, and when presenting them to the insurance company—[the process] is difficult and full 
of problems.247
In some cases, as detailed in earlier sections, migrant workers never receive key 
documents such as the KPA (the insurance card), placement agreement or insurance 
policy. A migrant worker who has fled her employer in the Middle East is generally 
unable to retrieve her documents from the employer, who frequently confiscates or 
retains the worker’s documents upon arrival. As a result, the worker does not have her 
passport, identity card, or insurance card when she seeks help from an embassy or 
seeks to return to Indonesia of her own accord. If the worker is still abroad, civil society 
groups in Indonesia will meet with the migrant worker’s family in Indonesia to try to 
obtain the needed documentation, but families often do not have copies of all docu-
ments. In such cases the organization must try to obtain the documents from various 
government agencies and the recruitment agency. As one civil society staffer explained, 
“this itself is not an easy process. We must go back and forth, back and forth, and just 
finding the documents for one case can take three or four full days [of meetings and 
travel].”248
In some cases, the recruitment agency itself holds the personal documents, and 
is either reluctant to give them up, or will (improperly) demand a fee for their return. 
If a worker’s contract is terminated early, the agency will commonly refuse to give her 
any of her documents (including her birth certificate, high school diplomas, and others) 
unless she pays around Rp. 25 million (around USD 2,600).249 TIFA Foundation noted 
that a migrant worker may visit the recruiter to seek the return of the documents and, if 
this “informal” method fails, may file a formal complaint at the provincial-level BP3TKI 
and “with the authority of the government, and the power of the law behind us, we can 
force the agency to give us the documents.”250
For some harms, the worker must also produce evidence of the occurrence of 
the harm and any costs incurred. The MoM office in Sukabumi noted that to receive 
compensation for an accident, for example, the migrant worker must provide receipts 
for treatment received. However, in most cases migrant workers use traditional heal-
ers rather than doctors because of custom and because they cannot afford high quality 
medical care, so they do not have any receipts.251 A recruitment agency recalled a case 
of sexual assault of a domestic worker by her employer in which the worker was unable 
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to supply documentary evidence demonstrating that the assault occurred, and her claim 
was refused.252
Since early 2012 when new insurance rules253 were passed, evidence of many 
losses may now be provided in the form of a letter from the embassy stating that a 
particular harm occurred. However, civil society groups explained that obtaining such 
a letter was time-consuming and difficult, because in most cases the worker has already 
returned home, and communicating with the embassy abroad is a highly bureaucratic 
process (workers are rarely aware of their insurance coverage or the need to obtain 
claims evidence while abroad). Moreover, embassies are often unaware of the infor-
mation required to satisfy an insurance claim and so insurers reject the letters that 
embassies produce. One embassy letter viewed in this study lacked the key information 
requested by the insurer about the reason for termination of a worker’s contract, leading 
to the rejection of the claim.
7.C Workers’ Concerns and Cases Not Taken Seriously
Migrant workers and civil society organizations repeatedly described the lack of seri-
ousness with which various actors addressed concerns and claims. Interviewees raised 
this challenge in relation to private recruitment agencies, insurers, and government 
officials, within all of the redress mechanisms. For example, in negotiations—or even 
government-facilitated mediations—with recruitment agencies, representatives from 
the agency often fail to appear, and workers have little leverage to compel their response 
or attendance. 
Similarly, workers and civil society group representatives described a dismissive 
attitude from certain government officials within offices ranging from the Ministry 
of Manpower to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They described being “ping-ponged” 
between departments, with each agency blaming the other for a lack of results. Civil 
society groups expressed particularly deep frustration when recounting their dealings 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassies in destination countries. They 
reported having to follow up many times, often receiving no information about the 
status of inquiries and cases. One civil society representative explained, “When it comes 
to communicating with an embassy, you have to call, send letters, SMS them there—we 
really have to be active. It seems like there is not enough attention or care about these 
cases. We do usually get a response but often after sending the letter twice or more.”254
Workers who had been housed in embassies after leaving their employer also 
described being addressed rudely or ignored by embassy staff. One worker who stayed 
at the embassy for four years to resolve her case remembered:
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  At the embassy the staff in the shelter yelled at me and told me I was misbehaved, and asked 
how would my employer ever have agreed to pay me if I acted like this. I was the one who 
was put in the wrong. This was hard for me as I was already stressed staying in that small 
space for so long, not able to go anywhere.255
7.D Lack of Awareness and Understanding of Legal 
 Rights and Redress Options
The vast majority of focus group participants had little understanding of their rights 
under Indonesian law and the contracts they had signed, and also very limited aware-
ness of redress mechanisms available to them should they suffer harm in the course 
of labor migration. While many workers seemed to know that they ought to go to 
the embassy if they had a problem in the destination country, and some knew they 
were insured, they had not been informed and had no knowledge of the procedures or 
documentation required to make an insurance claim, or how to seek redress after they 
returned home.
Workers’ lack of awareness and understanding of their legal rights and redress 
options is highly disempowering, and is likely the result of several factors. One factor 
often cited is the lack of formal education among many low-wage migrant workers, par-
ticularly those to the Middle East. This presents challenges to reading and understand-
ing a contract or insurance policy or other key document, especially if it is not explained 
to the worker or is not provided in Indonesian (as employment contracts often are not). 
The central role of brokers in recruiting migrant workers also limits a worker’s 
knowledge of her rights and options before departure, because the brokers handle 
all documentation and usually only ask the worker to sign where required, without 
effectively communicating anything to the worker about her rights and corresponding 
obligations. BNP3TKI has a statutory obligation to provide migrant workers with infor-
mation pre-departure, but this obligation has failed to translate into actual knowledge: 
workers participating in the study either did not receive or did not fully understand 
information they received on their rights, or on procedures for accessing redress in 
Indonesia or abroad. This is likely because brokers directly connect most Middle East 
workers with Jakarta-based recruitment agencies, circumventing the information and 
protection services of the local MoM and regional-level BNP3TKI offices.
Finally, information is difficult to access. If prospective migrant workers do not 
receive it during the training period, it is not easily available while abroad. The infor-
mation available online is limited, and not available to workers without access to the 
internet or telephones. Embassies—charged with protecting and fulfilling the rights of 
migrant workers in the destination countries—provide assistance to some workers, but 
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do not seem to prioritize educating workers about their rights or redress options on 
return. Moreover, despite some promising small paralegal-training programs, the qual-
ity of information that is generally available is still limited. This study reveals few if any 
resources that clearly and simply set out migrant workers’ rights under various sources 
of law, or delineate the responsibilities of recruiters, insurers, and various government 
departments. Nor did the study identify publicly available materials that clearly and sim-
ply set out the procedures and documents required to seek redress through insurance 
or other Indonesia-based mechanisms, in a manner accessible to a low-wage migrant 
worker or local civil society organization.
7.E Lack of Legal Aid and Legal Advice
Legal experts emphasized the importance of legal representation for migrant workers 
at all negotiations and mediations, and when going to the police to file a complaint. 
Umu Hilmy of Brawijaya University explained that it is difficult for people without legal 
training to, “truly understand the laws on migrant workers [in order to] argue against 
these recruitment agency lawyers. [Migrant worker lawyers] need to memorize the law 
and know all of the gaps and loop-holes that the other lawyer will use.” This includes 
Law 39/2004 and regulations, as well as the criminal code and Anti-Trafficking Law 
as they relate to migrant workers (see Redress through the Criminal Justice System in 
Section 6, above).
Few private or civil society lawyers have training in these areas, and interviewees 
noted that it is difficult for migrant workers to engage private lawyers because they 
can very rarely pay legal fees, and their claims are for relatively small amounts. Within 
legal aid organizations such as Jakarta Legal Aid, lawyers may specialize in labor law 
or criminal law, but experts said that none focused on migrant worker law specifically. 
Several interviewees were hopeful that a new law on legal aid, which recognizes a right 
to access justice and provides a framework for funding and overseeing legal aid, will 
assist migrant workers (see text box on Legal Aid in Indonesia in Section 6, above).256 
At the time of the field research the law had not yet been implemented. 
Legal expertise is also a challenge abroad. Embassy staff reportedly do not have 
the capacity to seriously handle all of the cases that are brought to them—in terms of 
both the time and skills required. For example, if migrant workers wish to take their 
cases beyond informal mediation to domestic legal processes, an understanding of the 
language, laws, and legal culture of the destination country is required. According to the 
civil society representative on SATGAS TKI, “the real problem is that the Indonesian 
embassies don’t have a lawyer there who understands the labor law of Saudi Arabia.”257
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Participants also noted that it was often difficult for workers to obtain necessary 
information and assistance because embassy officials were unfamiliar with key Indone-
sian labor migration laws, such as laws regulating migrant worker insurance. Indeed, 
the letters supplied to workers by embassies as evidence for insurance claims are fre-
quently inadequate and rejected by the insurer. In some cases, embassy security officers 
also improperly exclude workers without documents, despite the fact that the worker’s 
lack of documents was the result of mistreatment so that it is often these workers who 
are in greatest need of legal assistance.
Finally, lawyers interviewed in this study lamented the lack of information and 
training available to them on relevant law in major destination countries. They believed 
this gap prevented them from providing advice and assistance to migrant workers’ 
families when their relatives encountered problems abroad. 
7.F Inadequate Regulation of the Private Sector, which 
 Is Not Held Accountable for Worker Harms
Participants regarded government oversight of recruitment agencies, insurers, and bro-
kers as weak in general and particularly weak with respect to agencies’ provision of 
appropriate redress for worker harms. As noted in the section on ADR, securing recruit-
ment agency or insurer attendance at mediation is a persistent challenge. There is no 
mechanism for compelling private parties to negotiate with migrant workers, let alone 
negotiate in good faith. As a result, a recruitment agency can, and often does, simply 
refuse to respond to letters or to attend. As a representative of ATKI Jakarta explained, 
“Very few recruitment agencies are cooperative about returning money, they usually 
insist they are right.” She also noted a common perception that many recruitment agen-
cies are owned by people in positions of power who protect them from serious claims.
Ministry of Manpower officials emphasized the importance of building close 
working relationships with recruitment agencies, “so that they will be willing to coop-
erate. Because usually the worker who comes home does not have any data at all, so it is 
just her word against the agency’s.” However, these close relationships with recruitment 
agencies raise concerns about the officials’ capacity to act as objective arbiters between 
the parties, and could reinforce the perception among workers that the government and 
recruitment agencies are aligned.
The law contains limited sanctions for such behavior. Facilitation (or even non-
obstruction) of migrant worker redress is not a condition of agency licensing, for exam-
ple. Those sanctions that do exist appear to be rarely imposed, or at least not imposed 
in a manner that guarantees transparency and accountability. Recruitment agencies 
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therefore have little incentive to comply with their legal obligations regarding informa-
tion and training, to engage constructively in dispute resolution processes, to assist 
workers to obtain copies of key documents required for claims, or to ensure that the 
local brokers with whom they work deal honestly and fairly with workers. 
A number of interviewees expressed the view that the courts do not hold recruit-
ment agencies accountable because courts are fundamentally biased toward wealthier 
and more powerful private sector parties. A representative of Legal Aid Jakarta noted 
that even if a migrant worker had all of her documents, “we already know which way a 
case will go, we know the worker will lose.”258
7.G  Overlaps and Gaps in Migrant Worker Protection
Inadequate delineation of responsibilities for migrant workers has resulted in gaps and 
inefficiencies in worker protection in various parts of the labor migration system. These 
gaps present practical challenges to workers seeking redress, both because workers 
and their representatives do not know who is responsible for a particular function and 
because individuals within government and private institutions are unclear as to their 
responsibilities.
Most significantly, the content and boundaries between the migrant-worker-
related functions of the Ministry of Manpower and BNP2TKI, and between the national, 
regional and local levels within each agency, are unclear. The division of responsibilities 
between recruitment agencies and insurers to compensate workers for harms related to 
their work abroad is also opaque. For some work-related harms, responsibility may be 
shared by the insurer, recruitment agency, and possibly even the broker in Indonesia, as 
well as by the partner recruitment agency abroad and the employer—not to mention the 
responsibilities of governments in the countries of origin and destination. In practice, 
this often results in all parties denying responsibility.
7.H  Time, Resources, and Emotional Cost
Geographic distance and layers of bureaucracy make administrative dispute resolu-
tion in Jakarta time-consuming, resource-draining, intimidating, and stressful. Most 
migrant workers seeking redress after working in the Middle East have little option but 
to travel to Jakarta (see Section 7.A above), and remain both patient and persistent. The 
required travel to Jakarta presents an insurmountable obstacle to many migrant work-
ers who need urgent redress in order to pay debts, medical costs, or other expenses. 
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Local government offices are constrained in their ability to resolve disputes, and usually 
lengthen the dispute resolution process further when they are involved. As one local 
Ministry of Manpower official noted:
  Our facilitation of the process can take a long time, so those who are not patient or who want 
a quick resolution will take matters in their own hands with [a civil society organization] or 
other person directly to Jakarta. Usually it is like that. After they report to us, we call them a 
second and third time and then we go to that village for some reason we will find the family 
and ask, “Hey, what happened, why hasn’t she come? Has she received her wages?” They 
then say yes, but it was reduced for this reason and that reason. Well it is up to them; the 
main thing is that they reach their goal.259
The insurance claims process poses similar challenges. Migrant Care noted 
it could take up to a year to receive a response from the insurer regarding a claim. 
Although Regulation 7/2010 requires the consortium to pay a claim within seven days 
of fulfillment of all requirements for submitting a claim (Article 26(5)), there is no time 
limit for deciding whether these requirements have been met. Furthermore, the redress 
provided is rarely for the full amount claimed, which influences the workers’ decision 
as to whether to pursue a claim.
Of all mechanisms, the court process is the most time-consuming and emotion-
ally exhausting. TIFA Foundation described a case in which civil society lawyers assisted 
a migrant worker to file a case related to a failed departure. The worker had paid a large 
upfront fee to the recruitment agency and when the agency did not follow through on 
its departure promise, she sued for return of the fee based on breach of contract. The 
case progressed slowly but eventually was dismissed when the defendant could not be 
located. The TIFA Foundation lawyer explained:
  We identified another defendant and I recommended that she file the claim again, but she 
was already too tired from the first filing. Civil cases are exhausting because you have to be 
very active and if you don’t have enough stamina, you won’t succeed, you will be worn out.260
Reform of the redress system must therefore take into account geographic acces-
sibility, as well as the potential for timely redress.
7.I Corruption and Perceptions of Corruption
Almost all participants outside of government expressed deep mistrust of the labor 
migration system, as well as a certainty that individual workers would never win if 
they challenged a large recruitment agency, powerful broker, or insurer in court. Many 
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viewed the migrant labor system as burdened by collusion between recruitment agen-
cies, insurers, and government officials who undermined regulatory or bureaucratic 
procedures intended to protect workers—a view reinforced by the lack of transparency 
common to all redress mechanisms examined in this study. 
Recruitment agencies supported this view, noting that the more rules introduced, 
the more bribes they were required to pay. In addition, participants thought police, 
prosecutors, and courts favored the wealthy and powerful, and were unlikely to hold 
a recruitment agency accountable for criminal wrongdoing. As a result, participants 
believed that pursuing justice through the criminal justice system would only expose 
the worker to more stress, expense, and disappointment. Whether these allegations are 
true or not, the widely held scepticism toward the governmental and judicial bodies that 
facilitate access to redress creates a strong disincentive against seeking justice. 
7.J Summary—Despondency and Frustration
At the Indonesia Roundtable in January 2012, participants were asked in their intro-
ductions to identify a success story about access to justice. Very few were able to do so; 
most appeared discouraged, frustrated with the system, and generally skeptical about 
access to justice for Indonesian migrant workers, whether through formal, informal, or 
quasi-formal mechanisms. In the view of many experts, the limited bargaining power 
of migrant workers, along with lower levels of education, capital, and confidence to take 
cases, meant that recruitment agencies, insurers, and others are frequently permitted 
to unjustly profit from and avoid liability for the harms to which they contributed or 
from which they failed to adequately protect workers. Migrant workers also supported 
this view. 
The inherently transnational nature of migrant labor, in which many of the viola-
tions occur abroad in jurisdictions in which lawyers in Indonesia have no access and 
little understanding, understandably poses a significant challenge to achieving redress. 
But that alone does not account for the multitude of barriers to justice identified above. 
Contrary to the perspectives of some experts who viewed workers as relatively passive 
and bearing the onus for all aspects of achieving justice, our study revealed an engaged 
and even angry population seeking change. A number of the workers interviewed for 
this study expressed their frustration after trying in a number of ways to assert their 
rights and being thwarted throughout. When asked for their recommendations for 
improvements to the system, almost all focused on the need for Indonesia’s embassies 
to be more responsive to the migrant workers and their family members, and to be 
more proactive in protecting the rights of migrant workers. They also critiqued the gov-
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ernment’s relationships with destination countries, and identified these relationships 
as a barrier to ensuring government assistance in protecting their rights and working 
to achieve full redress when those rights are violated. Workers also demanded greater 
accountability in the system, a demand that requires greater transparency of each of the 
redress mechanisms as they respond to and resolve workers’ claims. 

1 3 5
8. Conclusion and 
 Recommendations
For the vast majority of low-wage Indonesian migrant workers who travel to the Mid-
dle East, access to justice remains elusive both abroad and at home. In some areas, 
the rights of migrant workers under Indonesian laws and private contracts are under-
enforced, and in other areas better regulation is needed. Throughout the Indonesian 
labor migration system, greater transparency is critical. 
Since research on this report began, Indonesian government and civil society have 
taken some promising steps toward improving access to justice for migrant workers. 
For example, the Association of Indonesian Lawyers has experimented with placement 
of lawyers in the main airport terminal in Jakarta to receive workers’ complaints directly 
and facilitate insurance claims. The BNP2TKI Crisis Centre in Jakarta began operations 
in 2008 and is receiving a significant number of calls, and the public has demanded 
accountability for corruption and mismanagement in the insurance system and else-
where in the labor migration system. 
Ultimately, improving access to justice for Indonesian migrant workers will 
require a fundamental change in the way that migrant workers are viewed—as rights-
holders with legitimate legal claims, rather than as passive charity-seekers or disrup-
tive children. All parts of the labor migration system must be involved in this change, 
beginning with the Ministry of Manpower and the private sector. The government of 
Indonesia can enable this change by systematically enforcing the law and better regu-
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lating the private-sector recruitment agencies, insurers, brokers, and others that profit 
from labor migration. The Indonesian Parliament can reform labor migration laws to 
include stronger enforceable protections for migrant workers. It can also initiate reforms 
to provide migrant workers with specific rights to redress, including provisions estab-
lishing enforceable government and private sector obligations to ensure and provide 
redress to migrant workers. Academia can support change by increasing the scrutiny 
of migrant worker laws and contracts, conducting further studies, collecting relevant 
data, and training a new generation of lawyers to represent migrant workers. Donors 
can support all of these efforts by supporting civil society advocacy, legal assistance, and 
litigation on behalf of workers. Donors can support training of law students, lawyers, 
and paralegals, as well as further research and analysis, and the development of better 
information sources for migrant workers on the content and enforcement of their rights.
8.A Summary of General Findings
1.  Migrant Workers Face a Range of Legal Problems Involving 
  Multiple Actors
 Indonesian migrant workers travelling to the Middle East face problems involving 
multiple private and public sector actors. Within the private sector these include 
recruitment brokers (“sponsors”), recruitment agencies, and insurers in the 
country of origin, as well as partner recruitment agencies and employers in the 
destination country. Problems arise throughout the migration process, including 
pre-departure, during placement, and post-return. 
 Indonesian migrant workers’ problems are governed by numerous sources of law 
that provide rights to migrant workers and impose obligations on government and 
private actors. These sources of law traverse private and public law, and include 
the constitution, statutes, regulations, private contracts, and international law. 
They may also include laws in the destination country. 
 Relevant areas of law include:
 • Law specifically related to migrant labor; 
 • Contract law;
 • Insurance law;
 • Criminal law, including the general criminal code and the Anti-Trafficking Law;
 • Consumer protection; and, 
 • Labor/employment law (in the country of origin and destination country).
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 Migrant workers’ legal issues are often complicated by the inherent transnational 
nature of migrant work. In particular, harms suffered abroad may be connected 
to problems that arise in Indonesia before departure, such that multiple private 
and government actors in Indonesia and abroad may bear legal responsibility to 
prevent and/or remedy a particular harm.
2.  The Key Laws on Migrant Worker Placement and Protection Do 
  Not Effectively Ensure Workers’ Access to Justice
 Indonesia’s labor migration laws, regulations, and policies do not focus on 
workers’ redress and restitution, and place only limited emphasis on holding 
recruitment agencies and others accountable for worker harms. Indonesia’s sin-
gle national law concerning migrant workers (Law 39 of 2004 on the Placement 
and Protection of Migrant Workers), which governs labor migration in Indone-
sia, does not specifically reference access to justice. It only requires that workers 
directly and “peaceably” negotiate disputes with recruitment agencies and, if this 
fails, that they seek the assistance of the Ministry of Manpower (see below) or 
submit a claim for insurance to the Migrant Worker Insurance Program. At a 
broader level, the ministry has power to sanction recruitment companies for vio-
lations ranging from non-compliance with licensing conditions to failure to give 
workers required documents, though there is no systematic regime and sanctions 
are rarely imposed. 
 The statute does, however, provide workers with rights to information, equality 
of treatment, the standard wage in the destination country, a copy of the work 
contract, and to “receive a guarantee of protection of the law … [ for] violation of 
one’s rights set out in the law for the duration of the placement abroad.”
 In practice, these rights are effectively unenforceable. The statute and regulations 
rarely identify the party responsible for fulfilling particular rights, and do not 
clearly delineate between government and recruitment agency obligations. They 
do not establish enforcement mechanisms nor consequences for non-fulfilment 
of government or recruiter obligations. For example, Law 39/2004 does not set 
out any method by which a worker may obtain redress if he or she is not treated 
equally, does not receive the prevailing wage, and does not receive a copy of the 
contract. 
 Moreover, although the statute and regulations task government with regulat-
ing certain aspects of privatized recruitment (primarily through licensing), these 
laws are generally assumed to apply only to recruitment agencies and not to local 
brokers who are the first and primary contact point for most migrant workers to 
the Middle East (though this assumption remains to be tested in the courts). 
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 Finally, although Indonesia’s human rights law declares the country’s interna-
tional human rights obligations to be directly enforceable in Indonesian courts 
and via other “effective national legal means,” this provision remains to be tested 
in the context of enforcement of the rights of migrant workers under the Migrant 
Worker Convention and other human rights treaties to which Indonesia is a party.
3.  Migrant Workers who Go to the Middle East Face Particular 
  Challenges to Rights Protection and Access to Redress
 The Middle East, and specifically Saudi Arabia, is a significant destination for 
Indonesian migrant workers. It provided placements to around half of all Indone-
sian migrant workers until several countries were “banned” in recent years, and 
still accounts for almost one third of placements.
 Government, civil society, and lawyers interviewed for this study agreed that the 
Middle East as a destination region poses particular challenges for both migrant 
workers who travel there, and for those seeking to improve access to justice 
for those workers. These challenges were viewed in contrast to the Asia Pacific 
region, the other main destination area, and specifically to Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Taiwan. Participants observed that:
 • The migrant workers who travel to the Middle East come from particular rural 
areas in Java and West Nusa Tenggara. They are overwhelmingly women, with 
low levels of education and little if any formal work experience before depar-
ture. These factors make them more vulnerable to fraud and other abuses. 
 • The recruitment process is inherently disempowering for migrant workers to 
the Middle East. All recruitment agencies for the Middle East are located in 
Jakarta—far from most migrant workers’ homes. As a result, the vast majority 
of workers use local-level brokers to connect them with the agencies—a pro-
cess that remains beyond government oversight and direct regulation. Migrant 
workers must sometimes travel several days to the capital, depending on the 
worker’s home province, which separates the worker from her or his family 
and local authorities. As a result of geographical distance, workers also face 
greater difficulties obtaining documents and seeking assistance or redress 
from the recruitment agencies if problems arise.
 • Migrant workers in the Middle East experience more problems, and problems 
of a more severe nature, than other migrant workers. The most common prob-
lem unique to Middle East workers is “loss of contact,” in which a family loses 
all contact with the worker, sometimes for a number of years, when the worker 
is cut off from phone and internet access. Participants believed that cases of 
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unpaid wages were also more common in the Middle East, as were serious 
physical and sexual abuse cases.
 • Organizations noted that advocacy on behalf of migrant workers is particularly 
difficult for those already in the Middle East or who have returned home, 
because the region is geographically far; the language and culture are very 
different to Indonesia (unlike Malaysia, for example); domestic redress mecha-
nisms, laws, and institutions are especially weak or non-existent; rights-based 
advocacy is not tolerated, particularly in Saudi Arabia; connections with local 
advocacy organizations and lawyers are limited; and the Indonesian embas-
sies and consulates are overburdened and fail to provide timely responses to 
requests for information, and generally lack expertise in local legal systems.
 • Moratoriums may limit the numbers of workers who travel to the region, 
but do not improve protections for migrants who have already departed, nor 
enhance their ability to access justice for rights violations. 
4.  Migrant Workers Have Significant Contractual Rights, but They Are 
  Underutilized
 The contractual rights of migrant workers are most clearly articulated in private 
agreements, which are governed by statute and regulations. Migrant workers must 
sign two private agreements before departing abroad: one with the recruitment 
agency (the placement agreement), and one with the employer or placement agency 
in the destination country (the employment agreement). In addition, workers must 
obtain an insurance policy, which sets out the worker’s rights and the insurer’s obli-
gations during the coverage period. Requirements for all of these documents are 
set out in statutes and regulations, but there are no legislated standard contracts.
 Employment agreements (between the worker and the employer or partner 
recruitment agency abroad) are generally provided close to the worker’s departure 
overseas and the contents must be explained by government officials at pre-depar-
ture briefings. They cover all aspects of the employment including the period of 
employment, wages and holidays. The role of the destination country’s law and 
legal system in the content and enforcement of this agreement is unclear.
 The placement agreement (between the worker and the recruitment agency in 
Indonesia) should be signed by the recruitment agency and the worker before 
the worker commences pre-departure requirements. According to statute, the 
placement agreement must include details about the employer and the prospec-
tive employment. Most significantly, Law 39/2004 requires that the agreement 
include a guarantee that the agency will compensate the worker in the event that 
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the employer in the destination country does not fulfill the terms of the placement 
and employment agreements (such as the amount of wages payable). It also gives 
the migrant worker rights against the recruitment agency if a placement does not 
take place as promised. 
 Though recent regulations require placement agreements to be vetted by local 
or provincial authorities, there is no mechanism for invalidating or correcting 
deficient placement agreements. Moreover, because migrants to the Middle East 
use brokers to connect directly with Jakarta-based recruiters who are viewed as 
outside the local regulatory ambit, the locally-based safeguards generally do not 
help migrants to the Middle East.
 Workers and their representatives interviewed in this study rarely discussed pri-
vate contracts as sources of rights or redress in Indonesia. Recruitment agencies 
and workers’ case-handlers do not rely explicitly on the terms of these documents 
as a basis for negotiation except regarding the agreed wage. Indeed, recruiters 
were perceived as generally denying responsibility for harms that workers suffer 
abroad, despite their contractual obligations under the placement agreement. Par-
ticipants could not identify any instances in which recruiters’ contractual obliga-
tions to workers were tested through litigation, and they were unable to identify 
any case law that explored the scope or enforceability of contractual rights or 
explained the relationship between the placement agreement and employment 
agreement. The intersection between recruiters’ contractual responsibility for 
workers’ losses and workers’ insurance was also unclear. 
 Further, experts and workers believed that workers to the Middle East rarely 
receive a placement agreement from the recruiter at all, and even if recruiters did 
provide a placement agreement, its contents were not explained to the worker. 
Indeed, the migrant workers who took part in the study were unaware of their 
rights under the placement agreement. This study’s researchers were only able 
to obtain one sample Middle East agreement (despite significant efforts to obtain 
others), which did not comply with statutory requirements. For example, it gave 
no guarantee of protection once the employment had commenced and provided 
no information on available mechanisms for resolving disputes. 
5.  Migrant Workers Seek Redress through Four Institutional 
  Mechanisms: “Mediation,” Insurance, Courts, and Consular 
  Assistance 
 Most workers handle their disputes informally by calling a friend, relative, or local 
organization to negotiate with their recruitment agency or broker, rather than 
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using any institutional mechanism. The few that do take their cases further have 
four mechanisms available to them. 
Mechanism Responsible Institution Location
Administrative Dispute 
Resolution, including “Mediation”
Ministry of Manpower and/or BNP2TKI 
(unclear)
Primarily 
Jakarta 
Migrant Worker Insurance 
Program
Private sector insurance companies 
overseen by the Ministry of Manpower
Primarily 
Jakarta
Judicial System The Ministry of Justice Regional
Embassy/Consular Assistance Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry 
of Manpower (through labor attachés) 
Destination 
Country
Findings specific to each mechanism include the following:
 Administrative Dispute Resolution/Mediation
 • Administrative dispute resolution (ADR)—resolution of migrant workers’ dis-
putes with the assistance of a civil servant—reflects the common Indonesian 
practice of seeking local authority figures’ intervention in private disputes, a 
mechanism familiar to migrant workers, civil society organizations, and lawyers.
 • Migrant workers use this method in disputes with recruitment agencies and 
insurance companies, after direct negotiations have failed. Services range 
from assisting workers to obtain documents from recruitment agencies and 
other government departments to contacting parties such as the recruitment 
agency and insurer on the worker’s behalf in order to obtain compensation. 
The final stage in ADR is a “mediation,” in which the government agency 
brings together the parties to a dispute to negotiate.
 • The Ministry of Manpower is responsible for resolving disputes related to 
migrant workers, but in practice, responsibility has shifted to BNP2TKI in 
Jakarta. This is particularly the case for Middle East workers because recruiters 
and insurers are located in Jakarta, beyond the reach of local MoM offices. The 
law is unclear on the respective dispute resolution responsibilities of MoM and 
BNP2TKI.
 • Mediation procedures are not legislated and a BNP2TKI Standard Operat-
ing Procedure Manual provides only general guidance to staff conducting the 
mediations. Mediations are held in private on an ad hoc basis by BNP2TKI, 
as well as by MoM offices at national, regional, and local levels. Mediators are 
not trained; they are bureaucrats who bring the parties together to negotiate 
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rather than to mediate a fair resolution. There is no avenue for appealing the 
result of a mediation, except to take the matter to court.
 • Recruitment agencies regularly do not attend mediations. If they do, they are 
generally represented by a lawyer. There is no mechanism to compel atten-
dance or to provide workers with a lawyer to ameliorate the power disparity.
 • Outcomes of mediation vary from obtaining information and copies of docu-
ments, to obtaining compensation for injuries, lost wages, or other losses 
(which, as worker representatives noted, were only ever partial). 
 The Migrant Worker Insurance Program
 • The Indonesian Migrant Worker Insurance Program is a unique privately-run 
scheme through which all migrant workers must obtain insurance as a condi-
tion of migrating abroad. A standard insurance policy covers losses throughout 
the migration process. 
 • The program has had very low pay-out rate and has been the subject of sus-
tained criticism from many quarters. Civil society and legal professionals were 
sceptical about its ability to provide redress to workers and regarded the pro-
gram as extortionate; the World Bank described regulation of the program as 
ineffective and an Indonesian parliamentary committee recommended that 
the insurance consortium be disbanded. At the time of writing, the Indone-
sian Financial Services Authority had ordered the current consortium to stop 
selling insurance to migrant workers due to misappropriation of funds by the 
consortium’s broker. Further, the Supreme Court had invalidated implement-
ing regulations. In July 2013 the Ministry of Manpower appointed 3 new con-
sortiums.
 • Awareness and understanding of insurance coverage among migrant worker 
returnee participants was very low. Most did not know they were insured, and 
others had limited understanding of the operation of their insurance. Accord-
ing to civil society groups, only 2 out of 48 participants stated that they knew 
they were insured and had an insurance card—a reflection of general levels of 
awareness and understanding among migrant workers.
 • Although participation in the program is mandatory and the premiums are 
low, the claims process is not accessible to low-wage migrant workers and 
very few workers make successful claims. The Proteksi consortium received 
approximately 15,000 claims per year from across all migrant workers, a tiny 
proportion of the number of persons who report problems while abroad. Half 
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of claims were rejected. Inappropriate exclusions and limitations, for example 
a short time limit for filing claims (12 months from date of harm, even if the 
worker is still abroad) also impeded access.
 • Participants perceived the claims procedures to be onerous and unfair: particu-
larly the documentation requirements such as the worker’s original insurance 
card (KPA), which many workers do not receive, or lose, and evidence of loss, 
which workers find difficult to obtain. In practice, workers could only file 
insurance claims at Proteksi’s head office in Jakarta (not at regional offices or 
offices abroad), which was prohibitive for many workers who live far from the 
capital. Civil society groups also complained that the procedure was highly 
non-transparent, and that information about the status of a claim was very 
difficult to obtain. Proteksi did not provide reasons for rejecting a claim, and 
had no appeals process for disputing an insurance decision.
 • The outcome of claims was a source of frustration to many civil society groups 
who felt that decision-making was often arbitrary. They noted that the system 
was not compensating workers for the range of harms they commonly experi-
ence. Insurers regularly use the controversial practice of “ex gratia” payments, 
declaring a claim incomplete but providing a small “charity” sum (permissible 
under regulations, but regarded by worker representatives as a way to close 
the file and prevent challenges).
 • The insurance regulator (Insurance Directorate) has had limited involvement 
in the program, which is primarily overseen by the Ministry of Manpower.
 Foreign Mission-Based Assistance Abroad
 • Consulates and embassies have substantial statutory obligations to Indonesian 
migrant workers abroad. These were strengthened in a 2013 regulation that 
includes obligations to provide legal aid and to monitor recruitment agencies 
and employers.
 • Many workers were aware of the possibility of contacting the Indonesian 
embassy and receiving assistance, and embassies in the Middle East provided 
shelter to a significant number of workers while they attempted to resolve 
problems. Civil society groups and lawyers were also familiar with the services 
offered by embassies and used them frequently to obtain information about a 
migrant worker or a case.
 • Embassy-based services are theoretically accessible in that they are intended to 
be free, open to any citizen, and in that a shelter is available for migrant work-
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ers who cannot return home. However, the services are based only in capital or 
other large cities, and so are practically inaccessible to workers based in other 
areas. Workers also reported being turned away if they did not have required 
identity documents, which are often retained by employers from whom work-
ers flee. Workers who chose not to go to the embassy cited a lack of informa-
tion or knowledge about the location of the embassy, negative perceptions of 
the embassy, or that the embassy was too far away (i.e., in the vast geography 
of Saudi Arabia, Indonesian consular services are only present in Jeddah and 
Riyadh).
 • The procedures used by the labor attaché or diplomatic staff to resolve com-
plaints are informal, and generally involve negotiation with the employer on 
the worker’s behalf. Legal advice was not provided to any migrant worker focus 
group participant, although it is theoretically available. In the few places that 
Indonesian government lawyers work in embassies on workers’ behalf, the 
lawyers do not appear to be fluent in the local language or legal system and 
legal assistance abroad is perceived by workers and civil society groups as 
inadequate. Most non-government participants described the procedures as 
lengthy, bureaucratic, and non-transparent.
 • Civil society organizations generally believe that embassies prioritize resolu-
tion of complaints as quickly as possible, regardless of whether the resolution 
is fair—partly because of severe overcrowding in shelters, limited embassy 
staff, and the limited ability to act in a foreign legal system. Despite Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs reports that 90 percent of Middle East cases are “resolved,” 
civil society groups indicated that workers generally only receive a flight home, 
rather than back wages or compensation for more serious harms. 
 The Court System for Criminal and Civil cases
 • Courts can theoretically be used by workers in at least three ways: (1) Migrants 
can bring a civil law suit against a recruiter for contractual violations such as 
unpaid wages or differences in the nature or location of work, or against an 
insurer for improper denial of a claim; (2) Courts can be used to compel gov-
ernment regulatory or other actions; and, (3) Police may file criminal charges 
against the recruiter or broker in serious cases of fraud, abuse, trafficking, or 
exploitation of migrant workers.
 • The court system was the least used of all pathways to justice, and all civil 
society and legal representatives interviewed believed that the courts were not 
a viable option for most migrant workers.
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 • All participants were aware of the existence of the courts, and that in order to 
bring a criminal case one contacts the police. Awareness of the civil law and 
its relevance to migrant workers was low. 
 • Although courts of general jurisdiction are geographically accessible in that 
they exist at local and provincial levels, there are other practical barriers that 
make access extremely difficult. These include onerous evidentiary require-
ments; expensive, slow, and time-consuming court procedures (including 
related appeals); the requirement of skilled legal representation; and the need 
to travel to and from the police, prosecutor, courts, and other locations. Claims 
are generally filed in the locality of the defendant, i.e., Jakarta for Middle East 
recruiters.
 • Study participants knew of only a handful of migrant worker court cases; in 
all, the workers were unsuccessful. More research is needed to determine the 
reasons for the failure. Little litigation to test the scope and meaning of the 
law has been conducted in this area.
6.  Most Institutional Mechanisms Lack Formality and Procedural 
  Standardization
 Most institutional mechanisms were strikingly informal in implementation. 
Except for the courts, the procedures for filing complaints and claims, and for 
resolving disputes, are governed only by general internal rules, if governed by 
rules at all. Dispute resolution appears to be carried out in a relatively informal 
and ad hoc manner. 
 This informality both benefits and disadvantages workers. On one hand, the infor-
mal procedures associated with administrative dispute resolution and embassy 
complaints are quicker, less expensive, and simpler than going to court. No dis-
covery or other requirements common to court matters can be used to delay pro-
ceedings or exclude workers. Indeed some lawyers suggested that the more rules 
introduced, the more barriers faced by workers, and the less likely they would 
receive anything at all.
 On the other hand, informality undermines transparency. Significant imbalances 
in power between workers and recruitment agencies or insurance companies 
give workers limited leverage in negotiations. In “mediation,” for example, nei-
ther the worker nor the government mediator can force the other party to the 
table (recruitment agencies frequently fail to attend), and workers often accept 
whatever is offered, regardless of whether it is fair. This also happens in insur-
ance claims, when, for example, workers are simply reimbursed the cost of a 
146  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
flight home and several months’ wages regardless of the wages actually owed to 
them or other injuries suffered. Like insurance claims and embassies’ complaints-
handling, migrant workers have no way to appeal a government mediation and no 
truly independent arbiter of disputes, unless the worker is able to go to court. As 
a result, worker representatives believe that most workers get something from a 
negotiation and/or mediation, but workers almost never receive their full entitle-
ment, and private actors have no incentive or realistic threat of sanction to compel 
them to provide fair redress. 
7.  Migrant Workers Face Barriers to Accessing Justice that Are 
  Common to All Mechanisms
 According to many experts, the limited bargaining power of migrant workers, 
along with lower levels of education, capital, and confidence to take cases, enables 
recruitment agencies, insurers and others to unjustly profit from and avoid liabil-
ity for the harms to which they contributed, or from which they failed to ade-
quately protect workers. Migrant workers also supported this view.
 The study found that, across all mechanisms, a further set of common key struc-
tural barriers prevents migrant workers from effectively obtaining adequate—if 
any—redress:
 A) Redress Mechanisms, Recruiters, Insurers, and Government Agencies Are Central-
ized in Jakarta—Far from Most Workers’ Homes: Because all Middle East recruit-
ment agencies, the insurance consortium, and government departments are 
all headquartered in Jakarta, migrants must invariably travel to Jakarta to nego-
tiate with the recruiter or insurer or to file a claim. BNP2TKI’s Crisis Centre 
is presently also only in Jakarta, and although local government officials may 
resolve disputes more informally, this is not possible in practice if the recruit-
ment agency does not have a branch in the province, as is the case for Middle 
East recruiters. Travel to Jakarta is costly, intimidating, time-consuming, and 
stressful for most migrant workers.
 B) All Mechanisms Have Documentation Requirements that Workers Struggle to 
Meet: Many workers either do not receive all of the standard contracts and 
other documents required to make claims, or their documents are improperly 
retained by the recruitment agency or employer. It is difficult for workers to 
obtain replacement copies of key documents such as the insurance card, or to 
obtain necessary information from the worker’s recruitment agency. In addi-
tion, workers are often unable to provide supporting evidence for their claims 
because when they were abroad they did not know what documents they were 
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required to obtain, or they were unable to obtain such evidence (e.g., wage 
statements). Evidentiary letters from the embassy are difficult to obtain while 
abroad, and often inadequate to support workers’ claims.
 C) Workers’ Concerns Are Not Taken Seriously by Government, Recruiters, and Insur-
ers: Workers and civil society organizations described a dismissive attitude 
toward workers on the part of many government departments and private sec-
tor recruitment agencies and insurers, for whom civil society groups believed 
worker protection was an inferior concern to the profit-making aspect of 
migrant work. There was a widespread perception that government officials 
would not side with workers demanding full accountability from recruitment 
agencies or insurers for worker losses. This prevented workers from filing 
claims and from challenging decisions they believed to be unjust.
 D) Workers Lack Awareness and Understanding of Their Legal Rights and Redress 
Options: Despite detailed training requirements under the statute, workers 
in this study generally did not receive, or did not understand, information 
about their rights, or procedures for accessing redress in Indonesia or abroad, 
beyond going to the embassy. There are few if any publicly available resources 
that clearly set out workers’ legal rights under statute and typical contracts, or 
the procedures and documents required to seek redress. 
 E) The Private Sector Is Not Sufficiently Regulated or Held Accountable for Migrant 
Worker Protection: Participants regarded government oversight of recruitment 
agencies, insurers, and brokers as weak in general, and particularly weak with 
respect to agencies’ provision of appropriate redress for worker harms. The law 
does not contain effective sanctions for agency misconduct, and where sanc-
tions do exist, they are rarely imposed. Facilitation (or even non-obstruction) 
of migrant worker redress is not a condition of agency licensing. Recruitment 
agencies have little incentive to comply with their legal obligations regarding 
information and training, to engage constructively in dispute resolution, to 
assist workers in obtaining copies of key documents required for claims, or 
to ensure that the local brokers with whom they work deal honestly and fairly 
with workers. 
 F) Migrant Workers Lack Legal Advice and Legal Aid Essential to Accessing Redress: 
Legal experts emphasized the importance of legal representation for migrant 
workers at all negotiations and mediations, and when going to the police to 
file a complaint. Legal aid organizations have little presence in the rural areas 
where most workers live, and generally do not focus on labor migration law. 
It is difficult for workers to retain private lawyers due to physical access con-
148  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
straints and lack of financial resources. Most workers, if they receive assis-
tance, do so through small civil society organizations of advocates and former 
migrant workers, who assist workers to gather their documents and negotiate 
with private and public actors, linking workers to other essential services. 
However, civil society group staff outside of Jakarta rarely have legal training 
and do not feel able to litigate complex cases in the courts. It is difficult for 
workers to access legal advice when abroad because embassy lawyers are often 
unfamiliar with destination country law and Indonesian labor migration law. 
Indonesian legal aid lawyers are unable to access information on destination 
country laws. 
 G) There Are Overlaps and Gaps in Migrant Worker Protection: Inadequate delinea-
tion of responsibilities impedes workers seeking redress, both because work-
ers do not know who is responsible for a particular function and because 
individuals within government and private institutions are unclear as to their 
responsibilities. This is true of the functions of the Ministry of Manpower 
and BNP2TKI relating to migrant workers, and of the national, regional, and 
local levels of each agency. For some work-related harms, responsibility may 
be shared by the insurer, recruitment agency, and the broker in Indonesia, 
as well as by the partner recruitment agency abroad and the employer (and 
origin and destination country governments)—resulting in no party accepting 
responsibility and ensuring redress.
 H) All Mechanisms Have Financial, Time, and Emotional Costs: Migrant workers 
rarely have timely and physically accessible redress options. Geographic dis-
tance and layers of bureaucracy make administrative dispute resolution and 
insurance claims in Jakarta time-consuming and resource draining (as well as 
intimidating and stressful). This presents an insurmountable obstacle to the 
many migrant workers who need urgent redress in order to pay debts, medi-
cal costs, or other expenses. The court process is especially expensive, lengthy, 
and emotionally exhausting.
 I) Redress Mechanisms Are Subject to Corruption or Perceptions of Corruption: 
Almost all participants outside of government expressed deep mistrust in the 
labor migration system. They perceived the migrant labor system as burdened 
by collusion between recruitment agencies, insurers, and government offi-
cials who undermined the regulatory and bureaucratic procedures intended 
to protect workers. Recruitment agencies supported this view, noting that the 
more rules introduced, the more bribes they were required to pay. In addition, 
participants thought that police, prosecutors, and courts favored the wealthy 
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and powerful, making them unlikely to hold a recruitment agency account-
able for criminal wrongdoing, and only exposing the worker to further stress, 
expense, and disappointment. Whether these allegations are true or not, this 
widely-held scepticism of the government and the judicial bodies that facilitate 
access to redress creates a strong disincentive against seeking justice. 
8.B Recommendations
Based on these findings, and the specific findings on each mechanism, (see Section 6, 
above), the authors make the following recommendations.
1.  Establish a Right to Access to Justice for Migrant Workers within 
  Indonesian Labor Migration Laws
 Access to justice and redress should be a central component of current labor 
migration law reform. At a minimum, the law on migrant workers should state 
that migrant workers have a right to obtain redress for contractual and statu-
tory violations, and should define the specific mechanisms available for seeking 
redress, the nature of redress, the parties responsible for providing redress, and 
the consequences for failure to provide redress or constructively engage with the 
available mechanisms. Standardized procedures that are accessible to workers 
should be set out in regulations. 
 The redress mechanisms made available to migrant workers should be developed 
in consultation with civil society, migrant workers, families of migrant workers, 
and their representatives. The mechanisms should reflect the specific needs of 
migrant workers seeking redress and address the common obstacles to accessing 
justice. Given the large number of returnees who report problems while abroad 
(at least 14 percent ), as well as those who do not report their problems and those 
who experience problems before departure and after return, the mechanisms 
must be simple, affordable, geographically accessible, and able to operate at scale.
 Education and training about the redress mechanisms, and assistance programs 
to aid access, are critical. Training should also be provided to government officials 
charged with implementing redress mechanisms, as well as to law enforcement 
officials and civil society groups tasked with enabling access, with additional tar-
geted training for recruitment agents, brokers, and insurers. Simple information 
and instructions on redress mechanisms should be made electronically available 
and incorporated into pre-departure training. 
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 Finally, redress mechanisms should be available to all migrant workers and their 
families, regardless of their regular or irregular status, as required under interna-
tional law. 
2.  Strengthen Enforceability of Existing Rights Under Statute and 
  Contracts
 Labor migration statutes and regulations should explicitly identify the actor(s) 
responsible for fulfilling the rights of migrant workers. In particular, they should 
delineate between government responsibilities and the responsibilities of recruit-
ment agencies and others. They should also specify the consequences for the 
failure of recruitment agencies (or government) to meet their responsibilities—
including, where possible, mechanisms through which workers may enforce their 
rights. Brokers should be directly regulated, or defined as “agents” of recruiters in 
appropriate circumstances.
 To improve consistency and enforceability of migrant workers’ protections under 
placement agreements, the Ministry of Manpower should draft a standard place-
ment agreement that incorporates the statutory rights of migrant workers and 
corresponding obligations of recruitment agencies. In particular, the standard 
agreement should include reference to Article 52(f) of 39/2004, which requires 
recruitment agencies to compensate workers if the employer does not fulfil the 
terms of the employment agreement. To the extent that recruitment agencies rely 
on insurers to fulfil this obligation, the agreement should be explicit about the 
recruitment agency’s responsibilities with respect to a worker making an insur-
ance claim, including in the event that the worker’s claim is not fully paid by the 
insurer. 
 The Ministry of Manpower should require agencies to use the standard agree-
ment, or until such agreement is drafted, should establish penalties for failure 
to provide a placement agreement and/or failure to provide an agreement that 
complies with 39/2004 and regulations. Lawmakers should consider including a 
presumption that the rights of migrant workers under both domestic and inter-
national human rights law are implied in any agreement.
3.  Standardize and Regulate the Administrative Mediation Procedures
 To strengthen the administrative dispute resolution procedures operated by 
BNP2TKI and the Ministry of Manpower, both institutions should consider stan-
dardizing and improving their procedures at all levels. This should include, for 
example:
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 • Clearly delineating between the complaint-handling and mediation respon-
sibilities of BNP2TKI and the Ministry of Manpower, and between different 
levels of government (national/regional/district).
 • Training mediators through an accredited course, and tasking mediators with 
assisting parties to reach a fair outcome based on the rights and obligations 
of parties under the placement agreement (or insurance contract) and statute.
 • Employing lawyers at crisis centers who specialize in migrant worker law, to 
advise migrant workers about their rights and redress options.
 • Setting clear documentation requirements that take into account obstacles 
that migrant workers commonly encounter, processes for obtaining missing 
documents, and alternative procedures if documents are unavailable.
 • Setting transparent reporting processes if BNP2TKI finds evidence of wrong-
doing or of bad faith by a recruitment agency, including timeframes by which 
the Ministry of Manpower is required to act. 
 • Setting clear procedures in the event BNP2TKI identifies potential criminal 
conduct in the course of complaint-handling and mediating a case.
 • Enabling the sanctioning of recruitment agencies that refuse to take part in 
mediation, to respond to worker inquiries, or answer requests for documents. 
 • Collecting and publicizing key data such as the amounts claimed by workers, 
against which parties claims were made; the compensation agreed upon; and 
amounts received by workers (de-identifying workers’ names and personal 
details to ensure the privacy of the migrant worker). 
 • Establishing a complaint and grievance procedure in relation to the conduct 
of the mediator or another party, and related sanctions. 
 • Guaranteeing workers’ right to privacy and confidentiality throughout the pro-
cess, as well as the workers’ right to be informed about progress in their case.
 In addition to mediation, the government should consider an administrative tri-
bunal based in regional areas for hearing appeals or deciding cases if mediation 
fails. The composition of the tribunal could mirror the domestic labor tribunal, 
with representatives of industry, unions, and migrant advocates sitting as tribunal 
members. 
 Changes to the mediation system and/or the creation of a tribunal should be 
made as simple and transparent as possible in order to avoid creation of further 
barriers to access. Extensive public consultation and pilot programs should be 
initiated before a new system is introduced.
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4.  Improve Effectiveness and Oversight of the Migrant Worker 
  Insurance Program
 The insurance program requires significant structural and operational reform in 
order to become the meaningful redress mechanism for low-wage migrant work-
ers that it was intended to be. This should begin with a thorough review of its cur-
rent operation, based on quality data on the nature of claims paid and refused, the 
amounts claimed and paid, the interpretation of claims and reasons for refusal, 
the relevant processing times, and all other aspects of the claims determination 
process. It should also include an evaluation of the operation of current policy 
exclusions and claim-filing time limits, amending these as necessary to ensure 
that they reflect common risks and challenges associated with labor migration 
and do not unfairly deny coverage (and to ensure that they are consistent with cur-
rent regulations). The claims process should be made simpler, more accessible, 
and more transparent, and the insurer should be required to establish a pay-out 
ratio that reflects appropriate coverage of the most common risks to migrant 
workers at all stages of the migration process. 
 Independent insurance experts, together with the Ministry of Finance insurance 
regulator and civil society, should conduct the review. The review should also 
examine whether the program would operate more effectively and transparently 
under the Ministry of Finance rather than the Ministry of Manpower, under the 
jurisdiction of the general insurance regulator (BAPEPAM).
 Any insurance consortium providing insurance to migrant workers should be 
given a limited period within which to process claims. Failure to comply should 
result in termination of the consortium’s license, and ongoing compliance should 
be a condition of ongoing appointment to the program.
 A number of additional reforms can be implemented immediately:
 • The Ministry of Manpower should:
  – Set short time limits for deciding and paying claims; 
  – Require insurers to provide a claim number that workers and their repre-
sentatives can use to check the status of their cases, as well as a telephone 
service through which workers may easily check the status of their claim;
  – Require insurers to replace a migrant workers’ lost insurance card within 
seven days, at no cost, and establish a hotline for workers to file a com-
plaint about insurer misconduct in this or other respects;
  – Sanction recruitment agencies for failure to provide workers with cop-
ies of documents in their possession in a timely manner or for charging 
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improper fees for doing so. Establish a hotline through which migrant 
workers may report improper recruiter conduct in this respect; and,
  – Require insurers to provide claimants with detailed reasons for rejecting 
a claim, an internal review of a claim determination upon request, and an 
opportunity to re-submit a claim if deficiencies may be rectified.
 • BNP2TKI, insurers, and recruitment agencies should provide workers with 
better information about the insurance program before workers depart, 
including an explanation of the evidence that workers should seek to obtain 
while still abroad (see also Recommendation 5 on assistance to obtain evidence 
while abroad). Simple information on the insurance policy and claims process 
should also be published and made freely available. This could be a joint ini-
tiative between government,civil society groups , and possibly donors in the 
initial stage.
 • BNP2TKI should better assist workers to obtain personal/identity documents 
for insurance claims, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff in embassies and 
consulates should better assist workers to obtain evidentiary documents and 
to learn about document requirements for insurance claims. 
 In the medium term, insurers should be required to establish effective regional 
claims processing centers. They should also be required to establish an effective 
and accessible complaint and appeal process that is monitored by the insurance 
regulator. This process should be accessible in regional areas and should not 
require travel to Jakarta. In order for these processes to be available to workers, 
there must be an expansion of legal assistance to file claims and challenge rejec-
tions, beginning with an evaluation of the three month airport trial program run 
by BNP2TKI and the Indonesian Lawyers Association. 
 Rules on insurance brokerage and the role of brokers in migrant worker insur-
ance should be clarified so that the use of a broker is either removed from the 
system as redundant, or the broker is required to act as genuine impartial actor 
working to the benefit of the insured.
 The government of Indonesia should also consider establishing a separate state 
compensation scheme for workers who suffer hardships and injuries that are 
difficult to insure. For example, physical, sexual, and emotional abuse could be 
compensated by such a scheme. The practice of awarding discretionary charity 
payments as part of the “social function” of insurers should be subject to transpar-
ent criteria. 
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5.  Improve Oversight and Accountability of Recruitment Agencies
 Migrant workers can only be effectively protected if recruitment agencies act in 
good faith to ensure that their promises and legal obligations to workers are met 
throughout the migration process, and if those agencies that fail to do so are iden-
tified through effective monitoring and sanctioned. Elements of a more effective 
regulatory system include:
 • More frequent monitoring of agencies using established criteria, as well as 
investigations in response to an accessible public complaints process and 
mandatory sanctions or de-registration for repeated compliance failures.
 • Stronger licensing requirements, including linking of license renewal with 
compliance with key migrant worker protections (among other things), and 
denial of licences to applicants previously involved in de-registered agencies.
 • Greater transparency in licensing, including opportunities for public com-
ment on licensing applications and publication of recruiter sanctions and the 
identities of senior management and other individuals/corporations with a 
significant financial interest in a recruitment agency.
 • Holding recruitment agencies accountable for brokers acting as their agents.
 • Providing recruiters with detailed guidance on their obligations to migrant 
workers under existing statute, regulations, and standard placement agree-
ments, as well as the ways in which recruiters ought to meet those obligations 
and the consequences of failure to do so. This information does not currently 
appear to be clearly defined or available. 
6.  Regulate the Broker System
 Local brokers/sponsors are an established part of the Indonesian labor migration 
system, acting essentially as agents for recruitment agencies at the village level. 
Some advocates call for banning brokers, because of high incidences of fraud and 
deceptive or incompetent conduct. However, it is the authors’ view that this is 
currently unrealistic given the extent to which workers rely on brokers to identify 
recruitment agencies and arrange travel documents. In light of the pervasive role 
of brokers within the labor migration system, there is a clear need to achieve far 
greater oversight of, and accountability within, the broker system. 
 This should begin with an empirically informed understanding of the operation 
of the broker system based on a national study that evaluates the services that 
brokers provide to workers, their relationship with recruiters (including the cir-
cumstances under which they are the “agents” of recruiters in practice and/or in 
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law), brokers’ geographic scope, the problems that migrant workers frequently 
encounter with brokers, and the ways in which brokers may protect workers. 
 The study should reflect realistic regulatory models that take into account the 
large number of brokers at the village level across the country as well as the sig-
nificance of personal relationships in the broker model. 
 Potential regulatory initiatives might include:
 • Defining the circumstances under which brokers are “agents” of recruiters, 
such that recruiters are liable for their actions.
 • Subjecting brokers to a statutory licensing and regulatory scheme that runs 
parallel to the scheme for recruitment agencies, including a mechanism for 
migrant worker complaints, investigation, dispute resolution, and redress. 
This would need to be reconciled with the prohibition under Article 4 of Law 
39/2004 against individuals engaging in migrant worker recruitment.
 • Prohibiting recruitment agencies from engaging brokers who are unlicensed 
(and sanctioning those who do so), and making a list of licensed brokers in 
each district publicly available and easily accessible. 
 • Making licenses valid for a limited period, with periodic renewal contingent 
on a clean record.
 • Training brokers on the law, including their obligations, duties, and the rights 
of migrant workers. This could be standardized nationally, implemented 
locally.
 • Sanctioning brokers for engaging in conduct intended to mislead or otherwise 
disadvantage a migrant worker, and banning repeat offenders from acting as 
brokers in the future. 
7.  Strengthen Embassy Oversight and Systematize Consular 
  Assistance
 Embassies and consulates in significant migrant worker destination countries 
should be better resourced, and their staff should be better trained to provide 
legal assistance to workers and to conduct more rigorous evaluation of partner 
recruitment agencies and employers. This is required in order to implement the 
responsibilities of the Indonesian government for protecting its citizens abroad, 
as recently articulated under Government Regulation 3 of 2013. Furthermore, con-
sular staff should make themselves more accessible to migrant workers outside of 
the capital cities, and should travel more frequently to local shelters in other parts 
of the country, particularly in geographically large countries such as Saudi Arabia. 
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 Specific recommendations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of 
Manpower attachés where relevant, include:
 • Embassies and consulates should provide free competent legal advice to 
low-wage migrant workers in relation to employment and criminal matters, 
addressing rights to redress within the destination country as well as upon 
return to Indonesia. While Government Regulation 3/2013 outlines the activi-
ties to be undertaken by the Indonesian Foreign Missions in providing legal 
aid, additional regulations should establish guidelines for determining when 
legal aid is mandatory and which migrants are eligible for legal aid, and that 
guidance should be as inclusive as possible. Resources must also be allocated 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and labor attachés to ensure that those legal 
services are truly accessible and meaningful. Embassy lawyers should either 
be extensively trained in local language, laws, and legal systems, or should 
engage local lawyers. Embassy staff should also be trained in Indonesian labor 
migration law, including the Migrant Worker Insurance Scheme, as well as 
relevant international legal standards.
 • Relevant parties should develop standardized procedures for consulate/
embassy staff to resolve disputes between workers and employers, including 
defining workers’ rights to information and to participate in the process, to 
ensure transparency and fairness.
 • Embassies and consulates should establish procedures to ensure that workers 
not in possession of their passports or other documentation receive assistance 
from foreign missions, and work to facilitate the workers’ retrieval of their 
documentation necessary to pursue a claim, either within the country of work 
or upon their return to Indonesia.
 • Embassies and consulates should establish a more efficient mechanism for 
responding to worker and family complaints and to inquiries regarding the 
status of their case at a particular mission abroad, and work to overcome the 
duration of time workers are trapped in the country of work while trying to 
resolve disputes with their employer.
 • The government should establish a mechanism for receiving and respond-
ing to complaints about consular handling of worker disputes or requests for 
information.
 • The government should establish clearer criteria and processes for assessing 
the quality of partner recruitment agencies and commercial employers based 
on their ongoing treatment of migrant workers.
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 • The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should maintain records regarding the types 
of complaints received by Indonesian missions abroad, the length of time to 
resolve the cases, and the outcomes of those cases, and make de-identified 
data publicly available. This is particularly important for fulfilling the mis-
sions’ obligations under Government Regulation 3/2013 to monitor, as well 
as provide guidance and oversight of recruitment agencies and employers.
8.  Improve Information on Rights and Redress, and Workers’ Access 
  to Documents Required to Substantiate Claims
 Government (and possibly donors) should support the development of resources 
that clearly and simply set out migrant workers’ rights under various sources of 
law, as well as the responsibilities of recruiters, insurers, and various government 
departments. Publicly available materials should also clearly and simply set out 
the procedures and documents required to seek redress through insurance or 
other Indonesia-based mechanisms in a manner accessible to local civil society 
groups and low-wage migrant workers. These should be developed by civil soci-
ety, in collaboration with government and academics, with input from the private 
sector. They should be made available online and in hard copy pre-departure, 
at embassies, and at local government offices. Development and distribution of 
materials should be supported by the government (and possibly donors).
 The Ministry of Manpower and BNP2TKI should establish a system in partner-
ship with recruitment agencies and insurers through which migrant workers may 
easily obtain copies of their contract and insurance documents in a timely manner 
and at no cost. One option would be to create a centralized electronic or hard-copy 
location with copies of all documents that migrants can access.
 The ministry should also train diplomatic staff about Indonesia-based redress 
mechanisms such as insurance, and establish procedures for consulates to advise 
and assist workers to collect documentation that they will need to make claims, 
before the workers leave the destination country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
should develop template letters for embassies to timely provide evidence of harm 
suffered by a worker.
 The BNP2TKI Crisis Centre Hotline should also advise workers on the documents 
that they must obtain and any other steps they should take while in the destina-
tion country to make an insurance or other related claim for redress in Indonesia. 
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9.  Improve Training and Capacity of Lawyers Representing Migrants
 To increase the pool of skilled individuals assisting migrant workers, law schools 
could teach courses on overseas migrant labor, including classes on relevant 
human rights, labor rights, consumer rights, and contract law. Law schools could 
also establish related clinical legal education programs that both train future law-
yers and provide essential services to migrant workers. In the future, transna-
tional clinical collaboration with law schools in destination countries could be 
a particularly powerful route to increasing access to justice for workers at all 
stages of the labor migration process, particularly with the support of established 
migration-focused clinical legal education programs. This would likely require 
donor support at the outset.
 The legal professional associations should also offer short courses so that prac-
tising labor migration lawyers can improve their skills and remain current with 
changes to the law. Short courses on the law in significant destination countries 
would also be beneficial.
 Donor organizations, in partnership with law firms and law schools, could also 
offer more in-depth legal training to paralegals and civil society groups assisting 
migrant workers, as well as to pro bono lawyers. In addition to domestic legal 
training, this could include modules on destination country laws as well as Indo-
nesia’s obligations under the Migrant Worker Convention and other international 
treaties. 
 Finally, donor organizations can support civil society organizations that are teach-
ing workers to assist others by involving the workers in the process to resolve 
their disputes. For such training to have a sustainable impact, particularly in light 
of significant power imbalances inherent in the dispute resolution process, the 
trained workers will need ongoing support. 
10.  Support Legal Research and Strategic Litigation
 Further research, analysis, and dialogue among lawyers and academics is strongly 
recommended to identify creative new ways for migrant workers to use the courts 
to enforce their rights. This could include cases to compel government action or 
to obtain redress from recruitment agencies or other private parties under con-
tract. 
 It could also include strategic litigation to test the enforceability of workers’ rights 
under the placement agreement, or the standard insurance policy, or to estab-
lish the accountability of recruitment agencies for the conduct of brokers (or 
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the independent liability of brokers) for worker harms. There may also be scope 
to test the new legal aid law as applied to migrant workers. Litigation may also 
be used to test the import of Indonesia’s obligations under the Migrant Worker 
Convention and other international treaties in domestic courts and international 
forums, particularly in light of Indonesia’s human rights law, which directly incor-
porates those obligations into domestic law and creates a right to their enforce-
ment through domestic and international mechanisms.
 In all of these areas, the involvement of pro bono law firms, civil society groups, 
law school clinics/academics and international donors, will be needed to develop 
and bring viable claims.
 Future research is recommended into the amenability of non-traditional forums, 
such as the Industrial Relations Tribunal, to migrant worker claims. It should 
also consider migrant workers’ access to redress for rights violations by other 
private sector actors, such as training centers, banks involved in the transmis-
sion of remittances, and transportation companies that transport workers from 
Jakarta airport back to their home communities (with reportedly frequent theft 
and fraud). Studies could also explore the discriminatory discrepancies between 
placement agreements of Middle East workers and those going to other regions.
 Finally, the impact of gender on the type of harms suffered and the barriers to 
redress for those harms is greatly needed, given that the vast majority of migrant 
workers from Indonesia are women carrying out work traditionally undervalued 
as “women’s work.” Further research should include the treatment of pregnant 
migrant workers, sexual assault cases, and barriers to seeking redress as experi-
enced by women.   

1 6 1
Annexure 1: International Law 
Ratifications by Indonesia
United Nations Conventions And Protocols Ratif. Year
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 YES 2000
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
1963
YES 1999
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 YES 2006
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 YES 2006
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights
NO —
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
NO —
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women 1979
YES 1984
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel , Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 1984
YES 1998
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990 YES 1990
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families, 1990 in force 2003
YES 2012
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United Nations Conventions And Protocols Ratif. Year
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the 
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (a) 2002
SIGNED 2003
UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, adopted 1956, 
entered into force 1957
NO —
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, 2000
YES 2009
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children (“Palermo Protocol”) 2000
YES 2009
International Labour Organization Conventions Ratif. Year
ILO Convention 14: Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, 1921 NO —
ILO Convention 29: Concerning Forced Labour Convention 1930, entered 
into force 1932
YES 1950
ILO Convention 87: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize 1948
YES 1998
ILO Convention 98: Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949
YES 1957
ILO Convention 100: Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 YES 1957
ILO Convention 105:Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 YES 1999
ILO Convention 111: Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention, 1958
YES 1999
ILO Convention 131: Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 NO —
ILO Convention 138: Minimum Age for Admission to Employment 
Convention, 1973
YES 1999
ILO Conventions 144: Tripartite Consultation (International Labour 
Standards) Convention, 1976
YES 1990
ILO Conventions 169: Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 NO —
ILO Conventions 182: Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action 
for the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999
YES 2000
ILO Convention 97: Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) 1949 NO —
ILO Convention 143: Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) 
Convention, 1975
NO —
ILO Convention 189: On Decent Work for Domestic Workers NO —
ILO Convention 181: Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997
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Annexure 2: Interviews and 
Focus Groups
Research Methodology
TABLE 1: Category of Persons Interviewed
Category Number 
Returned Worker 4
Civil Society Organizations 16 
Government 14 
Legal Practice/ Academic 3
Private Sector 4
International Organizations 2
Total 43
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TABLE 2: Focus Groups and Participants
District or 
Sub-District
Province Dates 
(2012)
Participants
Returned 
Worker
Family 
Member/CSO
Total
Malang East Java 12 April 8 1 9
Brebes Central Java 7 May 6 5 11
Indramayu West Java 20 May 7 7 14
Sukabumi (1) West Java 27 May 9 1 10
Sukabumi (2) West Java 27 May 7 3 10
East Lombok (1) West N.T. 10 June 6 7 13
East Lombok (2) West N.T 11 June 5 3 8
Total 48 27 75
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Annexure 3: List of Organizations/
Persons Interviewed
Organization/Agency Name
Jakarta
1. BNP2TKI Crisis Center Henry Prayitno
2. Ministry of Manpower, Placement Division Berry Komaruzaman
3. Ministry of Manpower, Protection Division Oscar Abdulrachman
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Citizen Protection Division Tatang Budie Utama Razak
5. Migrant Workers Task Force (SATGAS TKI) Humphrey Djemat
6. Assosiasi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (ATKI) Retno Dewi 
7. The Institute for Ecosoc Rights Sri Palupi
8. Jakarta Legal Aid Pratiwi Febry
9. Jala PRT Lita Anggraini
10. Migrant Care Nurharsono and Badriyah
11. Migrant Institute Adi Candra Utama and 
Nursalim
12. Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia (SBMI) Head Office Jamaluddin
13. SBMI Banyuwangi Yudi
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Organization/Agency Name
14. Private legal practice Harisan Aritonang
15. TIFA Foundation Eddy Purwanto
16. PT Abdillah Putra Tamala (Private recruitment agency) Irwan Rosadi and 
Made Bagus Surajaya
17. PT Jasindo; formerly PT Grasia Media Utama 
(Insurance Brokerage Company)
Bambang Sarjito
18. PT Harta Aman Pratama/ Konsorsium Asuransi 
Proteksi (Insurer)
Rusdiansyah
19. International Labour Organization (ILO) Lotte Kejser
20. World Bank, Justice for the Poor Program Lisa Noor Humaidah
Brebes, Central Java
21. Local MoM Office Henky Budi Rahmawan
22. SBMI Brebes Cahyo Subagyo
Indramayu, West Java
23. Local MoM Office Adi Satria
24. SBMI Indramayu Jihun
25. Fokbumi Heru
Malang, East Java
26. Local MoM Office Sukardi
27. Brawijaya University Umu Hilmy
28. Paguyuban Jinggo Putri (PJP) Mutmainah
East Lombok, NTB Province
29. BNP2TKI in Lombok M. Saleh
30. Office of Manpower, Placement Division Tohari Waluyo
31. Office of Manpower, Oversight Division Djunaidi and Syaiful
32. Advokasi Buruh Migran Indonesia (ADBMI) Lombok 
Timur
Roma Hidayat
Sukabumi
33. Local MoM Office Sukarwandi and Adi Kurniai
34. SBMI Sukabumi Jejen Nurjanah
1 6 7
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32. Focus group participants mentioned language barriers a number of times as a source of 
frustration for both employee and employer, and an additional barrier to seeking assistance and 
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MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: INDONESIA  171
47. Law 39/2004, Article 36.
48. One agency representative interviewed for the study remarked that, “if the migrant worker 
is illiterate … I send them back to the sponsor and tell him to take the worker home.” Interview 
with Mr. Irwan Rosadi and Made Bagus Surajaya, Recruitment Agency PT Abdillah Putra Tamala, 
Jakarta, June 22, 2012.
49. Manpower Regulation 14/2010, Article 22.
50. Ibid, Article 24.
51. Ibid, Articles 31–37.
52. Ibid, Articles 38–40.
53. A small number of workers organize their own work and visas abroad, or are placed by the 
state according to government-to-government contracts. The present report does not focus on those 
workers, or on workers who travel abroad through unofficial channels independent of any local 
recruiters.  
54. BNP2TKI was created by Law 39/2004, but it wasn’t until 2006 that the president passed the 
rules necessary to establish the body: Regulation of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Num-
ber 81/2006 concerning the National Body for Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant 
Workers, September 8, 2006 (Perpres 81/2006). Note also that a prior interagency body had been 
created in 1999 during reformasi, known as the Indonesian Migrant Worker Placement Coordina-
tion Body (BKPTKI), pursuant to Presidential Decree Number 29/1999 (Keppres 81/2006). In this 
earlier version, the Minister of Manpower headed the body.
55. This includes ministries of manpower, immigration, foreign affairs, health, population and 
the police. Perpres 81/2006 Article 2.
56. Law 39/2004 on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers, Article 95(2).
57. Government Regulation 5/2013 Concerning Procedures for Evaluating and Appointing Busi-
ness Partners and Individual Employers, January 2,  2013, Article 4.
58. Manpower Regulation 14/2010, Article 42.
59. Ibid, Article 9.
60. Ibid, Article 1(8).
61. Ibid, Article 8.
62. Ibid, Articles 11–12, 16.
63. Ibid, Article 19(5).
64. Presidential Regulation 81/2006 concerning BNP2TKI, Articles 27–28.
65. See for example, Sources. 2013. “BNP2TKI Prepares to Open P4TKI in Cirebon [West Java].” 
Antara News, June 2, 2013.  http://www.antarasumbar.com/berita/nasional/d/0/292441/bnp2tki-
siapkan-pembentukan-p4tki-di-cirebon.html.
66. MoM, [n.d.], list of private recruitment agencies to January 2013, on file with authors. Note 
that this figure may be misleading as it refers to recruitment agencies currently registered by 
MoM. However, experts explained that at the local level, individuals with an expired or cancelled 
license number still operate and it is difficult for prospective workers or civil society organizations 
172  NOTES
to identify if the agency is genuine; the list is available on the BNP2TKI site (http://www.bnp2tki.
go.id/pptkis.html) but is updated infrequently. In practice, many more recruitment agencies are in 
operation, whether legally or not.
67. Criteria for a recruitment agency to obtain a license are: Formation as a limited liability 
company (PT); paid-up capital in the company of at least 3 billion rupiah (around US $315,000); 
payment of a deposit to the ministry of 500 million rupiah ($52,000); and, at least a three-year plan 
for the placement and protection of migrant workers abroad, including possession of a training 
unit, and the facilities and infrastructure to place workers. MoM Regulation 10/2009 concerning 
Procedures for Granting, Extending and Withdrawing a License for Recruitment of Indonesian 
Migrant Workers, PER.10/MEN/V/2009, May 7, 2009. 
68. In late 2011, for example, the Ministry withdrew the licenses of 28 recruitment agencies after 
finding serious violations. The most common violation was sending migrant workers to countries 
for which there was a moratorium, including Saudi Arabia. Other violations included holding a 
worker in a placement center for many months and not sending him or her abroad, and falsifying 
training documents. See Serambi Indonesia. 2011. “Kemenakertrans Cabut Ijin 28 PPTKIS Nakal” 
[“The Ministry of Manpower Withdraws License from 28 Naughty Recruitment Agencies”]. Serambi.
news.com, November 7, 2011. http://aceh.tribunnews.com/m/index.php/2011/11/07/kemenaker-
trans-cabut-ijin-28-pptkis-nakal.
69. Law 39/2004, Article 1(6).
70. Ibid, Article 1(8).
71. Ibid, Article 25. See also Government Regulation 3/2013 concerning Protection of Indonesian 
Migrant Workers Abroad, January 2, 2013.
72. Government Regulation 5/2013 Concerning Procedures for Evaluating and Appointing Busi-
ness Partners and Individual Employers, January 2, 2013. See explanatory notes for discussion of 
role of Business Partners.
73. Government Regulation 3/2013 concerning Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers 
Abroad, January 2, 2013.
74. MoM Regulation 14/2010, Article 11(1).
75. Law 39/2004, Article 34(1).
76. MoM Regulation 14/2010, Articles 10–11.
77. Ibid, Article 11(2).
78. Law 39/2004, Article 34(3).
79. Law 39/2004, Article 41; MoM Regulation 14/2010, Article 22.
80. More detail about the content of the training is provided by Minister of Manpower Decree 
23/2009 concerning Information and Training for Prospective Indonesian Migrant Workers Over-
seas, NOMOR PER.23/MEN/IX/2009, September 30, 2009. This decree does not adopt an empow-
ering approach to training, defining the training as “a process of work training that gives, obtains, 
increases and develops work competency, productivity, discipline, attitude and a work ethic, increas-
ing skills and specialized knowledge according to the scale and qualifications necessary for the 
position.” (Article 1(3)).
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: INDONESIA  173
81. MoM Regulation 14/2010, Article 22; MoM Regional 23/2009 concerning Education and 
Training for Prospective Overseas Workers, PER.23/MEN/IX/200930, September 2009.
82. MoM Regulation 14/2010, Article 37(2).
83. Law 39/2004, Article 69(2).
84. Ibid, Article 69(3).
85. MoM Regulation 14/2010, Article 31.
86. Many studies have documented and critiqued the training center model. See for example 
Lindquist, who notes that women are confined before departure so that they don’t fall pregnant or 
change their minds before departure: Lindquist J. 2010. “Labour Recruitment, Circuits of Capital 
and Gender Mobility: Reconceptualizing the Indonesian Migration Industry.” Pacific Affairs 83, 
no. 1, pp. 115–132.
87. BNP2TKI. 2012. Recapitulation of migrant worker returns (2006–May 2012), June 11, 2012. 
Jakarta: BNP2TKI. 
88. It is not possible to determine whether the numbers of returned workers reporting problems 
per country are proportionate to the number of workers returning from those countries, as the 
numbers of returns by destination country is presently unavailable (i.e., it is possible that 80 percent 
of returns from Jakarta are workers from the Middle East for example and other workers return 
through other ports). However, given that only around one third to one half of migrant workers are 
placed in the Middle East, the large proportion of problems (75 percent) reported by migrants upon 
return indicate that workers to these countries report more problems than those to the Asia Pacific. 
Further analysis of government data in this area would be valuable. See BNP2TKI. “Kepulangan 
TKI Di BPK TKI Selapajang” [“Migrant Worker Returns through Selapajang Terminal”] (2006–31 
May 2012) http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/statistik-penempatan/statistik-kepulangan/6762-kepulangan-
tki-di-bpk-tki-selapajang-2006-31-mei-2012.html.
89. BNP2TKI [n.d.] Reports per Country, July 2011–June 2012.
90. Ibid.
91. Abdullah, A. 2009. “Kuwait Outraged at Indonesia Domestic Help Ban.” Al Arabiya 
News, October 29, 2009. http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/8429-bnp2tki-sudah-
pulangkan-7653-tkib-suriah-ke-daerah-asal.html. Hitipeuw, J. 2011. “Indonesia’s Gov’t Moratorium 
on Dispatch of Migrant Workers to Jordan.” Kompas, December 19, 2011. http://english.kompas.
com/read/2011/12/19/08275753/Indonesias.Govt.Moratorium.on.Dispatch.of.Migrant.Workers.
to.Jordan; and “Indonesian Ban on Workers to Saudi Arabia.” Al Jazeera, June 23, 2011. http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2011/06/201162383559495252.html.
92. BNP2TKI. 2013. BNP2TKI has brought 7,653 Indonesian migrant workers back to their 
home regions. http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/8429-bnp2tki-sudah-pulangkan-
7653-tkib-suriah-ke-daerah-asal.html.
93. See e.g., a review of all of the migrant worker cases received at a local legal clinic: Hilmy, 
U. 2011. “Pelanggaran dan perlindungan hukum tenaga kerja perempuan di kabupaten malang” 
[“Violations and Legal Protection for Female Migrant Workers in Malang”]. Gajah Madah University 
Journal of Law 23: 566–581.  
94. Law 39/2004, Article 8.
174  NOTES
95. Ibid, Article 9.
96. Regional Regulation of Sumbawa District 21/2007 concerning Protection and Guidance of 
Indonesian Migrant Workers, August 1, 2007.
97. For a study of Perda regulating migrant work in Indonesia, see Bachtiar, P.P. 2011. The 
Governance of Indonesian Overseas Employment in the Context of Decentralization. Manila: Philippine 
Institute for Development Studies.
98. Law 39/1999 concerning Human Rights, Article 7.
99. According to IOM, these include agreements with the Republic of Korea, (government-to-
government (G-to-G) via the Employment Permit System), Jordan (revised, signed March 2008); 
Kuwait (in the process of being renewed, being separated into formal and informal sectors); Taiwan 
Province of China; United Arab Emirates (dated December 18, 2007, for the formal sector); Qatar 
(signed on January 21, 2008); Australia (Government-to-Private Sector); and Malaysia (2 MOUs: 
one covering formal sector workers and the other covering domestic workers). International 
Organization for Migration. 2010. Labour Migration from Indonesia: An Overview. Jakarta: Interna-
tional Organization for Migration. 
100. For example, the U.S. Embassy noted that the Qatar MOU provides for a joint committee on 
labor cooperation to seek possible employment opportunities in Qatar for Indonesian workers, but 
the MOU is not public and an Indonesian Embassy official in Doha reported in 2008 that he had 
not seen the agreement. The U.S. embassy official noted his belief that Qatari agreements are little 
more then window-dressing to address the often appalling expatriate labor situation in Qatar. United 
States Embassy in Doha. 2008. Qatar’s bilateral labor agreements-all pomp and no circumstance. 
Confidential cable; Wikileaks, February 4, 2008. http://dazzlepod.com/cable/08DOHA88/.
101. MoM Regulation 14/2010, Article 3.
102. MoM Regulation 14/2010, Article 9(2).
103. Government Regulation 3/2013, Article 29.
104. Law 39/2004, Articles 52(4) and 53.
105. Although this is a widely held view, it is possible that brokers might be considered “agents” 
of recruiters and thus indirectly subject to regulation. As noted earlier, this area warrants further 
study and potentially litigation to test the law on recruiters and their relationship to their agents.
106. Explanatory notes to Article 52(2)(f), Law 39/2004.
107. See also examples on blogs, such as “Doglosss.” 2010. Perjanjian Penempatan TKI – Sin-
gapura [Placement Agreement – Singapore], Jakarta: Maju Makmur Blog. http://doglosss.blogspot.
com/2010/11/perjanjian-penempatan-tki-singapura.html.
108. Law 39/2004, Article 52(2)(j).
109. See generally, Lev D. 2000. “Legal Aid in Indonesia.” In Legal Evolution and Political Authority 
in Indonesia: Selected Essays, 283–304.The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
110. See the website of the Legal Aid Foundation: http://www.ylbhi.or.id
111. Interview with Pratiwi Febry, Jakarta Legal Aid, Jakarta, January 27, 2012.
112. Interview with Haris Aritonang, private legal practitioner, Jakarta, January 2012.
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: INDONESIA  175
113. Law 16/2011 concerning Legal Aid, November 2, 2011.
114. Law 16/2011, Article 3.
115. Agustinus Supriyanto, Komnas Perempuan, written comments provided to the authors, June 
24, 2013.
116. BNP2TKI. 2011. Standard Operating Procedure: Complaints Service System for Prospective 
Workers/ Workers Abroad and In-Country. Jakarta: BNP2TKI.
117. Hilmy, U. 2008. “Pemberdayaan perempuan di kabupaten malang untuk memperoleh hak 
atas akses dan kontrol pada penghasilan proses bermigrasi ke Hong Kong” [“Empowerment of 
Women in Malang for Realizing Rights to Access and Control the Benefits of Migration to Hong 
Kong”]. Rechtidee Law Journal 3:  93–101. 
118. Interview with Jihun, SBMI Indramayu, Jakarta, May 22, 2012.
119. Mother of a migrant worker, focus group, Brebes, May 7, 2012.
120. Interview with Roma Hidayat, ADBMI Lotim, East Lombok, June 10, 2012.
121. Law 39/2004, Article 85(2).
122. Interview with Eddy Purwanto, Legal Advisor, TIFA Foundation, Jakarta, June 24, 2012.
123. Interview with Oscar Abdulrachman, Case-Handling Division, and Berry Komarudzaman 
SH, director of Overseas Manpower Placement, Ministry of Manpower, Jakarta, July 27, 2012.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. Interview with Sukardi, Placement and Case-Handling Section, Manpower Office of Malang 
District, East Java, April 18, 2012.
127. See BNP2TKI webpage. 2011. TKI Complaints Service (Call Center). BNP2TKI, June 27, 
2011. http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/4786-pelayanan-pengaduan-tki-call-center-
bnp2tki-.html. 
128. BNP2TKI. 2012. Dalam Setahun Crisis Center BNP2TKI Selesaikan 2.714 Kasus TKI [In one 
year BNP2TKI Crisis Center resolves 2,714 cases]. BNP2TKI, June 27, 2012.
129. BNP2TKI . 2012.  Crisis Center BNP2TKI Resolves 4,577 TKI Cases. BNP2TKI, December 
10, 2012. http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/7684-crisis-center-bnp2tki-selesaikan-
4577-kasus-tki-.html.
130. Indonesian Embassy in Riyadh. Mechanism for protection assistance. http://www.kemlu.
go.id/riyadh/Pages/ServiceDisplay.aspx?IDP=1&l=id. 
131. Indonesian Embassy in Riyadh. 2009. Online Complaint Form: http://www.kemlu.go.id/
riyadh/Pages/FormulirPengaduanOnline.aspx.
132. Interview with Mutmainah, Peguyuban Jinggo Putri, Malang, April 26, 2012.
133. Interview with Pratiwi Febri, Jakarta Legal Aid, Jakarta, January 27, 2012. Note that techni-
cally BNP2TKI is answerable directly to the president rather than the Ministry of Manpower, and 
so is not technically “below” the ministry. However, only the Ministry of Manpower has the power 
to sanction recruitment agencies.
176  NOTES
134. Law 37/2008 concerning the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia. 
135. For information on the Ombudsman’s role and functions, see Ombudsman’s website, 
Ombudsman of the Republiic of Indonesia. http://www.ombudsman.go.id. 
136. BNP2TKI, Standard Operating Procedure: Complaints Service System for Prospective Work-
ers/ Workers Abroad and In-Country, 2011; and Head of BNP2TKI, Regulation 13/2012 concerning 
Protection Services Standards for Prospective/Current Migrant Workers (PER 13/KA/VII/2012), July 
2012. This regulation was originally adopted in a more informal document in 2010.
137. Head of BNP2TKI, Regulation 13/2012, Chapter 5, Part A.
138. Interview with Oscar Abdulrachman, Case-Handling Division, and Berry Komarudzaman 
SH, Director of Overseas Manpower Placement, Ministry of Manpower, Jakarta, July 27, 2012.
139. Court-based mediation was formalized only recently by Supreme Court of Indonesia Regula-
tion (Perma) 2/2008 concerning Court Mediation Procedures. The regulation states in the preamble 
that “Mediation is a conflict resolution process that is faster and cheaper and can increase access 
to parties to find a resolution that is satisfying and fulfils a sense of justice.”
140. Head of BNP2TKI, Regulation 13/2012 concerning Protection Services Standards for Pro-
spective/Current Migrant Workers (PER 13/KA/VII/2012), July 2012.
141. See discussion on Private Recruitment Agencies in Section 3B.
142. Interview with Henry Prayitno, crisis center coordinator at BNP2TKI, Jakarta, June 25, 2012. 
143. Sukardi, Placement and Case-Handling Section, Manpower Office of Malang District, East 
Java, Malang, April 8, 2012; Budi Rahmawan, Placement Section, Manpower Office of Brebes District, 
Central Java, May 7, 2012; Adi Satria, Industrial and Labor Oversight Section, Office of Manpower, 
Indramayu District, West Java, May 22, 2012; Tohari Waluyo and Syaiful Wathan, Placement and 
Oversight Sections, Office of Manpower, East Lombok, June 11, 2012; and Sukarwandi Kaidun and 
Ade Kurnia, Placement Section, Manpower Office of Sukabumi District, West Java, Sukabumi, June 
28, 2012. 
144. Head of BNP2TKI, Regulation 13/2012, p. 15.
145. Interview with Retno Dewi, ATKI Jakarta, Jakarta, June 23, 2012.
146. Law 39/2004, Article 1.
147. Erman Suparno, Indonesian Minister of Labor and Transmigration. 2008. Kebijakan dan 
strategi penempatan tenaga kerja Indonesia di luar negeri [Policies and Strategies for the Placement 
of Indonesian Migrant Workers Abroad], March 27, 2008. Jakarta: Indonesia National Secretariat.
148. MoM Decree Kep-92/Men/1998 concerning the Protection of Indonesian Manpower Abroad 
Through Insurance.
149. “[T]he current system of supervision and regulation of insurance for migrant workers is 
ineffective. This results in regulatory duplication in some areas; contradictory interpretations of 
claims; policy exclusions that contradict regulations; the revocation of licenses by different agencies; 
and gaps in supervision.” The World Bank. 2010. Enhancing access to finance for Indonesia overseas 
migrant workers: Evidence from a survey of three provinces. Jakarta: The World Bank.
150. Interview with Oscar Abdulrachman, Case-Handling Division, and Berry Komarudzaman 
SH, Director of Overseas Manpower Placement, Ministry of Manpower, Jakarta, July 27, 2012.
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: INDONESIA  177
151. Herman Sina. MA Batalkan Permenakertrans Tentang Asuransi TKI [Supreme Court 
Invalidates Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Regulation Concerning Migrant Worker 
Insurance]. Jurnas, August 1, 2013. Available at: http://www.jurnas.com/news/102119/MA_
Batalkan_Permenakertrans_Tentang_Asuransi_TKI/1/Nasional/Hukum.
152. Friska Yolandha. OJK Bekukan Konsorsium Asuransi TKI [OJK Freezes Migrant Worker 
Insurance Consortium]. Republika Online. July 15, 2013. Available at: http://www.republika.co.id/
berita/ekonomi/keuangan/13/07/15/mpyyu0-ojk-bekukan-konsorsium-asuransi-tki [last accessed 
September 6, 2013].
153. Tempo.co, Ini Daftar Asuransi TKI pada Konsorsium Baru [List of Migrant Worker Insurers 
in New Consortium]. Tempo.co Bisnis, August 1, 2013.
154. MoM Regulation 14/2010, Article 45.
155. Law 2/1992 concerning Insurance Business, ratified on February 11, 1992, Chapter 10: Guid-
ance and Oversight.
156. The insurance law is not mentioned on the Proteksi website. Konsorsium Proteksi. 2010. 
Tentang kami [about us]. http://asuransi.tki.car.co.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&
id=22&Itemid=45.
157. Minister of Manpower Decision 209/2010 concerning Appointment of One Consor-
tium, Proteksi Insurance (209/MEN/IX/2010), September 6, 2010. Note that an association of 
recruitment agencies (HIMSATAKI) challenged the appointment of a single consortium under 
Kepmen 209/2010 as a violation of insurance law, and laws outlawing monopolies. The Supreme 
Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to review the appointment because it was a 
personal decision of the minister, rather than a law. See Supreme Court of Indonesia, Himsataki v. 
Minister of Manpower and Transmigration, Decision 61 P/HUM/ 2010. 
158. During the period of this study, the ten consortium members were: PT ACA (Consor-
tium head), PT Asuransi Umum Mega, PT Asuransi Harta Aman Pratama, PT Asuransi Tugu 
Kresna Pratama, PT Asuransi LIG, PT Asuransi Raya, PT Asuransi Ramayana, PT Asuransi 
Purna Artanugraha, PT Asuransi Tafakul Keluarga and PT Asuransi Relife. Konsorsium Proteksi 
Homepage: http://asuransi.tki.car.co.id/index.php. “PT” in Indonesia denotes a private company. 
159. Konsorsium Proteksi Page: http://www.proteksi-tki.com/index.php.
160. MoM Regulation 7/2010, Article 14.
161. Commission IX, Parliament of Indonesia. (2013) Recommendations of the Working Commit-
tee on the TKI Insurance Consortium, April17, 2013. : http://politik.kompasiana.com/2013/04/17/
rekomendasi-panitia-kerja-konsorsium-asuransi-tki-komisi-ix-dpr-ri-551970.html.
162. Arif Minardi, member of DPR Commission IX, addressing the Commission, Jakarta, June 
19, 2012, quoted in BNP2TKI press release, “BNP2TKI (2012) Commission IX calls for the Dis-
solution of the Migrant Worker Insurance Consortium,” June 19, 2012:http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/
berita-mainmenu-231/6852-komisi-ix-dpr-wacanakan-pembubaran-konsorsium-asuransi-proteksi-
tki.html.
163. Ibid.
164. Definition of Brokerage Company, Regulation 7/2010 section 1.
178  NOTES
165. Christine Novita Nabebam. 2011. “Association of Insurance Brokers of Indonesia Explains 
Migrant Worker Broker’s Commission of up to 50% of Premium.” Kontan News, September 20, 
2011.  http://keuangan.kontan.co.id/news/abai-memaklumi-soal-komisi-broker-asuransi-tki-hingga-
50-dari-premi-1. 
166. Isa Rachmatarwata, head of the Insurance Bureau at the Ministry of Finance, speaking to 
the DPR Standing Committee IX, September 10, 2012. Quoted in Siahaan, C. 2012. “Ministry of 
Finances Evaluates the Role of Brokers in Migrant Worker Insurance.” Inilah.com News, September 
10, 2012. http://ekonomi.inilah.com/read/detail/1903158/kemenkeu-evaluasi-peran-broker-di-
asuransi-tki. 
167. The Jakarta Post. 2013. “Misappropriation in Workers’ Insurance Funds.” The Jakarta 
Post, July 16, 2013. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/07/16/misappropriation-workers-
insurance-funds.html
168. Proteksi Consortium.   2010. Migrant worker standard insurance policy. http://asuransi.tki.
car.co.id/Polis%20Induk%20Asuransi%20Tenaga%20Kerja%20Indonesia%20-%2001.96910%20
-%20PROTEKSI%20TKI.pdf. 
169. MoM Regulation 7/2010, Articles 23 and 25.
170. World Bank Indonesia, International Finance Corporation Indonesia. 2012. Improving 
IOMW’s Protection Scheme: Review on [sic] Asuransi TKI. Presentation to the National Seminar 
on Indonesian Overseas Migrant Worker’s Insurance, Jakarta, June 25, 2012 (World Bank & IFC 
Review of Migrant Worker Insurance).
171. Isa Rachmatarwata, head of the Insurance Bureau at the Ministry of Finance, speaking to 
the DPR Standing Committee IX, September 10, 2012, quoted in Siahaan, C. 2012. “The Migrant 
Worker Insurance Program Has Many Weaknesses.” Inilah.com News, September 10, 2012. http://
ekonomi.inilah.com/read/detail/1903361/asuransi-tki-miliki-banyak-kelemahan.
172. World Bank & IFC Review of Migrant Worker Insurance.
173. MoM Regulation 1/2010, Article 1(3), adding a new Article 41A to MoM Regulation 7/2010 
Concerning Insurance.
174. The exception to this is if the employer wishes to extend the worker’s contract after two years 
have expired. In this case, the employer is responsible for paying the insurance premium. Ministry 
of Labor Regulation 14/Men/X/2010, ss. 28–29.
175. It can result in one to five years in prison or a fine of between IDR one and five billion 
(Article 103).
176. MoM Regulation 7/2010, Article 15.
177. MoM Regulation 7/2010, Article 16.
178. Ibid, Articles 16(4) and 16(5).
179. Proteksi Insurance Consortium. Standard Insurance Policy, Proteksi. http://asuransi.tki.car.
co.id/Polis%20Induk%20Asuransi%20Tenaga%20Kerja%20Indonesia%20-%2001.96910%20
-%20PROTEKSI%20TKI.pdf. 
180. MoM Regulation 7/2010, Article 26(1).
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: INDONESIA  179
181. Ibid, Article 26(2).
182. Ibid, Article 26(4), as amended by MoM Regulation 1/2012.
183. Ibid, Article 27.
184. Bambang Sarjito, director of PT Gracia Media Utama Insurance, insurance broker for 
migrant workers between 2006–2010, Jakarta, June 27, 2012.
185. Interview with Henry Prayitno, crisis center coordinator at BNP2TKI, Jakarta, June 25, 2012. 
“Fine print” details that could be important for the worker to know are, for example, the 12-month 
limit on making a claim from the time the loss occurred.
186. Commission IX. 2013. Recommendations of the Working Committee on the TKI Insurance 
Consortium, Parliament of Indonesia, April 17, 2013 (citing BNP2TKI). http://politik.kompasiana.
com/2013/04/17/rekomendasi-panitia-kerja-konsorsium-asuransi-tki-komisi-ix-dpr-ri-551970.html.
187. Law Online. “Humphrey Djemat: A Lawyer Fighting for Migrant Workers.” http://www.
hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt519241932d5b5/humphrey-djemat-br-mencetak-advokat-pejuang-
melalui-tki.
188. Interview with Cahyo Subagyo, SBMI Brebes, Brebes, May 6, 2012.
189. Interview with Roma Hidayat, ADBMI Lotim, East Lombok, June 10, 2012.
190. BNP2TKI found that in 2010 14,854 claims were submitted and 8,124 were accepted, while 
in 2011 15,874 claims were submitted and 8,269 were accepted. See BNP2TKI. 2012. Commission 
IX Calls for the Dissolution of the Migrant Worker Insurance Consortium, June 19, 2012. http://
www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/6852-komisi-ix-dpr-wacanakan-pembubaran-konsorsium-
asuransi-proteksi-tki.html.
191. Commission IX. 2013. Recommendations of the Working Committee on the TKI Insurance 
Consortium,  Parliament of Indonesia, April 17, 2013.  http://politik.kompasiana.com/2013/04/17/
rekomendasi-panitia-kerja-konsorsium-asuransi-tki-komisi-ix-dpr-ri-551970.html.
192. Interview with Nurharsono and Badriyah, Migrant Care, Jakarta, June 28, 2012.
193. Interview with Roma Hidayat, ADBMI Lotim, East Lombok, June 10, 2012.
194. This means that the law is codified and judges apply the law as it exists, rather than creating 
new law. Precedent is persuasive but not binding. For an overview of the civil law system, see Apple, 
J., and R. Deyling. 1995. A Primer on the Civil Law System. Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center. 
195. As an example, in 2010 recruitment agencies challenged in the Mahkmah Agung the Minister 
of Manpower’s decision in 2010 (KEP – 209/MEN/IX/2010) to have only one insurance consortium. 
The Mahkmah Agung held that the decision was not a “regulation” but a “determination” and 
therefore was not within its jurisdiction. Mahkmah Agung Republik Indonesia, Decision 61/P/
HUM/2010.
196. Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945, as amended, Article 24(2).
197. The constitutional court was an important addition to the system in the reformasi period. The 
court is responsible for hearing all cases, at the first and final level, “in reviewing laws against the 
constitution, determining disputes over the authority of state institutions whose powers are given 
by this constitution, deciding over the dissolution of political parties, and deciding disputes over the 
180  NOTES
results of general elections.” Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945, as amended, article 
24C. 
198. These include religious affairs courts, dealing with family and probate matters for Muslims, 
military tribunals, and state administrative courts.
199. See generally International Labour Organization. 2005. Major Labour Laws of Indonesia. 
Jakarta: International Labour Organization. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@asia/@
ro-bangkok/@ilo-jakarta/documents/publication/wcms_120126.pdf. 
200. Responsibility for appointments to the courts was given to the independent Judicial Com-
mission (Komisi Yudisial), with approval by the legislature (DPR). See the Judicial Commission of 
the Republic of Indonesia website, “History of Establishment”: http://www.komisiyudisial.go.id/
statis-14-sejarah-pembentukan.html.
201. In addition to the creation of the Constitutional Court and an Ad Hoc Human Rights Court 
for crimes against humanity, the legislature has shifted organizational, administrative, and finan-
cial responsibility for the lower courts away from the executive branch (the Department of Justice 
and Human Rights, Department of Religious Affairs, and Department of Defense) to the Supreme 
Court.  See Law 4/2004 on Judicial Powers repealing Law 14/1974 as amended by Law No 35/1999.
202. Transparency International. Corruption by country 2010-2011 – Indonesia. http://www.
transparency.org/country#IDN_PublicOpinion.
203. See for example, Al Jazeera. 2012. “Indonesia’s Justice System,” Al Jazeera, March 1, 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101east/2012/02/2012221142341411535.html.
204. The Indonesian Penal Code is based on the Dutch colonial criminal code of 1915, the Wetboek 
van Strafrechtvoor Indonesia. 
205. All of these codes set out the crime and the maximum penalty if found guilty, usually com-
prising a penal sentence and a fine.
206. For KUHP provision and regulations relevant to migrant workers, see generally Hamim, A., 
and R. Rosenberg. 2003. Review of Indonesian legislation. In Trafficking of Women and Children in 
Indonesia, 195–215. Indonesia: International Catholic Migration Commission Indonesia.  
207. The offense is now punishable by up to five years imprisonment or maximum IDR 
500,000,000 (US$52,000) fine.
208. Law 6 of 2011 on Immigration, Articles 126 and 127. This law replaced the earlier Law 9 
of 1992 and according to the explanation, is intended to bring Indonesia’s system into the third 
millennium and the era of globalization of trade and labor, as well as to combat transnational 
organized crime and the irregular movement of migrants.
209. Law 21/2007 on Combating Trafficking in Persons.
210. The trafficking offense carries a sentence of three to fifteen years. The same sentence applies 
for sending a child abroad for the purpose of exploitation by any means (Law 21/2007, Article 6).
211. Interview with Nurharsono and Badriyah, Migrant Care, Jakarta, June 28, 2012.
212. The KUHAP, unlike the KUHP, was significantly updated by the Suharto regime in 1981, 
replacing the earlier Dutch procedural law.
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: INDONESIA  181
213. Interview with Oscar Abdulrachman, Case-Handling Division of the Ministry of Manpower, 
Jakarta, July 27, 2012.
214. Interview with Eddy Purwanto, legal advisor, TIFA Foundation, Jakarta, June 24, 2012.
215. Ibid.
216. Interview with Jihun, SBMI Indramayu, and Eddy Purwanto, legal advisor, TIFA Foundation, 
Jakarta, June 24, 2012.
217. Interview with Roma Hidayat, ADBMI Lotim, East Lombok, June 10, 2012.
218. Interview with Oscar Abdulrachman, Case-Handling Division, and Berry Komarudzaman 
SH, director of Overseas Manpower Placement, Ministry of Manpower, Jakarta, July 27, 2012. 
219. The Civil Code in Indonesia was introduced by the Dutch in 1847 and is based on the Napo-
leonic civil code. Except for discrete sections that have been superseded by later legislation, such as 
family law, mortgage law, and bankruptcy law, the Civil Code is still largely intact.
220. Interview with Pratiwi Febri, Jakarta Legal Aid, Jakarta, January 27, 2012.
221. In 2003, Presidential Decision 108/2003 specified the tasks of both embassies and consu-
lates, including the provision of legal and material assistance to Indonesian citizens in distress. 
Embassies are tasked with “representing and defending the interests of the nation, state and gov-
ernment” of Indonesia, as well as “protecting the citizens of Indonesia,” including through “guard-
ianship, care, protection and legal and material assistance to Indonesian Nationals in the event of 
threats and/or legal problems in the destination country.” Consulates have the same overall role for 
defending the interests/Indonesia and Indonesians abroad.
222. Presidential Instruction 6/2006, Policy for the Reform of the System of Placement and 
Protection for Indonesian Migrant Workers, August 2, 2006.
223. MoFA Regulation 4/2008 concerning Services to Citizens at Foreign Missions of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia; and Guideline on Providing Services to and Protection of Indonesian Citizens 
Abroad. 
224. MoM Regulation 12/2011 concerning Labour Attaches and Technical Labour Staff in Missions 
of the Indonesian Government Abroad, 12/MEN/X/2011.
225. Ibid, Articles 7(e) and (f). Focus group participants who remembered contacting the embassy 
were unclear as to whether they spoke to diplomatic or labor attaché staff, so in this section all are 
described as simply “embassy staff.”
226. Government Regulation 3/2013 concerning Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers 
Abroad, January 2, 2013, Article 16.
227. Ibid, Article 25.
228. The Embassy in Saudi Arabia has also developed a comprehensive procedure for handling 
cases in the Kingdom which it has made available on its website: http://www.kemlu.go.id/riyadh/
Pages/TipsOrIndonesiaGlanceDisplay.aspx?IDP=4&l=id.
229. MoFA Website. 2009. Pelayanan Perlindungan WNI & BHI [Citizen Services]. http://www.
kemlu.go.id/Pages/ServiceDisplay.aspx?IDP=1&l=id.
182  NOTES
230. MoFA Guideline on Providing Services to and Protection of Indonesian Citizens Abroad, p. 71.
231. Ibid.
232. Directorate of Citizen Services. 2011. “Migrant Workers between National Asset and National 
Image.” Tabloid Diplomasi, September 15 –October 14, 2011, at p. 4.
233. Interview with Sri Palupi, Institute for ECOSOC Rights, Jakarta, January 27, 2012.
234. Interview with Tatang Boedi Utama Razak, director of Citizen Services, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Jakarta, June 26, 2012.
235. Female migrant worker, focus group, Malang, East Java, April 12, 2012.
236. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261.
237. Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Riyadh. 2011. KBRI Riyadh Kecam Pelaksanaan 
Eksekusi Hukuman Mati Ruyati [“Indonesian Embassy in Riyadh Denounces Execution of Ruyati”]. 
Cabinet Secretariat of Indonesia Website, June 21, 2011. http://www.setkab.go.id/international-
2088-kbri-riyadh-kecam- -eksekusi-hukuman-mati-ruyati.html; and Hidayati, N. 2011. Kronologi 
Pemancungan Ruyati [“Chronology of Beheading of Ruyati”]. Detik News, June 19, 2011. http://news.
detik.com/read/2011/06/19/124055/1663347/10/kronologi-pemancungan-ruyati.
238. Interview with Humphrey Djemat, spokesperson for the Task Force on Indonesian Citizens/
Migrant Workers Threatened with the Death Sentence Abroad, Jakarta, June 26, 2012.
239. Directorate of Citizen Services. 2011. “Migrant Workers between National Asset and National 
Image.” Tabloid Diplomasi, September 15 –October 14, 2011, at p. 4.
240. Interview with Jamaluddin, civil society representative on the SATGAS TKI, Jakarta, January 
28, 2012.
241. Ibid.
242. The description of the court given by Roma appears similar to an employment tribunal where 
parties represent themselves and negotiate an outcome.
243. Directorate of Citizen Services. 2011. “Migrant Workers between National Asset and National 
Image.” Tabloid Diplomasi, September 15 –October 14, 2011, at p. 4. 
244. Saudi Gazette. 2012. “Jakarta Seeks ILO Cover for Its Domestic Workers.” February 26, 2012. 
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20120226118340.
245. Interview with Irwan Rosadi and Made Bagus Surajaya, Recruitment Agency PT Abdillah 
Putra Tamala, Jakarta, June 22, 2012.
246. Interview with Sukardi, Placement and Case-Handling Section, Manpower Office of Malang 
District, East Java, April 18, 2012.
247. Interview with Nurharsono and Badriyah, Migrant Care, Jakarta, June 28, 2012.
248. Interview with Jihun SBMI Indramayu, Jakarta, June 24, 2012.
249. “Then the case will come to us. We will go to the agency and demand they release them or 
we will report it to the police, but if we don’t accompany the worker she will have to pay. This is the 
crazy situation in Indonesia.” Interview with Eddy Purwanto, TIFA Foundation, Jakarta, June 24, 
2012.
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: INDONESIA  183
250. Interview with Eddy Purwanto, legal advisor, TIFA Foundation, Jakarta, June 24, 2012.
251. Interview with Office of Manpower, Sukabumi, June 28, 2012.
252. Interview with Mr Irwan Rosadi and Made Bagus Surajaya, Recruitment Agency PT Abdillah 
Putra Tamala, Jakarta, June 22, 2012.
253. MoM Regulation 1/2012.
254. Interview with Mutmainah, Paguyuban Jinggo Putri, Malang, April 26, 2012.
255. Female migrant worker, focus group, Lombok Timor, June 10, 2012.
256. Law 16/2011 concerning Legal Aid, November 2, 2011.
257. Interview with Jamaluddin, civil society representative on the SATGAS TKI, Jakarta, January 
28, 2012.
258. Interview with Pratiwi Febri, Jakarta Legal Aid, Jakarta, January 27, 2012. 
259. Interview with Sukardi, Placement and Case-Handling Section, Manpower Office of Malang 
District, East Java, April 18, 2012.
260. Interview with Eddy Purwanto, legal advisor, TIFA Foundation, Jakarta, June 24, 2012.
Open Society Foundations 
The Open Society Foundations work to build vibrant and tolerant democracies whose 
governments are accountable to their citizens. Working with local communities in more 
than 100 countries, the Open Society Foundations support justice and human rights, 
freedom of expression, and access to public health and education.
www.soros.org
Migrant Worker Access to Justice Project
This report was produced by the Migrant Worker Access to Justice Project. The Project 
examines and seeks to strengthen the legal frameworks that underpin low-wage labor 
migration, so as to better protect the rights of migrant workers and ensure redress 
for workers whose rights are violated. It is currently focused on the under-examined 
role of countries of origin in ensuring justice for labor migrants and private sector 
accountability, with a focus on the Asia-Middle East corridor.
The Migrant Worker Access to Justice Project is an applied research collaboration 
between law professors at the University of New South Wales Law School and the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, who work closely with local partners  in South 
and South East Asia. It is led by Bassina Farbenblum (Director of the Australian Human 
Rights Centre’s Migrant and Refugee Rights Project, and the Human Rights Clinic at 
UNSW Law), Eleanor Taylor- Nicholson (Fellow of the Australian Human Rights Centre 
at UNSW), and Sarah Paoletti (Director of the Transnational Legal Clinic, Penn Law 
School).  
www.migrantworkerjustice.org
International Migration Initiative
The International Migration Initiative (IMI) designs and supports initiatives to reform 
the most abusive aspects of the migration process. The program organizes its work 
around migration corridors, pursuing coordinated action in countries of origin, transit, 
and destination. IMI seeks to achieve two specific goals: (1) that labor migration is a 
safe, just, and non-exploitative process, and (2) that laws, policies, and practices do 
not discriminate against migrants or violate their rights. To achieve these, IMI targets 
employment practices and recruitment systems to improve labor protections, migration 
enforcement policies to reduce rights violations by ensuring that immigration and 
border controls comply with human rights norms, and governance structures to 
establish systems that more effectively protect the rights of migrants. IMI draws on 
the experience and activism of grassroots organizations while simultaneously and 
vigorously engaging with policymakers and political leaders.
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/programs/international-migration-initiative
Tifa Foundation
Tifa Foundation is a grant-making organization that strives to build an open society by 
actively strengthening civil society in Indonesia. Since 2012, Tifa has been dedicated to 
advancing quality democracy in Indonesia. Tifa Foundation’s vision is a society in which 
citizens, businesses and the government promote good governance, nurture solidarity 
and support individual rights, particularly the rights and views of women, minorities, 
and other disadvantaged groups. Tifa works to promote an open society in Indonesia, 
one which respects diversity and honors the rule of law, justice, and equality.
www.tifafoundation.org




Each year, around half a million Indonesians travel abroad 
to work, half of those to the Middle East. They are typically 
women from small cities or villages with primary education 
and limited work experience, hired to perform domestic work. 
Many suffer abuse and exploitation but have virtually no 
access to recourse within their host country’s legal system. 
The vulnerability of migrant workers abroad makes it crucial 
for them to be able to seek redress in their own countries. 
Access to justice at home also allows for redress when home 
governments and private recruitment businesses breach 
their legal responsibilities to migrant workers.
Migrant Workers’ Access to Justice at Home: Indonesia is the 
first comprehensive study of migrant workers’ access to 
justice in their country of origin. The report analyses the 
mechanisms through which migrant workers may access 
justice in Indonesia, and the systemic barriers that prevent 
most workers from receiving full redress for harms that they 
suffer before, during, and after their work abroad. 
The report also outlines the laws, policies, and procedures 
that govern the operation of each redress mechanism, and 
contains recommendations for improving access to justice 
and private sector accountability in 11 key areas, addressed 
to government, parliament, civil society, donors, and others. 
Migrant Workers’ Access to Justice at Home: Indonesia provides 
a strong evidence-based foundation for advocacy and law 
reform within Indonesia and globally. It can also function 
as a guide for civil society groups in Indonesia to better 
understand, use, and test existing justice mechanisms to 
enforce migrant workers’ rights.
